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Walter Lippmann’s classic work, Public Opinion, crystallized thinking about the 
dynamic relationship between the press and public opinion, and clarified the role of each 
in democracy. Evaluations of that book, however, tend to be one-dimensional. Public 
Opinion captured just one iteration of his thinking on the subject, not his final statement 
on the matter. A comprehensive survey of his writing reveals Lippmann’s views on the 
press and public opinion were not static, yet the attention Public Opinion receives 
continues to overshadow his other works; his evolving views on the press and public 
opinion are rarely mentioned. Although his views shifted in significant ways over the 
decades, those changes hewed to a familiar set of issues and oscillated between a fairly 
narrow set of differences. Lippmann’s primary concern was always the functioning of 
democracy. He wanted it to work. His views on the press and public opinion revolved 
around a central tenet of progressive thinking – that an informed public would reach 
reasoned conclusions. But Lippmann always wrestled with doubts about the capacity of 
the electorate; his elitist attitudes conflicted with his reformist sympathies. Could the 
public really govern itself intelligently? How could the press, with its own limitations, 
facilitate that process? Lippmann puzzled over the answers to those questions throughout 
his career. Ultimately, his experiences with the manufacture of consent during World 
War I undermined his confidence in public opinion; his stature as a member of the press 




He has been referred to as “one of the most important figures of American history 
in the 20th century,” although some variation on “the most gifted and influential American 
political journalist of the twentieth century” is the most common refrain used to describe 
the Pulitzer Prize winning columnist and author Walter Lippmann.1 One encounters no 
shortage of superlatives to describe his career, which has been characterized as “without 
parallel in the American press, his life an extraordinary record of the conflicts which 
wracked the twentieth century.”2 On more subdued occasions, Lippmann is modestly 
referred to as the “dean of American journalists.”3 
Lippmann wrote his first editorial, for his school’s student paper the Junior 
Record, in 1903, when he was thirteen years old.4 He left Harvard three weeks prior to 
completing a master’s degree in philosophy for what turned out to be a brief, seven-week 
stint at Boston Common, his future father-in-law’s reformist weekly paper. Unhappy 
there, Lippmann appealed to Lincoln Steffens for more fulfilling work and soon began an 
apprenticeship with the famed muckraker at Everybody’s magazine. 
1 Cesar Garcia, “Rethinking Walter Lippmann’s Legacy in the History of Public 
Relations,” Prism 7, no. 1 (2010): 1. Michael Curtis, “Walter Lippmann Reconsidered,” 
Society (Jan./Feb. 1991): 23. 
2 Jay Rosen, “Impossible Press: American Journalism and the Decline of Public Life” 
(PhD diss., New York University, 1986), 269. 
3 Edward Weeks, introduction, Conversations with Walter Lippmann (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1965), vii. Lippmann has also been referred to as the “dean of American political 
columnists” and the “dean of American publicists.”  
4 Lippmann edited the paper with a childhood friend who recalled: “The editorials all 
began with the solemn assertion: ‘We, the Editors of the Record, sincerely believe.” Carl 
Binger, “A Child of the Enlightenment,” in Walter Lippmann and His Times, ed. Marquis 
Childs and James Reston (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), 27. 
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Lippmann began his formal journalism career in 1914 as a founding editor of the 
progressive weekly magazine, The New Republic. His first book, A Preface to Politics, 
had been published the previous year. After the United States entered World War I, 
Lippmann joined the war effort, first as an assistant to Secretary of War Newton Baker, 
then as the youngest member of the Inquiry, a secret group of specialists charged with 
preparing data for peace negotiations following the war.5  
Lippmann later went to Europe as a captain in the Army, where he engaged in 
propaganda efforts in support of the Allies, but returned home disillusioned not long after 
President Wilson arrived in Paris for the peace conference. In 1922, the same year his 
classic work Public Opinion was published, Lippmann joined the New York World, 
taking over the editorial page in 1924 after the death of Frank Cobb. When the World 
folded in 1931, Ogden Reid lured Lippmann to the conservative New York Herald 
Tribune, a union that struck many as curious, considering Lippmann’s liberal-leanings. It 
was at the Herald Tribune that Lippmann launched “Today and Tomorrow,” his 
syndicated column on world affairs. He carried on for 36 years, taking it with him for one 
last move to the Washington Post in 1963. In between his newspaper obligations, 
Lippmann wrote dozens of books, contributed articles to magazines, gave lectures, made 
speeches and conferred with statesmen.  
 
 
                                                
5 Sue Curry Jansen, “‘The World’s Greatest Adventure in Advertising:’ Walter 
Lippmann’s Critique of Censorship and Propaganda,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Propaganda Studies, ed. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 302. 
 3 
Throughout his long career, Lippmann occupied a rarefied position in public 
affairs, influencing public opinion as a journalist and U.S. policy as a counselor to 
presidents, politicians and military officers.6 As Jay Rosen explained, “His daily column 
was read by millions of ordinary people who depended on Lippmann to tell them what to 
think. The influence this gave him meant extraordinary access to leaders and events.”7 
Held up as an exemplar of the profession and lauded as “the last of the great political 
columnists,” it has been noted that Lippmann’s political maneuvering is a “contrary 
example” of how a modern, ideally objective press conducts itself. 8 “Lippmann never did 
have a rigid belief in journalistic celibacy…he promoted friends for office, plotted 
strategies, intrigued behind the scenes, all unbeknownst to his readers.”9  
The three-sided relationship between the press, the public and the government, 
and how it contributed to a viable democracy, was the dominant theme of many of 
Lippmann’s books and articles. Remarking on Lippmann’s access to American power 
brokers, the size of his national audience, and his courting by heads of state across 
Europe, Rosen wrote, “One does not lead a life like this and develop an ordinary political 
philosophy. When Lippmann stepped back to ponder a problem, he stepped back from a 
world which had welcomed him all the way inside. In 1919, for example, he wrote 
editorials about the Fourteen Points he had earlier helped Woodrow Wilson to draft.”10  
6 Garcia, 1. 
7 Rosen, 270. 
8 Thomas Griffith, “Comrade of the Powerful,” Time, Sept. 15, 1980, 86. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Rosen, 271. 
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Lippmann’s journalism career spanned six decades, and during that time, the 
world changed, the profession changed, and his views changed as well. His best-known 
work explored the relationship between the press and public opinion, and crystallized 
thinking about that relationship. Evaluations of that work, however, have been one-
dimensional, as if Public Opinion were his final statement on the matter when it was only 
one marker on a long road of thought. Lippmann took up the subject in books, newspaper 
columns, editorials and magazine articles, and in letters to colleagues and friends. 
Specifically, no one has identified everything Lippmann wrote about the press and public 
opinion. This study takes up that twin challenge. But first I’ll provide an overview of his 
body of work. This introduction is brief; his oeuvre is not.
 5 
PART I; CHAPTER ONE 
SURVEYING WALTER LIPPMAN'S BODY OF WORK 
Walter Lippmann was a prolific writer. Between 1913 and 1961, he published 27 
books.11 Between 1909 and 1971, he wrote more than 7,000 editorials, newspaper 
columns, and magazine articles.12 In the introduction to a collection of his writings, The 
Essential Lippmann, the editors estimated Lippmann had written more than 10 million 
words.13 That book was published in 1963, eight years before Lippmann wrote his final 
article for Newsweek, and four years before he gave up his syndicated “Today and 
Tomorrow” feature.14 As a New York Times reviewer once marveled, when Lippmann’s 
first book came out, “No man could have foreseen the prose river he was prefacing. Not 
even Lippmann. The generations pass. Walter Lippmann goes marching on serenely, 
urbanely, alertly.”15 
Plotting the course of Lippmann’s evolving views on the press and public opinion 
demands a comprehensive survey of the whole of his writings. That required identifying 
everything he wrote on these topics. My inquiry began with his books, my efforts focused 
on those volumes, chapters and passages in which Lippmann expressly addressed issues 
related to the press and public opinion. From these readings, I noted Lippmann’s stated 
11 Thirteen of Lippmann’s books are reprints of lectures or collections of newspaper 
columns or magazine articles. Six books focus on foreign policy. 
12 A complete, indexed collection of original “Today and Tomorrow” columns can be 
found in the Robert O. Anthony collection at Yale. In 1931, as a hobby, Anthony began 
collecting articles, newspaper clippings, pamphlets and other published works written by 
or about Lippmann. In 1946, Anthony was named curator Yale’s Lippmann collection. 
13 Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds., The Essential Lippmann: A Political Philosophy 
for Liberal Democracy (New York: Random House, 1963), xii. 
14 When asked by the New York Times why he was discontinuing the column, Lippmann 
retorted, “Well, I’ll tell you this, it wasn’t Lyndon Johnson.” 
15 Charles Poore, “Lippmann Sometimes Scares Us in the Morning,” New York Times, 
Aug. 19, 1965.  
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views on the topic, and sketched a preliminary outline to track his evolution, organized 
around the dominant themes in his writing.   
Next, I looked at what Lippmann wrote about the press and public opinion as a 
journalist: the editorials he wrote at the New Republic and the New York World, his 
“Today and Tomorrow” columns from his many years at the New York Herald Tribune, 
and later, the Washington Post, and his articles for publications like the Atlantic Monthly, 
Vanity Fair and Newsweek.  
The finding aid for the Robert O. Anthony collection of Walter Lippmann at Yale 
University catalogues every known article, book or essay written by or about 
Lippmann.16 This resource represents the entire body of Lippmann’s work. The finding 
aid also served as a field guide for tracking down articles and an instruction manual for 
assembling a comprehensive list of Lippmann’s writings on the press and public opinion. 
For his newspaper and magazine work, the finding aid lists the publications 
alphabetically, followed by a chronological listing of the dates Lippmann’s articles 
appeared in the publication. The interlibrary loan staff at LSU’s Middleton Library 
secured four reels from the Robert O. Anthony collection for my review: Series I: 
Magazines, reel 1 – more than 350 articles written by Lippmann for more than 50 
magazines, starting with his 1903 article for his student paper and ending with his final 
column for Newsweek on January 11, 1971; Series II: Newspapers, reel 4 – a scrapbook 
of Lippmann’s unsigned New York World editorials from 1922 through July 1923; reel 5 
– the entire New York World editorial page for each day, March 1924-March 1926, and
16 The collection, originally curated in 1978, does not appear to have been updated since. 
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reel 11 – which contained some of his earliest work, including the articles he wrote while 
at the Boston Common.  
As I read about Lippmann, I kept a running list of references to relevant articles 
and columns cited in studies and books. I consulted the LSU library catalog, publication 
archives, and conducted online searches to locate these articles. Some of his writings can 
be found in the following collections of Lippmann’s work: Force and Ideas: The Early 
Writings (1970), a collection of 67 Lippmann editorials from the New Republic, 
annotated by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.; Interpretations: 1931-1932 and 
Interpretations: 1933-1935, selections of “Today and Tomorrow” columns, edited by 
journalist and historian Allan Nevins; The Essential Lippmann (1963), a selection of 61 
writings from Lippmann’s books, articles, columns, editorials and pamphlets; and 
Conversations with Walter Lippmann (1965), transcriptions of his much-lauded CBS 
interviews in the 1960s.17  
As part of my systematic review of Lippmann’s views, I also searched his private 
writings for statements regarding the press and public opinion. Sterling Memorial Library 
at Yale University houses the Walter Lippmann papers, an archival collection consisting 
of 163.5 linear feet of correspondence, drafts, manuscripts, school records and 
engagement books. Much of the collection is made available for inter-library loan on 170 
reels of microfilm. 
Walter Lippmann wrote and received reams of mail. His personal correspondence, 
available to scholars in his and others’ archival collections, offers another avenue to 
17 Upon reading this collection of his transcribed interviews, Lippmann responded “My 
God, what syntax!” Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 517. 
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assess the evolution of his views on the press and public opinion.18 Lippmann enjoyed 
correspondence with an impressive roster of influential people throughout his 60-year 
career—presidents, ambassadors, military officers, academics and other prominent 
journalists. As a public figure, Lippmann also received an abundance of what we might 
today consider junk mail: a steady stream of requests from both acquaintances and 
strangers to join various committees, to endorse a variety of causes and to advise aspiring 
journalists inspired by his career.19 Readers of his syndicated column sometimes carried 
on years-long, one-sided communication with Lippmann, all of which is preserved in the 
Yale archives. It is estimated that from 1906, the year he entered Harvard, until his death 
in 1974, Lippmann wrote twenty thousand letters.20 He amassed an overwhelming 
volume of correspondence over the course of seven decades. 
As with his public, published writings, my study focuses on letters in which 
Lippmann conveyed his thoughts on the press and public opinion. As befits his career, 
Lippmann’s correspondence contains recurring references to both issues. Letters in the 
Lippmann collection also reveal the role he played in shaping public opinion about public 
affairs, not only through his newspaper columns, but in advising politicians and 
                                                
18 This task hinges on the ability to decode Lippmann’s notoriously bad handwriting. 
Even his oldest friends found it difficult: “I infer (though I am not sure) that you like 
what you have read of my book. The fact is, I am a little rusty at deciphering cuneiform.” 
Carl Binger to Lippmann, March 22, 1945, Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University 
Library, New Haven, CT (hereafter cited as WLP). Lippmann clarified his original 
message in a type-written reply: “I certainly do like your book, but why you can’t read 
my handwriting when you are supposed to be able to read people’s minds I can’t 
imagine…” Lippmann to Binger, a psychiatrist, March 24, 1945, WLP. 
19 Or, on at least one occasion, to advocate on behalf of the lowly hotdog: “We ask that 
you, as a moulder of public opinion, consider the frankfurter.” Frank M. Firor, president, 
Adolf Gobel, Inc., to Lippmann, August 26, 1929, WLP. 
20 John Morton Blum, ed., Public Philosopher: Selected Letters of Walter Lippmann 
(New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1985), vii. 
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proposing strategies to rally support for policies. Tracking his behind-the-scenes 
involvement in political events, as well as his official positions during WWI, with his 
publicly stated positions adds context to the evolution of Lippmann’s views. 
 Employing the finding aid for the Walter Lippmann papers, I determined the 
reels of correspondence that appeared to contain material most relevant to this study. In 
total, I reviewed 73 reels of microfilm from the collection: 34 reels from Series I, 
containing selected correspondence from 1906-1930; 34 reels from Series III, selected 
correspondence from 1931-1974; one reel from Series VII, diaries and engagement 
books; and four reels of correspondence and general files from Series I in the 2001 
accession. I also viewed Lippmann correspondence found in the Newton D. Baker 
archives and in the Edward M. House papers at the Library of Congress. 
To round out my portrait of Lippmann, I read what others have written about him. 
Ronald Steel’s Walter Lippmann and the American Century, considered the definitive 
biography of Lippmann, provides a thorough overview of his career and personal life. It 
is an excellent introduction to Lippmann and the people and events that influenced his 
worldview. Walter Lippmann and His Times is a charming book of essays contributed by 
his friends in honor of his 70th birthday. I looked at reviews of his books to gauge how 
Lippmann’s views were received at the time they were published. Also, book reviews 
written by his contemporaries, including H.L. Mencken, John Dewey and Charles 
Merriam, for insight into the reactions of Lippmann’s peers, or, in the case of former 
President Theodore Roosevelt, who reviewed Drift and Mastery for Outlook magazine, 
the reaction of Lippmann’s hero. 
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PART I; CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON WALTER LIPPMAN 
Many a public figure has come to imitate the journalism which describes him. –Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics
The literature on Lippmann confirms his continued appeal to scholars. Lippmann 
studies address topics as varied as his foreign policy views, his political philosophies, his 
influence on mass communication research, and his so-called “debate” with philosopher 
John Dewey. His political views, particularly his supposed denouncement of liberal 
ideology, seem to hold great fascination for scholars.21 Indeed, the overwhelming motif 
in Lippmann studies is change. His critics more pointedly emphasize examples of his 
inconsistency. Reviews of his second book, Drift and Mastery, noted the discrepancies 
between it and A Preface to Politics, published only the year before. “And, though his 
diagnosis departed drastically from what he had published little more than a year earlier, 
he confessed no error.”22  
Owing to the scope of Lippmann’s writing, few studies fit neatly into a single 
category of inquiry. The longevity of his career almost inevitably invites at least a 
cursory overview of his historical relevance. And regardless if the primary focus of a 
study is on his philosophy or his foreign affairs policies, Lippmann’s political views 
rarely escape mention. 
21 It seems some authors conflate charges of Lippmann harboring anti-democratic views 
with suggestions he adopted a conservative political ideology. 
22 William E. Leuchtenburg, introduction to reprint of Drift and Mastery (1914) by 
Walter Lippmann (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 6. In this revised 
edition, Leuchtenburg consulted Lippmann’s original draft, handwritten in the summers 
of 1913 and 1914. Lippmann wrote all of his books and columns in longhand; his original 
manuscripts can be found in the Walter Lippmann collection at Yale University. 
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Historical studies 
Lippmann retains marquee status in historical journalism studies, often deployed 
as “shorthand” to embody post-World War I changes in the press and the culture at large. 
“This conflation is evident outside communications as well: the title of Ronald Steel’s 
impressive biography, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, suggests that to 
chronicle Lippmann’s life is tantamount to detailing the collective experience of a major 
twentieth century nation.”23 Lippmann’s first two books, A Preface to Politics and Drift 
and Mastery, are widely considered to reflect the optimistic mood of the progressive era. 
The two editors of a 1963 collection of his writings are so confident of the timelessness 
of Lippmann’s talent and his standing among journalists, they feel assured “he may be 
honored for his achievements by the men of centuries to come.”24 
 
World War I 
Many studies look to a defining moment to signal a change in Lippmann’s various 
views; War World I is the most frequently cited and mutually agreed upon event 
influencing his views on politics, the press and public opinion.25 “The pragmatist’s desire 
to reshape the world collapsed with the Versailles settlement, and Lippmann wondered 
whether democracy, dependent as it is on the will of the governed, can rely on an 
electorate sufficiently informed to understand what is happening in the world.”26 Sue 
                                                
23 Gretchen Soderlund, “Rethinking a Curricular Icon: The Institutional and Ideological 
Foundations of Walter Lippmann,” Communication Review 8 (2005): 309-310. 
24 Rossiter and Lare, vi. 
25 Sue Curry Jansen, Walter Lippmann: A Critical Introduction to Media and 
Communication Theory (New York: Peter Lang, 2012), 8. 
26 John Patrick Diggins, “From Pragmatism to Natural Law: Walter Lippmann’s Quest for 
Legitimacy,” Political Theory 19, no. 4 (Nov. 1991): 526. 
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Curry Jansen disagrees. She argues that in Liberty and the News, his first post-WWI 
book, “Lippmann’s approach to observation, method, truth-telling and science is 
grounded in pragmatism and humanism.”27 She feels others’ views on the book often 
amount to a “misreading of his message.”28  
In an interview in 1969, just before his eightieth birthday, Lippmann was asked 
what events influenced his life. His response seems to indicate the consensus at least has 
the timeline correct: “The first, I suppose, was the First World War, for which I was 
entirely unprepared in my mind,” he said. “That was the beginning of my first awareness 
of what the world was about.”29 
Lippmann’s experience during the war – his propaganda work, his realization that 
news coverage of the war was routinely slanted – “jarred (him) profoundly,”30 and his 
writing assumed an urgent tone post-World War I; in a way, he epitomized the mood of 
the nation during that era.31 “Social histories of news and public relations have used 
Lippmann to characterize a cultural mood of detachment that emerged during and after 
World War I. In these accounts, Lippmann’s views on objectivity, science, and expert 
knowledge exemplify the postwar cultural and historical order.”32  
27 Jansen, in Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, 315. 
28 Jansen, in Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, 314. 
29 Henry Brandon, “A Talk with Walter Lippmann, at 80, About ‘This Minor Dark Age,’” 
New York Times, September 14, 1969. 
30 Sidney Kaplan, “Social Engineers as Saviors: Effects of World War I on Some 
American Liberals,” Journal of the History of Ideas 17, no. 3 (June 1956): 365. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Soderlund, 309. 
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Political ideology 
In reviewing the literature, Lippmann’s political ideology emerges as a major 
preoccupation of scholars.33  The notion that he abandoned his liberal ideals and adopted 
an increasingly conservative point of view is one of the most popular tropes in studies of 
his work. “No contemporary who read Lippmann’s early books and followed his career 
could have predicted where his thinking would take him by midcentury.”34 So how did a 
former socialist turned crusading progressive, a self-avowed life-long liberal arrive at the 
point where critics accused him of championing conservatism? If change is the most 
popular subject for scholarly investigation involving Lippmann, then Public Opinion is 
the most popular source of evidence. It’s his signal work, the one his other books are 
compared to. It was also the first work to arouse accusations that Lippmann harbored 
anti-democratic views. 
Anti-democratic 
When not examined exclusively, Public Opinion is sometimes compared or 
contrasted with Lippmann’s other works; often, his books are considered in pairs. 
Anthony Giambusso evaluates Public Opinion and The Phantom Public through the lens 
of pragmatic philosophy principles, concluding “Lippmann’s critique of democracy 
results in prescriptions which are clearly, as he himself admits, undemocratic…Lippmann 
has proposed a profound challenge to traditional democratic assumptions.”35  
33 Steven Blum, “Walter Lippmann: Ideas, Events, and the Cosmopolitan Outlook” (PhD 
diss., Brandeis University, 1982), 9. 
34 Diggins, 522. 
35 Anthony Giambusso. “Is Propaganda Pragmatic?” (PhD diss., Southern Illinois 
University at Carbondale, May 2006), 19. 
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Lippmann went even further in The Phantom Public and Essays in the Public 
Philosophy. Both books are regarded as indictments of American democracy, leading to 
charges that Lippmann was “anti-democratic.” John Patrick Diggins writes that both 
Public Opinion and The Phantom Public “challenge the validity of liberal democracy by 
suggesting that to invest authority in the people may be foolish when people’s thoughts 
are determined by the distortions of the mode of information.”36 Diggins concludes that 
Essays in the Public Philosophy was “the conservative culmination of years of searching 
for radical and liberal solutions to the dilemmas of modernity.”37  
Heinz Eulau writes that although the sentiments in Essays in The Public 
Philosophy are expressed more forcefully than those in Public Opinion, the theses of 
these two books are essentially the same. With Essays in the Public Philosophy, Eulau 
believes Lippmann reached “the logical conclusion” of the concepts he first explored 30 
years earlier in Public Opinion, namely that the public is incapable of giving “genuine” 
as opposed to “manufactured consent.”38 “Even in 1922, Lippmann’s judgment of the 
incompetence of the masses betrayed the emotional fiber of conservatism in his make-up 
rather than that skeptical and experimental temper of mind characteristic of the liberal.”39 
The implication is that Lippmann’s questioning of the soundness of majority rule shaped 
by public opinion is a “reconsideration of his earlier hopes for democracy’s 
revitalization,” which in turn is seen as a reflection of his political ideology.40  
36 Diggins, 526. 
37 Diggins, 522. 
38 Heinz Eulau, “From Public Opinion to Public Philosophy: Walter Lippmann’s Classic 
Reexamined,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 15, no. 4 (July 1956): 449. 
39 Eulau, “From Public Opinion to Public Philosophy,” 450.	  
40 Diggins, 526.	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Inconsistency as an indicator of change 
Change, a predominant theme of many Lippmann studies, is typically presented 
negatively, usually as evidence of his innate conservatism. This approach to Lippmann’s 
work tends to gauge his changing views primarily as an indicator of his political 
temperament. The inclination to delineate Lippmann’s ideological leanings along 
political lines “has been very common. The assumption has been that it changed every 
ten years.”41 Others reject that tendency as an oversimplification of the development of 
Lippmann’s political thought, arguing, “the liberal versus conservative formula does little 
to illumine Lippmann’s theoretical statements as they evolved over the decades…The 
author is marked as having fallen from grace for diverging from opinions that antedated 
his thirtieth birthday.”42 Early in his career, Lippmann, writing about Woodrow Wilson, a 
man about whom he had a serious change of heart, stated: “I see no virtue in the picture 
of the strong, obstinate, consistent man who never learns and never forgets.”43 Despite 
the protestations of his defenders and Lippmann’s own declarations, the tendency 
remains to emphasize instances of his conflicting opinions. “The charge of ambivalence 
and inconsistency has been the major and most frequent criticism made of Lippmann’s 
works.”44  
41 Frederic Krome, “From Liberal Philosophy to Conservative Ideology? Walter 
Lippmann’s Opposition to the New Deal,” Journal of American Culture: 62. 
42 Steven Blum, 9. 
43 Walter Lippmann, “The Case for Wilson,” New Republic, VIII, October 14, 1916. 
44 Janice Scott Anderson, “The Rhetorical Theory and Practice of Walter Lippmann: 
Advocacy Journalism as Rhetorical Discourse” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-
Madison: 1981), 72. 
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New Deal 
His opposition to President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies is considered 
the turning point in his political ideology, the era when the famously liberal Lippmann 
transformed into “a conservative thinker.”45 David Weingast sought to quantify 
Lippmann’s views on those policies by modeling the content-analysis technique 
Lippmann and Charles Merz employed in “A Test of the News.”46 Weingast divided the 
policies into eight distinct categories, and, reading every “Today and Tomorrow” column 
written between 1932 and 1938, coded Lippmann’s references to each policy as 
favorable, unfavorable or neutral. Although Lippmann initially supported Roosevelt’s 
program, the content analysis indicates that Lippmann’s views on the New Deal policies 
were, on the whole, unfavorable.47 Weingast cites these results to suggest that 
Lippmann’s public persona is at odds with his writings, advancing the charge of 
inconsistency. Weingast advocates adopting quantifiable research methods to encourage 
objectivity in historical studies, arguing that works based on subjective interpretations 
“abound in myths based on unsupported generalizations. Fragmentary evidence is still 
being dignified as universal truth.”48  
Frederic Krome adopts the contrary view; he contends that Lippmann’s views did 
not change during the New Deal era, rather, circumstances changed and Lippmann 
adapted his positions in light of the new reality. Krome argues that the flaw in Weingast’s 
study, and in others focused on Lippmann’s inconsistencies, is that the New Deal policies 
45 Krome, 57. 
46 David Weingast, “Walter Lippmann: A Content Analysis,” Public Opinion Quarterly 
14, no. 2 (Summer 1950): 296-302. 
47 Weingast, 302. 
48 Weingast, 302. 
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are treated as “constant” whereas Lippmann’s views on those policies are seen as 
“variable.”49 Lippmann’s friend and fellow journalist Marquis Childs also defended 
Lippmann against charges that his criticism of the New Deal signaled an abandonment of 
his principles. “During the era of the New Deal, when not to be for the brave new world 
was to be against it, old friends broke crossly with a critic who persisted in being 
critical,” Childs wrote. “The intolerable affront was that one so obviously of a liberal and 
humane view should not subscribe with all his heart to the effort to remake the old 
order.”50 
Public Opinion 
Although the New Deal era is considered the turning point in Lippmann’s 
political philosophy, Public Opinion is seen as the book in which those changes first 
manifest. “In many respects, Public Opinion was the liberal Lippmann’s farewell to 
liberalism. The actual denouement would not come for many years, but the ground had 
been well ploughed.”51 His most enduring book, the classic Public Opinion has been 
hailed as “his most original contribution to political thought, social psychology, and the 
study of mass communications.”52 In this work, Lippmann explicitly explored the 
relationship between the press and public opinion, the concept most closely associated 
with his legacy. It is also the book that receives the most attention from scholars: “If he 
49 Krome, 62. 
50 Marquis Childs, “Introduction: The Conscience of the Critic,” in Childs and Reston, 1-2. 
51 Eulau, “From Public Opinion to Public Philosophy,” 450. 
52 Curtis, 24. 
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had written nothing in his life except Public Opinion, he would be quoted and studied for 
generations to come.”53 
Lippmann’s “pioneering” critique in Public Opinion challenged the assumption 
that news was, or could be, an accurate reflection of the world around us.54  “Lippmann’s 
Public Opinion was… an attempt to introduce a contrary idea – namely, that the world 
cannot be mirrored in the news because it is a joint product of the perceiver and the 
perceived, both for journalists and, more importantly, for the public.”55  
The conviction that ‘the trouble lies deeper’ than the conduct of the press 
has helped make Public Opinion a classic of modern political thought. For 
the press had been traditionally put forward as the solution to every 
weakness in democratic theory…. By stating emphatically that the press 
was not enough… a whole world of assumptions about how people form 
an understanding of public questions then began to collapse, including 
those of the journalism profession.56 
Public Opinion maintains its relevance – and its interest to scholars—because 
Lippmann “foresaw two of the most challenging, intertwined problems of democracy: the 
absence of the omnicompetent citizen and the inability of the news media to help citizens 
achieve minimal competence…it was the skeptical and erudite Lippmann who first (and 
most eloquently) brought us the bad news.”57 Rereading Public Opinion decades after its 
publication, one critic was “struck, above all, by Lippmann’s uncanny ability to 
53 Rossiter and Lare, xviii. 
54 Eulau, “From Public Opinion to Public Philosophy,” 446. 
55 Rosen, 283.
56 Rosen, 278-279.
57 Susan Herbst, “Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion Revisited,” Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics 4, no. 88 (1999): 89-90. 
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anticipate later developments in the study of public opinion and mass communications.”58 
One modern scholar describes it as “eerily prophetic.”59 
Lippmann’s philosophical influences 
Although he is recognized foremost as a journalist, some scholars approach 
Lippmann primarily as a philosopher.60 Lippmann acknowledged the presumably 
competing yet ultimately complementary forces guiding his career. “I have lived two 
lives, one of books and one of newspapers,” he wrote. “Each helps the other. The 
philosophy is the context in which I write my books. The column is the laboratory or 
clinic on which I test the philosophy and keep it from becoming too abstract.”61 
Washington Post editor Phillip Geylin referred to Lippmann as “a philosopher with a 
deadline.”62   
Throughout numerous studies parsing Lippmann’s views on various topics, one 
area of consensus that emerges is how the philosophies espoused by three Harvard 
professors shaped Lippmann’s thinking. The influences of William James, George 
Santayana and Graham Wallas are apparent, to varying degrees, in Lippmann’s writing, 
although disagreement remains as to which philosopher made the greater contribution to 
Lippmann’s body of work.63 “There has been much controversy among scholars as to 
who left the deeper impressions upon Lippmann’s thinking – James or Santayana. The 
58 Eulau, “From Public Opinion to Public Philosophy,” 439. 
59 Soderlund, 317. 
60 Krome, 63. 
61 James Reston, “Conclusion: The Mockingbird and the Taxicab,” in Childs, 227. 
62 Anderson, 67. 
63 Anderson, 32. 
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influence of Wallas has been less disputed.” 64 In a footnote in Drift and Mastery, 
Lippmann acknowledged the debt his first two books owed to Wallas’s influence. “I had 
the privilege of reading Mr. Wallas’s book (The Great Society) in manuscript while I was 
revising this one,” Lippmann wrote. “My obligations go far deeper than that, however, 
for they extend back to the spring of 1910, when Mr. Wallas came from England to 
lecture at Harvard. In A Preface to Politics I tried to express my sense of the way in 
which Graham Wallas marks a turning point in the history of political thinking.”65 
“William James,” Steel writes, “was a liberating influence on an entire 
generation.”66  His optimistic philosophy was irresistible to idealistic young men like 
Lippmann, who was attracted to James’ “passion for social reform, commitment to 
experimentation, abhorrence of dogma, and deep sense of personal morals.”67 James 
ignited Lippmann’s passion for science, and his pragmatic influence is evident in A 
Preface to Politics and Drift and Mastery, which “resonate with hope, despite the 
awareness of the complexity of problems facing America and the world,” a marked 
contrast to the prescriptions later found in Public Opinion.68 Among Lippmann’s earliest 
published pieces – his first signed article for Everybody’s magazine – was a tribute to 
William James: “James was no more afraid of a new political theory than he was of 
ghosts, and he was no more afraid of proclaiming a new theory, or an old one, than he 
64 Anderson, 42. 
65 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 39. 
66 Steel, 17. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Diggins, 522. 
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was of being a ghost. I think he would have listened with an open mind to the devil’s 
account of heaven, and I’m sure he would have heard him out on hell.”69 
Lippmann enrolled in every class George Santayana taught at Harvard, and was 
the philosopher’s “star pupil” and research assistant. From Santayana, Lippmann “learned 
the importance of writing gracefully as well as clearly…to value the classical virtues of 
measure and restraint…Except for the exuberant books of his early youth, Lippmann’s 
works bear the imprint of Santayana’s search for a reality beyond experience.”70  
In an interview a few days before his eightieth birthday, Lippmann reflected on 
his mentors, telling the interviewer, “James, I think, made me see how a human reaction 
to problems ought to be. But what he taught I found less convincing than what Santayana 
taught.”71 When asked to name the men who most influenced him, Lippmann included 
British economist John Maynard Keynes and Harvard professor Irving Babbitt along with 
James, Santayana and Wallas. 
By including Babbitt on the list, Lippmann lent some credence to the charge that 
he grew more conservative in his later years. As a student at Harvard, Lippmann was 
repelled by Babbitt’s argument that “democracy itself rested on restraining the power of 
the majority,” although that sentiment hews closely to the premise Lippmann 
progressively built upon in his books.72 At the time, the young socialist considered 
Babbitt’s views “elitist.” Despite Lippmann’s initial distaste for Babbitt’s worldview, “a 
69 Lippmann, “William James: An Open Mind,” Everybody’s, December 1910. 
70 Steel, 21. 
71 In a New York Times interview on Sept. 14, 1969, Lippmann initially named James, 
Santayana, Wallas and Keynes, who, he said, influenced his view on economics: “In fact, 
I hope I’m a Keynesian.” He added Babbitt to the list in reply to a follow-up question. 
72 Steel, 19. Lippmann refers to “the tyranny of the majority” in his first book. 
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decade later he was a good deal closer to Babbitt than to James.”73 It was not long before 
Lippmann would be accused of harboring elitist and “antimajoritarian” attitudes himself.  
Jansen, again, disagrees with this characterization of Lippmann as an elitist or 
anti-democratic. “Reading Lippmann’s diagnosis as prescriptive rather than descriptive, 
(critics) have inverted and subverted his arguments about censorship and propaganda.”74 
She also challenges the notion that Lippmann considers himself smarter than everyone 
else. “It should be noted that, since arrogance and elitism are often ascribed to Lippmann, 
when he described the limits of human knowledge and counseled humility, he always 
included himself within the circle of the limited in need of humility.”75 
Not everyone considers it unreasonable that Lippmann’s views would evolve over 
“a lifespan that extended from the horse-and-buggy age to the space age.”76 Following his 
career trajectory, Janice Anderson notes, as Lippmann’s platform and audience expanded, 
so did his influence: “On the New Republic he had basically addressed the ‘intelligentsia.’ 
On the World, he had primarily addressed a metropolitan audience. With the ‘Today and 
Tomorrow’ column appearing in more than 200 newspapers and reaching an estimated 
ten million readers, he addressed the whole country and many parts of the world.”77 
Lippmann is credited with articulating the modern understanding of public 
opinion, so it is hardly surprising that Public Opinion is his most frequently cited work. 
He enjoyed a long and successful career as a journalist, so it is no surprise he developed 
strong opinions – and often expressed sharp criticism – about the role of the press. What 
                                                
73 Steel, 19. 
74 Jansen, in Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, 317. 
75 Jansen, in Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, 315. 
76 Jansen, Walter Lippmann: A Critical Introduction, 11. 
77 Anderson, 59. 
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is surprising, considering his status, the longevity of his career, and the frequency with 
which he returned to the topic, is that no analysis maps how his views on the press and 
public opinion evolved over the course of his lifetime. Surprising, in that no study 
examines how Lippmann arrived at, and later departed from, the major theme he 
addressed in Public Opinion – the relationship between the press and public opinion – in 
conjunction with what he wrote about those subjects in his newspaper articles and 
editorials, his correspondence, and his other books.  
In an address to guests at the National Press Club on the occasion of his 
seventieth birthday, Lippmann may have inadvertently revealed a key consideration for 
assessing the evolution of his views: 
Being newspapermen in the American liberal tradition, the way we 
interpret the news is…by proposing theories and hypotheses which are 
then tested by trial and error. We put forth the most plausible 
interpretation we can think of…and then we wait to see whether the later 
news fits into the interpretation. We do well if with only a little 
amendment…the later news fits into it…if the later news knocks down the 
earlier story, there are two things to be done. One is to scrap the theory 
and interpretation, which is what liberal, honest men do.78  
78 Walter Lippmann, “October 1959: Birthday Address to the National Press Club,” 
reprinted in Nieman Reports 53/54, no. 4/1 (Winter 1999-Spring 2000): 25-26. 
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PART II 
 We grow into a new point of view; only afterwards, in  
 looking back, do we see the landmarks of our progress. 
– Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics
Due to the enduring appeal of his classic work, Walter Lippmann continues to be 
closely identified with contemporary notions of the relationship between the press and 
public opinion. Although it remains his most thorough elaboration on the topic, Public 
Opinion was neither Lippmann’s first attempt to evaluate this dynamic, nor his decisive 
verdict on the subject. A comprehensive survey of his books, articles and correspondence 
reveals how his theories on the press and public opinion changed, sometimes subtly, 
other times dramatically, over the course of six decades. Published early in his career, 
Public Opinion signals just one – admittedly pivotal – point in that evolution.  
In mapping his views, I identified five distinct periods that informed Lippmann’s 
writing on the press and public opinion; each period represents a stage in the evolution of 
his thinking. During every stage, he contemplated the relationship between the press and 
public opinion. During every stage, his level of concern regarding the performance of the 
press and the competence of the public reflected his comfort with the state of public 
affairs. The distinguishing factor in each period was the degree of confidence he 
expressed in the ability of both the press and the public to fulfill its role in our 
democracy.  
The five stages in the evolution of Lippmann’s views on the press and public 
opinion are examined in this section. Throughout the first period, from 1908-1918, 
Lippmann was idealistic, and his views, which he was still refining, were inconsistent. In 
THE EVOLUTION OF WALTER LIPPMAN'S VIEWS ON THE PRESS AND PUBLIC 
OPINION
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the lead up to the United States’ entry into World War I, he romanticized the roles of 
public opinion and the press in strengthening democracy. In the next period, 1919-1921, 
alarmed by his wartime experiences, Lippmann was critical of the press and concerned 
about protecting the sources of public opinion. He proposed reforms for both, suggesting 
he remained optimistic that each could still achieve the democratic ideal. Lippmann 
wrote his most popular book, Public Opinion, during the third period, 1922-1924. His 
view at that time was neither the public nor the press could properly fulfill its duty in an 
increasingly complex world. By the fourth period, 1925-1951, Lippmann’s views on 
public opinion had grown undeniably negative. He now argued that the public was 
qualified only to make yes or no decisions. He thought the press did its best to help 
citizens navigate their environment. Lippmann’s most negative views on public opinion 
are found in Essays in the Public Philosophy, published during the final period examined 
in this section, 1952-1971. Lippmann felt catering to public opinion enfeebled the 
executive branch; critical policy decisions, which he argued should be handled by 
knowledgeable experts, were instead shaped by the whims of popular sentiment. He 
heralded the press, however, as “essential” to democracy. 
Even as his views evolved from period to period, Lippmann’s assessment of the 
state of the press and public opinion returned to the same set of issues: competence; 
power; the roles of elites, experts, and government leaders; and the consequences for 
democracy. Tracking his evaluation of these issues over the years adds context to his 
changing views. Lippmann was both a product of and a participant in events; his 
experiences shaped his views. This section begins with Lippmann’s most hopeful period, 
which coincided with the optimistic, reform-minded progressive era. 
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PART II; CHAPTER ONE 
 1908-1918 
“Idealism” creates an abstraction and then shudders at a reality which does not answer to it. 
– Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics
This chapter looks at Lippmann’s writings on the press and public opinion from 
1908 to 1918, a period when he adapted the views of others as he refined his own 
theories. While he voiced concerns about the performance of the press and doubts about 
the formation of public opinion, his views were tempered with the confident optimism of 
youth. The period follows Lippmann from his final years at Harvard to the end of World 
War I, when he worked at the War Department, served on the Inquiry, and wrote 
propaganda in support of the Allies. During this time period, Lippmann wrote three 
books and helped launch the New Republic. The defining theme, from our 100-year 
vantage point, is the contradictions in his thinking as he puzzled with issues that went to 
the heart of democracy, issues that would become the focus of much of his life’s work. 
Public Opinion may be his career-defining book, but Lippmann once struggled to 
define the term. In 1915, as a young New Republic editor, he discussed opinion formation in 
an interview with a newspaper reporter.1 The focus of the interview was well defined: 
Lippmann was asked simply, “What is opinion?” His answer, in contrast, was quite 
convoluted: “We understand it here in this office…as belief for which one is not quite ready 
to be burnt at the stake. Humility is necessarily a part of the process of arriving at it.”2  
1 The reporter chose the New Republic because it billed itself as “a journal of opinion.” It 
was not specified why Lippmann was the editor selected for the interview. 
2 E.S. Evans, “American Opinion is in a Pretty State: Provincialism and Prejudice in 
Their Making, says Walter Lippmann, Mark the Opinions We Hold so Desperately,” New 
York Tribune, July 25, 1915. 
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The reporter, unsatisfied, repeated the question and Lippmann flailed about in a second 
attempt, more tortured than his first: 
It is a crystallized something, yet always changing — the human fashion 
of trying answers to problems not by looking on high, but by looking 
around. No, no, not dogma — that you know…(it) is a sort of sanctified 
intuition conforming pretty much to individual indigestion…what you 
have is something you’ve got either from having it handed to you or out of 
your own prejudices. It is an object of life to have opinions and know why 
you have them.3 
In light of Lippmann’s verbose response, it is possible the reporter was mocking him 
when he referred to Lippmann as “the Analyst of Opinion.” What is evident is that 
Lippmann had been thinking about the role of public opinion, even if he could not fully 
articulate his thoughts on the subject. That would come in time. 
Lippmann’s views on public opinion during this period 
“Their specific plans may be silly, but their demands are real.”4 
Lippmann’s first love was politics, but it was his desire to influence public 
opinion that led him to pursue a career in journalism. “I have a more or less professional 
interest in public affairs,” Lippmann wrote in 1913. “I have had opportunity to look at 
politics from the point of view of the man who is trying to get the attention of people in 
order to carry through some reform.”5 He began writing for campus publications – and 
attracting attention for his work – while an undergraduate at Harvard.6  Lippmann found 
3 Evans, “American Opinion is in a Pretty State.”  
4 Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics (1913; repr., Lexington: 2014), 31. 
5 A Preface to Politics, 3. 
6 Walter Schloss to Lippmann, 1909, praising “Harvard In Politics”: “It is one of the best 
I have read in a college publication. If your journalistic work in the outside world is up to 
this standard there will be no doubt as to your ultimate success in this line.” WLP. 
	  28	  
his voice in the socialist movement, apiece with progressive theory at the time.7 His 
earliest works addressed the challenges facing democracy in the modern age and 
conveyed his discontent with the status quo in politics. He was adamant that the abundant 
promise of the new century demanded a fresh approach to politics, one that harnessed 
public opinion in pursuit of that potential. “The old individualism, with its anarchistic 
laissez-faire,” Lippmann wrote, must surrender the reins to a modern, “constructive 
statesmanship, imbued with a social conscience, and acting through the collective will of 
the nation.”8 More than a decade before he wrote Public Opinion, Lippmann was already 
evaluating the role public opinion played in public affairs. 
Although Lippmann recognized that public opinion was often shaped by passions 
and uneducated views, he believed it had value.9 Without specifically calling it public 
opinion, in writing about the collective will, Lippmann signaled the importance he placed 
on a politically engaged public. In A Preface to Politics (1913) and Drift and Mastery 
(1914), he advocated for a human-centered approach to government, one that attempted 
to satisfy, rather than to thwart, human desire. Lippmann’s thesis, modeled on political 
theorist Graham Wallas’ idea of “the Great Society,” insisted government should 
facilitate both needs and wants; it must be responsive to public opinion.10 “It is not the 
business of the politician to preserve an Olympian indifference to what the stupid people 
call ‘popular whim,’” he wrote. “Being lofty about the ‘passing fad’ and the ephemeral 
7 Lee Simonson to Lippmann, March 1908, WLP. The letter opens with the salutation 
“Dear Deputy to the Socialist Celebrities.” 
8 Walter Lippmann, “Socialism at Harvard,” Harvard Illustrated, March 1909, 139. 
9 “‘Enlightened public opinion’…is largely determined by the real impulses of men.” A 
Preface to Politics, 46. 
10 “For the easy expression of public opinion in government is a clue to what services are 
needed and a test of their success. It keeps the processes of politics well-ventilated and 




outcry is all very well in the biographies of dead men, but rank nonsense in the rulers of 
real ones.”11 Lippmann recognized that public opinion was not an entirely rational 
phenomenon; it was shaped by desires as much as practical concerns. He defended 
passion as a legitimate component of public opinion.12 “Ignore what a man desires and 
you ignore the very source of his power,” Lippmann warned, “run against the grain of a 
nation’s genius and see where you get with your laws.”13 
Although he believed in the power of public opinion, at the same time he 
mistrusted it, perhaps even feared it slightly, a harbinger of his coming views. “The 
public is capable of oppression,” Lippmann wrote. “There will be a tyranny of the 
majority for which minorities will have to prepare.”14 The gulf between his theoretical 
ideals and concrete reality led to contradictions in his writing; his desire to reform 
democratic processes and his elitist concerns about the people who would engage in those 
processes were constantly at war during this period. Lippmann’s enthusiasm for public 
opinion belied his disdain for the actual public, that “great dulling mass” he considered 
largely ignorant or indifferent, and all too easily bewildered.15 Lippmann maintained 
government should be responsive to public opinion, yet considered most public sentiment 
ill-informed. Even as he advocated for a human-centered politics, Lippmann warned of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A Preface to Politics, 31. 
12 “Men desire first, then they reason.” A Preface to Politics, 66. 
13 A Preface to Politics, 70. 
14 Drift and Mastery, 55. 
15 Lippmann readily noticed contradictions in others. When he wrote “‘Idealism’ creates 
an abstraction and then shudders at a reality,” he was referring to statesmen rather than 
himself. A Preface to Politics, 15. 
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placing too much faith in humans.16 “The one thing that no democrat may assume,” he 
wrote, “is that the people are dear good souls, fully competent for their task.”17 Passion 
he would defend; ignorance he could not tolerate. 
Still, Lippmann vacillated between the rationality of the public and the validity of 
public opinion, revealing the tension between his reform-minded progressivism and his 
innate elitism. Regardless of its inherent flaws, Lippmann argued that public opinion 
merited attention. “Democracy, because it registers popular feeling, is…an enlightened 
form of government,” he wrote. “So we who are democrats need not believe that people 
are necessarily right in their choice: some of us are always in the minority, and not a little 
proud of the distinction.”18 So while Lippmann wrote that voting conveyed consent of the 
governed, he rejected the idea it necessarily revealed a form of mass insight.19 “Its real 
value,” he argued, “is to furnish wisdom about multitudes.”20 Despite his embrace of 
public opinion as a gauge of government performance, he deemed entire segments of the  
population unfit to participate in democracy. “You can’t build a modern nation out of 
Georgia crackers, poverty-stricken negroes, the homeless and helpless of the great cities,” 
he wrote. “They make a governing class essential.”21 In time, he would expand this idea 
to include the population at large. He will build his case in favor of insiders versus 
outsiders. Lippmann’s elitism ultimately will prevail. 
16	  “Governments have to be carried on by men, however much we distrust them.” A 
Preface to Politics, 9.	  
17 A Preface to Politics, 90 – 91. 
18 It is evident in his writing that Lippmann saw a clear distinction between himself (and 
his highly educated cohorts) and “the public.” A Preface to Politics, 37. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Drift and Mastery, 141. 
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Lippmann ascended to insider status almost from the launch of his career.22 This 
was a case when his views moved beyond the theoretical into the practical. As a 
journalist and author, Lippmann aspired to educate elites as well as shape public opinion. 
After attracting considerable attention with his first book, Lippmann accepted Herbert 
Croly’s offer to join the New Republic as a founding editor. The publication targeted an 
elite audience, “that select stratum of intellectual talent from which experts might 
derive.”23 According to Lippmann, the weekly magazine was conceived as a means to 
promote the Progressive platform.24 “We started, in other words, on the assumption that 
we were enlisted as loyal, though we hoped critical, members of the Progressive 
movement,” he wrote. “We thought the movement was established. We thought that 
Roosevelt would continue to lead it.”25 When it became clear Theodore Roosevelt could 
not win the 1916 election, and after much lobbying of his fellow editors by Lippmann, 
the New Republic belatedly threw its support behind President Woodrow Wilson’s re-
election.26 Before long, the editors of the New Republic were meeting regularly with 
22 Lippmann “made his way almost effortlessly into the highest levels of society and 
politics, his uninterrupted elevation almost proof in itself of the progressive view of 
history.” Sidney Blumenthal, afterword to Liberty and the News, by Walter Lippmann 
(1920; repr., Chicago: BN Publishing, 2007), 63. 
23 Kaplan, 355-356. The magazine’s mission, according to Croly, was “to do something 
towards brightening the coinage of American opinion, sharpening the edges of its 
design.” Herbert Croly, “The New Republic Idea,” New Republic, December 6, 1922, 3. 
24 Croly recruited Lippmann to join the New Republic in November 1913; the first issue 
was published two months after the start of World War I. (Lippmann continued writing 
for Socialist publications throughout much of 1914. In June 1914, he was listed as a 
member of the New Review advisory board. His name had been removed from the list by 
the following issue.) The leading editors’ note for the inaugural issue advised readers that 
the new magazine was “frankly an experiment…and attempt to find (a) national audience 
for a journal of interpretation and opinion.” New Republic 1, no. 1, November 7, 1914.  
25 Walter Lippmann, “Notes for a Biography,” New Republic, July 16, 1930, 250. 




members of the Wilson administration, much as they had previously met regularly with 
Roosevelt.27 
Regarding their connections at the White House, Lippmann insisted that, 
following a quarrel with Roosevelt, the editors of the New Republic “never had any close 
personal association with any public man.”28 He and Croly were, however, in close touch 
with Wilson advisor Colonel Edward House, and Lippmann frequently corresponded and 
met with Secretary of War Newton Baker, often making policy suggestions and asking 
Baker to pass along information to Wilson, or writing directly to the President himself. 
(He would leave the New Republic to briefly join Baker’s staff at the War Department in 
1917, before being recruited to serve on the Inquiry, where he drafted the majority of 
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points). Yet, according to Lippmann, if the President 
regularly adopted policies endorsed by the magazine, it was, as he once wrote to Wilson 
appointee George Rublee, “a happy journalistic coincidence.”29 Lippmann maintained the 
editors were never privy to inside information. “We never knew anything that hadn’t 
appeared in the newspapers,” he wrote.30 This, of course, was not true. Despite 
Lippmann’s repeated disavowals, his private correspondence reveals he actively sought 
opportunities to assist and influence members of the Wilson administration.31  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Lippmann wrote the labor plank for Roosevelt’s Bull Moose Party platform. Steel, 65.  
28 Lippmann, “Notes for a Biography,” 251. 
29 Lippmann to George Rublee, August 26, 1916, congratulating Rublee on Wilson’s 
decision to renominate him to the Federal Trade Commission. WLP. 
30 Lippmann, “Notes for a Biography,” 252.  
31 “The things you are most closely in touch with are the very things we are most likely to 
need help in understanding and interpreting.” Lippmann to Baker, April 21, 1916. Baker 
replied, “I will always be glad to see you. There are several sub-surface things about 





When, in January 1917, President Wilson lifted the phrase “peace without 
victory” from the title of a December 1916 Lippmann editorial and used it in an address 
to the Senate, it was hard to dismiss as a coincidence, and Lippmann claimed the New 
Republic editors were “horrified” rather than happy.32 In any case, the incident enhanced 
the impression of a close relationship between the White House and the magazine. Other 
journalists continued to assume the magazine was, if not an organ of, a strategic partner 
to the Wilson administration: “To us the morning’s news means only a sort of editorial 
paralysis; we can only wait and wait, and refrain from new undertakings till we know 
what’s to happen; but of course the New Republic must go on advising and 
commenting.”33 The assumption raised the profiles of both the magazine and 
Lippmann.34 C.P. Scott, publisher of the Manchester Guardian, recruited him to cable 
updates on the war from America, noting that readers in England would undoubtedly be 
interested in Lippmann’s views. “It is, I think, quite recognized here that you are in 
intimate communication with the President,” Scott wrote.35  
Not only would Lippmann enjoy some form of communication with every U.S. 
president from Theodore Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson (wielding more influence in some 
administrations than others), he also engaged in correspondence with secretaries of State, 
military commanders, senators and congressmen.38 As his readership grew, so did his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Lippmann, “Notes for a Biography,” 252. Wilson used the phrase to promote his peace 
plan, a wholly different context than Lippmann, who was against the idea of a negotiated 
peace. Walter Lippmann, “Peace Without Victory,” New Republic, December 23, 1916. 
33 Frederick L. Allen to Lippmann, Feb. 1, 1917. WLP. 
34 As Lippmann related: “once to our intense surprise the stock market reacted when an 
issue of The New Republic appeared on the newsstands.” “Notes for a Biography,” 252. 
35 C.P. Scott to Lippmann, March 21, 1917, WLP. 
38 Former President Teddy Roosevelt wrote to Lippmann expressing his pleasure with A 
Preface to Politics: “With your main thesis I am in hearty agreement…I also much 
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ability to leverage his platform to gain inside information from government officials and 
other elites.39 Prior to joining the New Republic, Lippmann regarded the press as 
operating on the periphery of public affairs; now, as a journalist, he helped shape the very 
policies he was writing about. He referred to people who relied solely on the press for 
knowledge, those who were “limited to gazing at the facade of public life,” as 
“outsiders.” This condition put such men at a disadvantage. “Insiders,” those elite men 
who had direct knowledge of public affairs, “read the newspapers and then telephone to 
find out what really happened.”40 It was between these two groups that “the cleavage of 
opinion” most often occurred.41 The disparities between insiders and outsiders would be a 
recurring theme in Lippmann’s views on public opinion. During this period, he thought 
the press might bridge the divide between the two, primarily by insiders making better 
use of publicity so as to convince outsiders of the rightness of their arguments.42 In 
addition to its watchdog duties, Lippmann saw the press as a conduit for elites to make 
their case to the public.43 “Nothing,” he wrote, “would be more disheartening than to do a 
good job and have nobody know about it.”44  
appreciate your tone toward me.” Roosevelt to Lippmann, December 12, 1913, WLP. 
Roosevelt reviewed Lippmann’s next book, Drift and Mastery, along with Herbert 
Croly’s Progressive Democracy, writing: “No man who wishes seriously to study our 
present social, industrial, and political life…can afford not to read these books through 
and through and to ponder and digest them.” Theodore Roosevelt, “Two Noteworthy 
Books on Democracy,” Outlook, Nov. 18, 1914, 648. 
39 David Weingast considered columnists like Lippmann “practitioners of personal 
journalism,” opinion makers who use their platform to practice a “distinctly individual 
interpretation of the news.” Weingast, 297. 
40 Walter Lippmann, “Insiders and Outsiders,” New Republic, November 13, 1915, 35. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Lippmann, “Insiders and Outsiders,” 36. 
43 Walter Lippmann, “A National Diagnosis,” Everybody’s, Feb 1913, 248. 
44 Walter Lippmann, “The Greatest Question,” Everybody’s, April 1911. 
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Lippmann’s views on the press during this period 
“To govern a democracy you have to educate it.”45  
Lippmann’s views on the press during this period, much like his views on public 
opinion, were unfixed. At times, he felt the news reflected public opinion; at others, that 
the press censored itself out of deference to its audience; and at others still, that public 
opinion distorted the news.48 For example, Lippmann attributed the muckrakers’ initial 
popularity to a genuine dissatisfaction among their audience. “If business and politics 
really served American need,” he explained, “you could never induce people to believe 
so many accusations against them.”49 In this way, he thought the press mirrored public 
opinion. He also wrote, rather contradictorily, just a few pages later that the muckrakers 
went too far: “But the fact that a public official took no bribe soon ceased to shield him 
from popular attack…he wasn’t for what public opinion had come to expect, and the 
muckrakers laid their traps for him.”50 Yet it was during his year with the muckrakers at 
Everybody’s magazine that Lippmann experienced firsthand how outside pressures 
influenced news content. It was not, however, the usual suspects lording power over the 
publication that most alarmed him – it was the way editors shrank before public opinion:  
I have worked in the editorial office of a popular magazine, a magazine 
that is known widely as a champion of popular rights. By personal 
experience, by intimate conversations, and by looking about, I think I am 
pretty well aware of what the influence of business upon journalism 
amounts to. I have seen the inside working of business pressure; articles of 
my own have been suppressed after they were in type; friends of mine 
have told me stories of expurgation, of the “morganization” of their 
45 A Preface to Politics, 37. 
48 A Preface to Politics, 30. 
49 Drift and Mastery, 24.  
50 Drift and Mastery, 27. Ultimately, Lippmann felt muckraking exhausted itself in the 
relentless pursuit of corruption: launching indiscriminate attacks on easy targets was a 
misreading of the public’s appetite. “The search for not-dishonest men ceased to be 
interesting.” 
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editorial policy. And in the face of that I should like to record it as my 
sincere conviction that no financial power is one-tenth so corrupting, so 
insidious, so hostile to originality and frank statement as the fear of the 
public which reads the magazine. For one item suppressed out of respect 
for a railroad or a bank, nine are rejected because of the prejudices of the 
public. This will anger the farmers, that will arouse the Catholics… 
Anybody can take a fling at poor old Mr. Rockefeller, but the great mass 
of average citizens (to which none of us belongs) must be left in 
undisturbed possession of its prejudices.51  
This editorial self-censorship, Lippmann complained, was “the reason why 
American journalism is so flaccid, so repetitious and so dull.”52 He questioned the press 
as a source of reliable facts, and considered its lackluster performance a disservice to the 
public that relied on it for information. “Pick up your newspaper,” Lippmann wrote, “run 
over in your mind the ‘issues’ of a campaign, and then ask yourself whether the average 
man is entirely to blame because he smiles a bit at Armageddon and refuses to take the 
politician at his rhetorical valuation?”53 While the preceding quote appears to be a light-
hearted jab at the press, in more serious musings Lippmann warned that this lack of 
knowledge undermined democracy. “Those portions of America where there are voting 
booths but no schools cannot possibly be described as democracies,” he wrote. “Nor can 
the person who reads one corrupt newspaper and then goes out to vote make any claim to 
having registered his will. He may have a will, but he has not used it.”54  
51 A Preface to Politics, 60-61. 
52 A Preface to Politics, 61. 
53 A Preface to Politics, 3. 




The problem Lippmann identified was two-fold: The press made poor choices 
regarding news content and the public lacked the critical skills to discern whether news 
was accurate and, just as importantly, relevant.55 Lippmann worried that the public, who 
took the newspaper to stay informed on current affairs, was being misled. Newspaper 
readers, he wrote, were “torn and twisted by the irrelevant, in frenzy about issues that do 
not concern us, bored with those that do.”56 At this point in time, Lippmann did not 
consider the situation hopeless. Nor did he consider himself a part of the problem, even 
though a few examples of criticism could be pointed at him. The issue, as he saw it, was 
not that the press could not do a good job but rather that it would not. Editors were 
unwilling to risk alienating their audiences. 
Lippmann had an abiding interest in foreign affairs and addressed how news 
coverage of such issues shaped public opinion. “It is small wonder that newspapers are, 
in the main, instruments of irritation between peoples,” he wrote. “In almost every crisis 
the tension is increased by the newspapers.”57 Lippmann faulted editors who relinquished 
their decision-making function to public opinion, while making allowances for the 
pressures they faced. News on international affairs, which almost always revolved around 
conflict, aroused the emotions of a community; the editor, of course, was part of the 
community, too. Taking a “strong” stand on the front page was the safest approach,  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Editorial cartoons featuring Wall Street financiers were mistaken for legitimate 
portraits that “no end of fairly sane people believe.” Drift and Mastery, 24. 
56 Drift and Mastery, 118-119. 
57 Walter Lippmann, “Some Notes on the Press,” excerpt from The Stakes of Diplomacy, 
in Rossiter and Lare, 398. 
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Lippmann suggested, “for it flatters everybody.” In attempting a more balanced, nuanced 
approach — what he referred to as the “weak” stand — editors risked coming off as 
“academic, mugwumpish, unmanly.”58 The key to balance, he explained, was in making 
“appeals to thought which is pale rather than to lusts which are strong.”59 Lippmann 
acknowledged it was difficult for an editor to go against the prevailing public mood; he 
did not feel such decisions were made with malicious intent. “He does it with a good 
conscience, for the human conscience is never so much at ease as when it follows the line 
of least resistance,” Lippmann wrote. “Only saints, heroes, and specialists in virtue feel 
remorse because they have done what everybody was doing and agreed with what 
everybody was thinking.”60 
During World War I, Lippmann was troubled by government attempts at 
censorship and suppression of news. When the United States Post Office refused to 
forward socialist newspapers it deemed “seditious,” he expressed his concerns to Colonel 
House, while allowing that some degree of censorship during a time of war was 
inevitable. “I have no doctrinaire belief in free speech,” Lippmann wrote. “In the interest 
of war it is necessary to sacrifice some of it.”61  He worried that censorship would stir up 
more agitation than a radical paper possibly could. As he wrote in 1913, “We deprive 
anarchists of free speech by the heavy hand of a police magistrate, and furnish them with 
58 Lippmann, “Some Notes on the Press,” 399. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Lippmann to Colonel House, October 17, 1917. Lippmann initially discussed his 
concerns with House in person, who then asked him to put his views in a letter so House 
could share it with President Wilson. Diary entry, October 17, 1917, reel 160, WLP. 
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a practical instead of a theoretical argument against government.”62 Although he was a 
journalist, over the years Lippmann would concede there were circumstances where the 
First Amendment could – as well as others where he felt it should – be circumscribed. 
During the war, Lippmann’s primary argument against press suppression was that it 
negatively affected public opinion. 
Throughout this period, Lippmann was refining his views about the role of the 
press and public opinion. He felt each served important functions in democracy, although 
he was still calibrating the proper balance required for the relationship to flourish. He was 
optimistic that equilibrium could be achieved. In Lippmann’s view, uneducated and 
indifferent voters – those Georgia crackers and poverty-stricken Negroes he so readily 
dismissed – posed the greatest obstacle to a workable democracy. “The great reactionary 
forces in the world to-day are not the professed reactionaries,” he wrote, “but the great 
dulling mass of people who don’t care.”63  The public’s ignorance and apathy were both 
symptom of an inadequate press and cause of an ill-judged public opinion. 
Despite his reservations about the public and his lack of confidence in the press, 
his early writings reflect a generally positive outlook; he did not consider the challenges 
he identified insurmountable. Like many progressives of that era, he championed the 
scientific method and endorsed education reform to address the deficiencies in the 
public’s knowledge of public affairs. Lippmann believed fact and reason would lead 
public opinion toward wise conclusions. Progressives like Herbert Croly and Walter 
Weyl, Lippmann’s future co-editors at the New Republic, and Randolph Bourne and John 
Dewey, who would also write for the magazine, had been advocating for experts, the 
62 A Preface to Politics, 15. 
63 Walter Lippmann, “In Defence of the Suffragettes,” Harvard Monthly, Nov. 1909, 64. 
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scientific method, a human-focused politics, and the inevitability of progress prior to  
Lippmann’s own endorsement of those ideals.64 In their books, these men, like 
Lippmann, laid out visions of a “mystically perfected democracy.”65 Dewey, Bourne and 
Croly built their visions on “a strong faith in magnetic intellects as pilots of social 
change.”66 So did Lippmann. The antidote to what Lippmann considered the public’s 
appalling lack of knowledge, the partisan motives of the press, and the shallow platitudes 
of politics was a steady stream of reliable facts. “No matter what the remedy is,” he 
wrote, “the facts must come first; whatever the theory you deduce, the only solid 
foundation is the facts; the way to begin is to find out.”67 Lippmann had faith the press 
could facilitate this ideal, and in the next period, he would call upon it to help protect the 
sources of public opinion from corruption, and, perhaps, save democracy from itself. 
In these early writings, Lippmann sowed the seeds of ideas that will mature in 
Public Opinion and in his later works. During this period he was neither as sure nor as 
focused as he would be in the coming years when his theories are more fully realized. He 
will raise these issues more forcefully in the next period. 
64 Croly was the first of the group to address these issues; his book, The Promise of 
American Life, was published in 1909, three years before Weyl’s The New Democracy. 
Croly’s second book, Progressive Democracy, was published the same year as 
Lippmann’s Drift and Mastery. Felix Frankfurter said Croly’s first book “became the 
reservoir for all political writing” that came after it. Felix Frankfurter, “Herbert Croly and 
American Political Opinion,” New Republic, July 16, 1930, 247. Eulau called Croly “the 
intellectual godfather of Woodrow Wilson’s ‘New Freedom’ and Franklin Roosevelt’s 
‘New Deal.’” Heinz Eulau, “Herbert Croly’s Promise,” Antioch Review 8, no. 3 (Autumn 
1948): 382. Lippmann considered Croly “the first important political philosopher who 
appeared in America in the twentieth century.” Lippmann, “Notes for a Biography,” 250. 
65 David W. Noble, “The New Republic and the Idea of Progress, 1914-1920,” 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 38, no. 3 (Dec. 1951): 389. 
66 Kaplan, 351. 
67 Lippmann, “A National Diagnosis,” 248. 
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PART II; CHAPTER TWO 
 1919-1921 
The present crisis of western democracy is a crisis in journalism. 
– Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News
This chapter covers the years 1919 to 1921, a relatively brief yet significant 
period in the evolution of Walter Lippmann’s views on the press and public opinion. As 
the optimistic national mood of the progressive era receded in the years following the end 
of World War I, Lippmann’s voice, so hopeful in his first two books, assumed an urgent 
tone as he revisited his earlier views.1 Lippmann’s wartime experience disabused him of 
many of his idealistic notions, not least the possibility of an unadulterated public opinion 
successfully navigating a marketplace of ideas flooded with publicity and propaganda.2 
What Lippmann lacked of his pre-war optimism was offset by his confidence and 
passion. He remained convinced an enlightened public opinion was possible and, despite 
his harsh assessment of the press, still believed American journalism could be redeemed. 
Lippmann detailed his theories to rehabilitate both in his book Liberty and the News.3  
1 “War had wrecked the domestic reform movement;” progressivism was replaced by 
2 “Journalists, like others, lost faith in verities a democratic market society had taken for 
granted. Their experience of propaganda during the war and public relations thereafter 
convinced then that the world they reported was one that interested parties had 
constructed for them to report.” Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social 
History of American Newspapers (Basic Books, Inc., 1978), 6. 
3 Two of the three essays in Liberty and the News were first published in the Atlantic 
Monthly. In a letter to Atlantic editor Ellery Sedgwick, Lippmann revealed his strategy 
and his intended audience. “I think the articles are arranged in such a way as to catch the 
attention of newspaper men who may not be interested in the more philosophical 
arguments addressed to students of politics. I am not at all pleased with the titles.” 
Lippmann to Ellery Sedgwick, June 30, 1919, WLP.  
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With his New Republic colleague Charles Merz, he undertook a pioneering content 
analysis of the New York Times’ coverage of the Russian Revolution.4 During this period, 
Lippmann resumed his position at the New Republic and served as the first American 
foreign correspondent for the Manchester Guardian.5  
In the wake of World War I, Lippmann viewed the relationship between the press, 
public opinion and government from a new perspective. Before the war, he thought an 
uninformed public diminished the promise of democracy; he now felt a misinformed 
public threatened the entire foundation: 
It is clear that in a society where public opinion has become decisive, 
nothing that counts in the formation of it can really be a matter of 
indifference. When I say “can be,” I am speaking literally. What 
men…believe about property, government, conscription, taxation, the 
origins of the late war…constitutes the difference between life and death, 
prosperity and misfortune, and it will never on this earth be tolerated as 
indifferent.6  
Lippmann started his career as an idealist.7 He volunteered for the war effort 
because he wanted to be of service, to help make the world “safe for democracy”8 (and, if 
he garnered a little acclaim in the process, that was fine, too). Lippmann supported 
President Wilson’s war aims, framing the fight to spread democracy as a noble endeavor.9 
Instead, the United States’ involvement in World War I led to a curtailing of our citizens’ 
4 Lippmann and Merz developed rigorous criteria to ensure the objectivity of their 
analysis; Lippmann, long a proponent of the scientific method, put his ideal into practice 
with laudatory results. “The reliability of the news may be tested by a few fundamental 
and decisive happenings about which there is no doubt.” Walter Lippmann and Charles 
Merz, “More News from the Times,” New Republic, August 11, 1920, 301. 
5 From March 1919 to June 1920, he wrote about 85 articles for the Manchester Guardian. 
6 Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News (1920; repr., BN Publishing, 2007), 21. 
7 See Noble, “The New Republic and the Idea of Progress;” and Heinz Eulau, “Wilsonian 
Idealist: Walter Lippmann Goes to War,” Antioch Review 14, no. 1 (Spring, 1954).  
8 From President Wilson’s war declaration, April 2, 1917. 
9 “We are fighting for democracy…for the democratic rights of other nations.” Walter 
Lippmann, “Losing Our First Trenches,” New Republic, July 14, 1917, 292. 
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basic rights. Upon his return from Europe, Lippmann found it necessary to mount a 
defense of democratic principles at home.10 His war experiences seemed to reinvigorate 
his crusading nature. “It is forever incredible,” Lippmann wrote to Newton Baker, “that 
an administration announcing the most spacious ideals in our history should have done 
more to endanger fundamental American liberties than any group of men for a hundred 
years.”11 
 
Lippmann’s views on public opinion during this period  
“A sound public opinion cannot exist without access to the news.”12 
In the essays, articles and books he wrote during this period, Lippmann warned 
that without a legitimate public opinion “democracy will degenerate.”13 To avoid this 
fate, he insisted public opinion must be grounded in truths rather than patriotic slogans or 
political platitudes.14 He rejected passion as an appropriate source of opinion in favor of 
rationality. Whereas he once wrote off whole segments of the population as unfit to 
participate in democracy, he now maintained that the public was capable of reaching 
reasoned conclusions when provided with accurate information. “To deny this, it seems 
to me, is to claim that the mass of men is impervious to education,” Lippmann wrote, 
“and to deny that, is to deny the postulate of democracy.”15 This pronouncement 
contradicted his earlier position about the necessity of a governing class and hinged on 
the question of whether the facts were readily available. 
                                                
10 “We have learned that many of the hard won rights of man are utterly insecure.” 
Liberty and the News, 12. 
11 Lippmann to Newton Baker, January 7, 1920, WLP. 
12 Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, “A Test of the News,” New Republic, August 4, 
1920, 1. 
13 Liberty and the News, 59. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Liberty and the News, 58. 
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Lippmann’s views during this period reflect his disillusionment upon “the 
discovery that opinion can be manufactured.”16 He had been troubled by wartime 
restrictions on free speech and began work on the essays that would become Liberty and 
the News (1920) soon after he returned to America.17 The book reads as an exercise in 
reconciling his earlier idealistic views on the press and public opinion with the realities of 
his war experience. Lippmann first broached the idea of pursuing the topic with Ellery 
Sedgwick, the editor of the Atlantic Monthly, in April 1919.18 “The idea has come to me 
gradually as a result of certain experiences with the official propaganda machine,” he 
wrote to Sedgwick, “and my hope is to attempt a restatement of the problem of freedom 
of thought as it presents itself in modern society under modern conditions of government 
and with a modern knowledge of how to manipulate the human mind.”19 
Lippmann’s primary concern during this period was protecting the sources of 
public opinion. “Everything else,” he wrote, “depends upon it.”20 Assuming as Lippmann 
did “a public opinion that governs,” his realization that news was often manipulated and 
consent routinely manufactured suggested grave consequences for democracy.21 “Without 
protection against propaganda, without standards of evidence, without criteria of 
emphasis,” he wrote, “the living substance of all popular decision is exposed to every 
                                                
16 Lippmann to Ellery Sedgwick, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, April 7, 1919,WLP. 
17 The original title for the book, according to a contract between Lippmann and 
Harcourt, Brace and Howe dated November 14, 1919, was The Sources of Public 
Opinion, Democracy and the News. WLP, reel 12. 
18 “I have started to write a longish article around the general idea that freedom of thought 
and speech present themselves in a new light and raise new problems because of the 
discovery that opinion can be manufactured.” Lippmann to Sedgwick, April 7, 1919. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Liberty and the News, 37. 
21 Liberty and the News, 37. 
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prejudice and to infinite exploitation.”22 He understood a misinformed public was 
vulnerable to propaganda and distortions. “The quack, the charlatan, the jingo, and the 
terrorist,” he warned, “can flourish only where the audience is deprived of independent 
access to information.”23 Lippmann had little confidence in the old clichés about truth 
prevailing over lies; he considered untrue opinions potentially dangerous, and “just as 
effective as true ones, if not a little more effective.”24  
A recurring theme in Lippmann’s writing over the years was that the world had 
grown too complex for most men to fully contemplate.25 The problem, as he identified it 
during this period, was that the public realized the issues were challenging, but they did 
not have access to the information required to reach informed opinions. “Increasingly 
they are baffled because the facts are not available,” Lippmann wrote, “and they are 
wondering whether government by consent can survive in a time when the manufacture 
of consent is an unregulated private enterprise.”26 Prior to the war, he attributed the 
dismal state of public opinion to the public’s indifference toward public affairs.  Now, 
however, Lippmann’s writing assumed a civically engaged public much interested in the 
news of the day. “What he knows of events that matter enormously to him, the purposes 
of governments, the aspirations of peoples, the struggles of classes, he knows as second, 
third, or fourth hand,” Lippmann wrote. “He cannot go see for himself. Even the things 
22 Liberty and the News, 37. 
23 Liberty and the News, 32. 
24 Liberty and the News, 42. The skeptical Lippmann fell more into the “you can fool 
most of the people most of the time” camp.  
25 “The world about which each man is supposed to have opinions has become so 
complicated as to defy his powers of understanding.” Liberty and the News, 22. 
26 Liberty and the News, 2. 
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that are near to him have become too involved for his judgment.”27 Lippmann’s concern 
was that this second-hand news was more than likely subjective.28 He was adamant that a 
well-formed public opinion depended upon access to unbiased news.29 Reason required 
objectivity.30  
Lippmann witnessed first hand the ill effects of second-hand news during World 
War I, when distance amplified the usual distortions, and, aided by the censors, primed 
conditions for the spread of rumor and propaganda. Although he argued in Liberty and 
the News that the First Amendment was the basis of all liberty, his dire assessment that 
uninformed beliefs would ultimately result in disaster led Lippmann to endorse a 
circumscribed freedom of expression. In an article that appeared in the New Republic the 
same month his first essay from Liberty and the News was published in the Atlantic, 
Lippmann seemed to argue that true liberty meant ensuring the right to free expression 
applied equally to popular and unpopular beliefs, with no qualification that the belief be 
based on fact.31 “That means protecting some pretty poor opinions,” Lippmann explained, 
“ignorant, wild and mean opinions, occasionally even sinister ones.”32  He went on to 
suggest that pride of opinion – a belief that one held a monopoly on the truth – was “the 
worst form of pride.”33 It would have to be surrendered if the nation was to recover from 
                                                
27 Liberty and the News, 22. 
28 “But where all news comes at second-hand, where all testimony is uncertain, men cease 
to respond to truths, and respond simply to opinions.” Liberty and the News, 32-33. 
29 Liberty and the News, 58. 
30 Liberty and the News, 34. 
31 “For the very essence of any sincere belief in the liberty promised by the First 
Amendment is a willingness to defend the liberty of opinions with which you disagree.” 
Walter Lippmann, “Unrest,” New Republic, November 12, 1919, 317. 
32 Lippmann, “Unrest,” 317. The article seems aimed at specific critics in defense of some 
specific opinions, rather than simply promoting tolerance at large.  
33 Lippmann, “Unrest,” 320. 
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the psychic injuries of war.34 Yet in that same article, Lippmann wrote that vehemence 
must yield to veracity, which hewed closer to his sentiments in the Atlantic essays.35 In 
those works, he maintained that true liberty could exist only if free expression was 
protected at all times – protected from distortion, propaganda and lies.36 Lippmann would 
define freedom of opinion ideally “as freedom from error, illusion, and 
misinterpretation.”37  
When Lippmann wrote that suppression of free expression led to tension and 
sterility of thought, he made it clear he was referring to beliefs backed by facts. “Men 
cease to say what they think, and when they cease to say it, they soon cease to think it,” 
he wrote. “They think in reference to their critics and not in reference to the facts.”38 
Lippmann maintained that even the most ardent supporters of liberty never proposed a 
theory in which freedom of expression was absolute. He described how other theorists 
had justified limits on speech “to the effect that ‘of course’ the freedom granted shall not 
be employed too destructively” – a “weasel clause” Lippmann called it – and always, he 
noted, to suppress opinions not aligned with their own values.39 Thus, he argued, liberty 
had only ever been guaranteed in matters of little consequence. In its current 
manifestation, liberty was arbitrary; it remained vulnerable to circumstance. “When men 
feel themselves secure, heresy is cultivated as the spice of life,” Lippmann wrote. 
“During a war liberty disappears as the community feels itself menaced….In other words, 
34 “Time and energy that should go to building and restoring are instead…fighting a 
guerilla war against misunderstanding and intolerance.” Liberty and the News, 11. 
35 Lippmann, “Unrest,” 320. 
36 Liberty and the News, 37. 
37 Liberty and the News, 39. 
38 Liberty and the News, 11. 
39 Liberty and the News, 15. 
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when men are not afraid, they are not afraid of ideas; when they are much afraid, they are 
afraid of anything that seems, or can even be made to appear, seditious.”40  Lippmann’s 
insistence on protecting opinion from corruption implied untrue opinions should not 
enjoy the same protection.41 
In a time of great insecurity, certain opinions acting on unstable minds 
may cause infinite disaster. Knowing that such opinions necessarily 
originate in slender evidence, that they are propelled more by prejudice 
from the rear than by any reference to realities, it seems to me that to build 
the case for liberty upon the dogma of their unlimited prerogatives is to 
build it upon the poorest foundation. For, even though we grant that the 
world is best served by the liberty of all opinion, the plain fact is that men 
are too busy and too much concerned to fight more than spasmodically for 
such liberty.42 
Even as he advocated for objectivity and rallied for facts, Lippmann pinned his 
hopes for democracy on a “Public” that bore little resemblance to the actual public, the 
public which was susceptible to propaganda and prone to a herd mentality.43 His idealized 
“Public” was non-partisan, reasonable and free from prejudice. He reserved the honorific 
for a small subset of the general population: “those who in any crisis are seeking the truth 
and not advocating their dogma.”44 Lippmann’s lofty description indicated that, during 
40 Liberty and the News, 17.  
41 “Mr. Lippmann vindicates his own theory of liberty by refusing to permit freedom of 
opinion to those who fail to adhere to his own faith in facts.” New York Times, “Fact and 
Fancy as to ‘Suppression of News,’” March 21, 1920, 1. 
42 Liberty and the News, 38. Lippmann’s correspondence during this period dispels any 
notion that his support of freedom for even verifiable expression was absolute. He 
insisted the press recognize the distinction between the private affairs of public men. 
Lippmann took issue with a manuscript by Heber Blankenhorn, whom he worked with in 
propaganda, which recounted dinner conversations the two men enjoyed with their 
British cohorts. In a letter demanding the book’s publisher remove all reference to him, 
Lippmann referred to the stories as “a gross violation of hospitality extended to a group 
of American officers by British officials” and called it “an act of bad faith.” Lippmann to 
Ferris Greenslet, April 19, 1919, WLP. 
43 “At the present time a nation easily acts like a crowd.” Liberty and the News, 33. 
44 Lippmann, “Unrest,” 320. 
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this period in the evolution of his views, he maintained a degree of confidence that public 
opinion could be reformed, that knowledge could overcome bias, and that his ideal might 
one day be realized, a time when “when evidence, not mere jaw, will then decide.”45 
Without a disentangled Public the unending clash of Ins and Outs, Haves 
and Have Nots, Reds and Whites is likely to be sheer commotion. No 
doubt there is much that is insincere and much that is maudlin said about 
the Public. The news system of the world being what it is, it is possible to 
fool most of the Public a good part of the time. The Public is one of those 
ideals, if you like, which we miss oftener than we attain. But it is a 
precious ideal. It is the only way we have of formulating our belief that 
reason is the final test of action, that mere push and pull are not by 
themselves to set the issues and render the decision.46 
Consistent with his views in the previous period, Lippmann’s faith that facts 
would lead to a well-reasoned public opinion remained strong. What shifted was where 
he now focused his criticism: it was no longer the “bewildered herd” but the press that 
posed the biggest challenge to achieving the democratic ideal.47 The press, Lippmann 
concluded, bore an obligation to inform, rather than misinform, the public. And while his 
support of freedom of expression was equivocal, in one regard Lippmann remained 
absolute: “It may be bad to suppress a particular opinion,” he wrote, “but the really 
deadly thing is to suppress the news.”48 
Lippmann’s views on the press during this period 
“The news about the news needs to be told.”49 
Lippmann no longer considered the shortcomings of the press mere inadequacies, 
but rather “the supreme danger which confronts popular government.”50 He explained 
45 Lippmann, “Unrest,” 320. 
46 Lippmann, “Unrest,” 321. 
47 Liberty and the News, 8. 
48 Liberty and the News, 38. 
49 Liberty and the News, 9. 
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that as government grew more responsive to public opinion, representative government 
had been replaced with “government by newspaper.”51 As he described it, “the news is 
the chief source of the opinion by which government now proceeds.”52 This alarmed 
Lippmann. He viewed the press as powerful gatekeepers, and urged it to use its power 
honorably, insisting “there can be no higher law in journalism than to tell the truth and 
shame the devil.”53 During this period, Lippmann felt the press was not telling the truth, 
so he elected to tell the truth about the press. His major works during this brief period laid 
out his indictment against journalists. 
The most destructive form of untruth is sophistry and propaganda by those 
who profession is to report the news. The news columns are common 
carriers. When those who control them arrogate to themselves the right to 
determine by their own consciences what shall be reported and for what 
purpose, democracy is unworkable. Public opinion is blockaded.  For 
when a people can no longer confidently repair ‘to the best fountains for 
their information,’ then anyone’s guess and anyone’s rumor, each man’s 
hopes and each man’s whim becomes the basis of government.54  
As the population moved from small communities to big cities, as government 
departments multiplied, as the nation became increasingly involved in foreign affairs, it 
became decidedly difficult to follow everything happening at a local, state and national 
level.55 “What men who make studies of politics a vocation cannot do, the man who has 
an hour a day for newspapers and talk cannot possibly hope to do,” Lippmann wrote. “He 
must seize catchwords and headlines or nothing.”56 Lippmann allowed that the 
50 Liberty and the News, 6. 
51 Liberty and the News, 36. 
52 Liberty and the News, 6. 
53 Liberty and the News, 7. 
54 Liberty and the News, 5-6. 
55 Lippmann admitted he knew little of local interests outside his own city. “I have not the 
vaguest idea of what Brooklyn is interested in.” Liberty and the News, 31. 
56 Liberty and the News, 22-23. 
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complexity of the issues facing the country made it difficult for reporters as well as the 
public to make sense of it all, a theme he would advance in Public Opinion. “News 
comes from a distance; it comes helter-skelter, in inconceivable confusion; it deals with 
matters that are not easily understood; it arrives and is assimilated by busy and tired 
people who must take what is given to them,” he wrote.57 In Liberty and the News, 
Lippmann likened the role of newsgathering in the formation of public opinion to the 
proceedings of a legal trial. He wrote of the unreliability of eyewitnesses and compared 
the public to a jury reaching verdicts based on false testimony.58 Unlike a legal trial, there 
was no penalty for perjury in newsgathering nor was it required to adhere to any rules of 
evidence. “If I lie in a lawsuit involving the fate of my neighbor’s cow, I can go to jail,” 
Lippmann wrote. “But if I lie to a million readers in a matter involving war and peace, I 
can lie my head off, and, if I choose the right series of lies, be entirely irresponsible.”59  
Lippmann cast himself in the role of court administrator, repeatedly imploring the press 
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.  
Although he wrote that “the mechanism of the news-supply has developed 
without plan, and there is no one point in it at which one can fix responsibility for truth,” 
Lippmann viewed the editor as the linchpin in the entire enterprise. 60 He held the 
newspaper editor, as the arbiter of public opinion, liable for the failings of the press.61 
57 Liberty and the News, 23. 
58 Ibid. “The jury is the whole community, not even the qualified voters alone. The jury is 
everybody who creates public sentiment – chattering gossips, unscrupulous liars, 
congenital liars, feeble-minded people, prostitute minds, corrupting agents.” 
59 Liberty and the News, 23-24. 
60 Liberty and The News, 25. 
61 Liberty and the News, 28. The editor “has to decide the question which is of more 
importance than any other in the formation of opinions, the question where attention is to 
be directed.”  
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The news of the day as it reaches the newspaper office is an incredible 
medley of fact, propaganda, rumor, suspicion, clues, hopes, and fears, and 
the task of selecting and ordering that news is one of the truly sacred and 
priestly offices in a democracy. For the newspaper is in all literalness the 
bible of democracy…It is the only serious book most people read. It is the 
only book they read every day. (The editor has) the power to determine 
each day what shall seem important and what shall be neglected.62   
 
In his first two books, Lippmann maintained that the press engaged in self-
censorship out of fear of alienating the public. During the war, Lippmann considered 
government-sanctioned press restrictions the biggest threat to the free exchange of 
information: Americans were presented with a slanted view the war.63 The censors, 
Lippmann wrote, “abolished all possibility of telling the unprejudiced and unvarnished 
truth,” as they could easily conjure a reason to justify any news they sought to suppress.64  
“So the censor made the news vacuum; then the propagandist filled it.”65 The barriers 
impeding the transmission of accurate news about the war across the Atlantic were many: 
overseas cable transmissions were censored for both political and military concerns; news 
items were censored not only for substance, but also for presentation, page position and 
even font choice; cable access was hampered not just by cost, but due to demand and the 
limited capacity of transatlantic cable.66 Lippmann argued that even the reporters 
covering the events overseas relied on second-hand news.67 “Most people,” he wrote,  
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 Although publishers and editors were arrested under the Sedition Act during WWI, the 
press supposedly engaged in “voluntary” censorship; the issue was not magically 
resolved after the war. 
64 Lippmann, “Unrest,” 318. 
65 Ibid. 
66 “Undesirable messages are not infrequently served badly.” Liberty and the News, 27.  
67 “What the correspondents…reported day by day was what they were told at press 
headquarters, and of that only what they were allowed to tell.” Liberty and the News, 26. 
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“seem to believe that, when they meet a war correspondent or a special writer from the 
Peace Conference, they have seen a man who has seen the things he wrote about. Far 
from it. Nobody saw this war.”68  
After the war, Lippmann once again blamed the press for the tepid state of news 
reporting, although he felt its motives had changed. “Since the war, especially, editors 
have come to believe that their highest duty is not to report but instruct,” he wrote, “not 
to print news, but to save civilization.”69 It was not just that journalists misunderstood 
their role in democracy; Lippmann accused the press of actively engaging in suppression 
and distortion to promote their own points of view. “The work of reporters has thus 
become confused with the work of preachers, revivalists, prophets and agitators,” he 
wrote. “The current theory of American newspaperdom is that an abstraction like the 
truth and a grace like fairness must be sacrificed whenever anyone thinks the necessities 
of civilization require the sacrifice.”70 After the war, publishers and editors assumed the 
role of the censor: they would decide what the public did and did not need to know. 
Editors, Lippmann wrote, “are on the whole curiously unanimous in their selection and in 
their emphasis. Once you know the party and the social affiliation of a newspaper, you 
can predict with considerable certainty the perspective in which the news will be 
68 Ibid. A memo from Ralph Hayes to Secretary of War Newton Baker supports 
Lippmann’s allegations about news coming out of the peace conference: “The entire 
delegation of newspaper men – allied as well as American – at the Peace Conference, are 
bitterly incensed over the action of the Conference yesterday decreeing that news of the 
conference will be given out solely in the form of a communiqué prepared by the 
Secretaries of the commissions…The attitude of the writers is exceedingly hostile and 
defiant at what they consider the repudiation of the first of the Fourteen Points – open 
covenants openly arrived at.” Hayes to Baker, Jan. 16, 1919, Newton Baker Papers. 
69 Liberty and the News, 3. The NYT wrote that Lippmann had “inadequate 
comprehension” of the reporter and editor’s duties and his suggested reforms were 
“invalidated by his apparent faith in the ancient myth of ‘suppression of the news.’” 
70 Liberty and the News, 4. 
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displayed.”71 Whereas Lippmann had once warned about the tyranny of the majority, he 
now worried that a relatively small group of journalists had wrested control of public 
information. “That minority, which is proudly prepared to think for it, and not only 
prepared, but cocksure that it alone knows how to think for it, has adopted the theory that 
the public should know what is good for it.”72  
Amid all the press criticism raised in Liberty and the News, Lippmann singled out 
New York Times publisher Adolph Ochs and British publisher Lord Northcliffe as two 
whose behavior he found especially egregious.73 “(They) believe that edification is more 
important than veracity,” he wrote. “They preen themselves upon it. To patriotism, as 
they define it day to day, all other considerations must yield.”74 Lippmann cited C.P. 
Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian and Frank Cobb, editorial page editor of the 
New York World, as embodying the best practices of modern journalism.75 (There was 
possible self-interest at work here, as Lippmann wrote for Scott’s paper and would soon 
                                                
71 Liberty and the News, 28. 
72 Liberty and the News, 4. 
73 In a critical review of Liberty and the News, the New York Times took issue with 
Lippmann’s generalizations of newsroom practices, especially in light of his never having 
worked as a reporter. “He has never been a newspaper man and, while he knows a good 
deal about news, most of what he knows is not true.” Regarding his singling out the paper 
for critique, the Times wrote, “he appears to regard THE NEW YORK TIMES as one of 
the most baleful and pernicious of them all.” Whether the preceding phrase was 
ultimately prescient or imprudently provoking, just a few months later, in “A Test of the 
News,” Lippmann would again use the paper to illustrate the failures of journalism. New 
York Times, “Facts and Fancy.” Lippmann’s co-author Merz would go on to serve as the 
editorial page editor of the New York Times from 1938-1961. 
74 Liberty and the News, 5. 
75 “I won’t try, because I can’t succeed, to tell you what association with a paper of such 
clean purpose and great competence has meant to me. Whenever I have been in the mood 
to despair about the press and to wonder whether democratic institutions were workable 
with the kind of press that we have, I have come back to the Guardian as a living 
illustration of what character and intelligence can actually do in a commercialized world. 
I am heavily in your debt.” Lippmann to C.P. Scott, November 12, 1920, WLP.  
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go to work with Cobb). In a February 1920 speech, Lippmann criticized Ochs’ paper for 
declining, in 1918, to print the terms of a Russian Bolshevik proposal to negotiate an 
early end to the war; Allied officials deemed it an insincere piece of Soviet propaganda. 
Lippmann, however, made clear his thoughts on the New York Times’ editorial decision. 
“There is the censorship,” he said, “the absolute denial that the American people have a 
right to know the terms of a peace offer made to their government by another 
government.” He noted that, in another instance, the Times had published unattributed 
information – “in quotes, verbatim” – that could not be substantiated: a report from 
Berlin about an unnamed Russian assumed to be secret leader of the Soviet movement, 
speaking at a secret meeting of leading Communists, whose identities were also 
unknown. Lippmann categorized this second item as pure speculation and hearsay; he 
found the juxtaposition between the two standards jarring. 
Out of that soil, that soil of blockaded news and advertised fiction, have 
grown groups of people who have conducted the red hysteria. Moderate 
people, people with a sense of evidence, people who seek the truth about 
things they talk about, faced with that kind of thing, have been unable to 
take a position, to make up their minds. Some of these people are inspired 
by sinister motives. Some are partly hysterical, but those who are most 
interested are those who are fanatically self-righteous. There are people in 
this country to-day who believe that they are chosen by God or by the 
Union League Club to save this country from contamination.76 
Still, Lippmann was not yet finished with the New York Times. He would once 
more use that paper to illustrate the failures of the press. His next examination of the 
Times, however, would present quantified, objective criticisms that bolstered and 
confirmed his subjective appraisals. 
76 Norman Hapgood, The Advancing Hour (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920), xviii. 
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Liberty and the News and “A Test of the News” expanded upon an idea Lippmann 
previously touched on in The Stakes of Diplomacy (1915): the challenges of reporting on 
foreign affairs. Lippmann and Charles Merz analyzed The New York Times’ coverage of 
the Bolshevik Revolution, publishing their results as “A Test of the News,” a 42-page 
supplement to the New Republic.77 To assess the accuracy of the Times’ reporting, 
Lippmann and Merz examined more than three thousand news items on events in Russia 
that appeared in the paper over a thirty-six month period, from March 1917 to March 
1920.78 They listed five reasons the New York Times was selected for the study, each one 
complimentary.79 Their conclusions, however, were harsh: “On every essential question 
the net effect of the news was almost invariably wrong.”80 The failures constituted a 
dereliction of duty. “Not incidentally, not accidentally, but persistently,” Lippmann and 
Merz wrote, “the news served a purpose which was not the truth which frail, but 
disinterested human nature could secure.”81 Their findings echoed Lippmann’s 
77 Merz joined the World in 1924, and the New York Times in 1931. 
78 The NYT review of Liberty and the News defended American coverage of events in 
Russia, saying the language barrier made reporting exceedingly difficult: “Any editor will 
feel that the best practical method for handling Russia is to print all the stories he can get 
about Russia, ascribing each one to its proper source, and giving where possible an 
indication of the opinions of the man who made this statement or that so that the reader 
can form some idea of the possible deflection due to his ideas. and if editorial conclusions 
differ from Mr. Lippmann’s it does no necessarily follow that the editor has been bought 
by General Deniken.” New York Times, “Facts and Fancy.” 
79 The reasons were so complimentary, in fact, the first reason (“As great as any 
newspaper in America, and far greater than the majority”) was repeated, perhaps for 
emphasis, at the end of the list (“and fifth, because the Times is one of the really great 
newspapers in the world”). Lippmann and Merz, “A Test of the News,” 1. 
80 Lippmann and Merz, “More News from the Times,” 299. 
81 Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, “A Test of the News:’ Some Criticisms,” New 
Republic, September 8, 1920, 33 
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assessment of the press in Liberty and the News: “This touches the core of democracy, for 
without reliable and disinterested news, representative democracy is a farce.”82 
 While acknowledging the demands faced by reporters working on deadline, 
Lippmann and Merz asserted those difficulties were all the more reason that studies such 
as theirs should be conducted, and conducted regularly. “Since human beings are poor 
witnesses, easily thrown off the scent, easily mislead by a personal bias, profoundly 
influenced by their social environment,” they wrote, “does it not follow that a constant 
testing of the news and a growing self-consciousness about the main source of error is a 
necessary part of the democratic philosophy?”83 Whatever his motivations in repeatedly 
holding up the New York Times for criticism, Lippmann seemed sincere in his desire to 
reform journalism. As he wrote to Upton Sinclair at the start of 1920, “The problem of 
how to get an adequate press seems to me infinitely the most important problem in 
modern democracy.”84 Lippmann was convinced the problem could be resolved.  
In April 1921, Lippmann took a six-month sabbatical from the New Republic, to 
reflect more deeply – and, as it turned out, more despairingly – about these issues, 
retreating to his Long Island beach house to write Public Opinion.85 He never returned to 
the magazine. In the next period, he would part with some of his earlier views as well. 
82 Lippmann and Merz, “Some Criticisms,” 33. 
83 Lippmann and Merz, “Some Criticisms,” 32. 
84 Lippmann to Upton Sinclair, January 27, 1920, WLP. 
85 Steel, 177. 
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PART II; CHAPTER THREE  
1922-1924  
You cannot take more political wisdom out of human beings than there is in them. 
– Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion
During the first period in the evolution of Walter Lippmann’s views, he graduated 
from Harvard University (1910), published his first book (1913), helped found the New 
Republic (1914), and authored one of the most successful propaganda pamphlets of 
World War I (1918).1 The first year of the current period was marked by two professional 
milestones: In 1922, Lippmann joined the New York World as an assistant editorial page 
editor, and he published his classic work, Public Opinion. His influence grew along with 
his platform as his career path continued its upward trajectory, and his views on the press 
and public opinion evolved at a similarly rapid pace. In the two preceding periods 
examined in this study, Lippmann recalibrated various theories as he sought to align the 
functions of the press and public opinion with the goals of democracy. He embraced and 
abandoned passion in favor of reason as an appropriate source of opinion, shifted the 
blame for the challenges faced by democracy from an indifferent public to an inadequate 
press, and alternately championed the rights of the public even as he derided “the 
bewildered herd.” He never, however, wavered in his conviction that facts must be the 
basis of any remedy, the foundation of any reform. During this period, Lippmann 
approached the issues he had been puzzling over for so long from an entirely different  
1 In the two months he engaged in propaganda work during WWI, Lippmann’s unit 
“produced more than 5 million copies of eighteen different pamphlets.” He authored a 
pamphlet urging German soldiers to surrender; those who did were promised the same 
rations enjoyed by American troops. It was “the most effective of all American propaganda 
material and the one found most often on captured German soldiers.” Steel, 148.  
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angle, debuting a new theory that, while essentially negating many of his earlier 
premises, reconciled the incongruent elements in his previous views on the press and 
public opinion, at least temporarily. 
In Public Opinion, Lippmann analyzed the psychological aspects of opinion 
formation. He concluded that the distortions were so inherently ingrained, the processes 
so fundamentally flawed, the correlation between news and truth so tenuous, it 
invalidated prevailing democratic theories of both the press and public opinion. 
The environment with which our public opinions deal is refracted in many 
ways, by censorship and privacy at the source, by physical and social 
barriers at the other end, by scanty attention, by the poverty of language, 
by distraction, by unconscious constellations of feeling, by wear and tear, 
violence, monotony. These limitations upon our access to that 
environment combine with the obscurity and complexity of the facts 
themselves to thwart clearness and justice of perception, to substitute 
misleading fictions for workable ideas, to deprive us of adequate checks 
upon those who consciously strive to mislead.”2 
In the post-WWI era, the “manufacture of consent” Lippmann first wrote about in 
1919 was common practice, public relations a fast-growing profession.3 Society had 
changed significantly in the years since the utopian ideals of a free press and an 
omnicompetent public first were conceived. “As social truth is organized to-day,” 
Lippmann wrote, “the press is not constituted to furnish from one edition to the next the 
amount of knowledge which the democratic theory of public opinion demands.”4 Both the 
press and the public lacked the resources to uncover truth at a time when the truth was 
2 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (Blacksburg, VA: Wilder Publications, 2010), 46. 
3 As “the manufacture of what is usually called consent.” Liberty and the News, 37. 
4 Public Opinion, 195. 
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not readily discoverable.5 The original democrats had not envisioned the complexity of 
the modern world.6 The ideal would have to yield to reality. Objective facts could not 
conquer personal bias and deeply held stereotypes; public opinion could not govern. 
Unbiased news could not defeat widespread rumors and political propaganda; it was an 
unfair fight the press could not win. Newspapers could not rescue democracy. 
 
Lippmann’s view on public opinion during this period 
“In real life no one acts on the theory that he can have a public opinion 
 on every public question.”7 
 
During this period, Lippmann abandoned the last of his pre-war ideals concerning 
the press and public opinion – the notion that objective news would inevitably lead to a 
well-reasoned public opinion (although he did not suspend his perennial campaign for the 
primacy of facts in public debate). The events of the world were simply too complex for 
reporters to accurately document and the gist of the issues too cryptic for men to 
decipher.8 “In putting together our public opinions, not only do we have to picture more 
space than we can see with our eyes, and more time than we can feel,” he wrote,  “but we 
have to describe and judge more people, more actions, more things than we can ever 
count, or vividly imagine.”9 Lippmann’s thinking on the subject had crystallized, and 
Public Opinion crystallized the concept for readers. Rational public opinion, however, 
                                                
5 “Institutions, having failed to furnish themselves with instruments of knowledge, have 
become a bundle of ‘problems’ which the population as a whole, reading the press as a 
whole, is supposed to solve.” Public Opinion, 196. 
6 “Democracy in its original form never seriously faced the problem which arises because 
the pictures in our heads do not automatically correspond with the world outside.” Public 
Opinion, 22. 
7 Public Opinion, 213. 
8 Public Opinion, 22. 
9 Public Opinion, 84. 
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remained difficult to crystalize. Prejudices, stereotypes and symbols held more sway than 
facts. Like an elaborate game of telephone, the dissemination of information grew less 
reliable the further it spread from its source; facts were misunderstood, manipulated and 
misrepresented at every step.10 What emerged, after a bit of news made its rounds, seldom 
bore more than a passing resemblance to the original event. “The way we see things,” he 
wrote, “is a combination of what is there and of what we expected to find.”11 
It was difficult, Lippmann explained, for people to comprehend the details 
concerning complex events they did not directly witness. Because most newsworthy 
events and political issues unfolded beyond their physical environments, men relied on 
“pictures in their heads,” or stereotypes, to navigate the invisible landscapes.12 “We are 
not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and 
combinations,” he wrote.13 Instead, the general public operated in the realm of “pseudo-
environments,” enhanced by “fictions” that approximated their limited view of the world. 
These internal filters operated in a manner similar to censorship and propaganda; they 
obstructed knowledge and obscured the truth. “Obviously our public opinion is in 
intermittent contact with complexes of all sorts; with ambition and economic interest, 
personal animosity, racial prejudice, class feeling and what not.” Lippmann wrote. “They 
distort our reading, our thinking, our talking and our behavior in a great variety of  
10 Public Opinion, 96. 
11 Public Opinion, 66. 
12 “The only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the 
feeling aroused by his mental image of that event.” Public Opinion, 12. 
13 “We have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it.” Ibid, 13. 
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ways.”14 The use of stereotypes and other cognitive shortcuts was so instinctive, and, 
usually, so unreliable, even eyewitness accounts usually involved a “transfiguration” of 
events.15 
In Public Opinion, Lippmann challenged the soundness of a basic tenet of 
democracy. Based on his analysis of opinion formation, he insisted that the democratic 
ideal of the self-governing man was no longer viable.16 This romanticized vision of the 
citizenry, he argued, was premised on the fallacy “that a reasoned righteousness welled 
up spontaneously out of the mass of men.”17 Original theories of democracy, contingent 
on the consent of the governed, hinged on the assumption of a public endowed with an 
innate knowledge of public affairs.18 This assumption gave rise to the myth of the 
omnicompetent citizen, who was not only wise, but also, Lippmann marveled, 
“consistently public-spirited and endowed with an unflagging interest.”19 (It was certainly 
convenient, he noted, that “by the age of twenty-one he had his political faculties.”20) 
Lippmann had long argued that political science sidestepped the messiness of 
human nature, focusing instead on systems and institutions; the public, in the aggregate, 
was cast in an unbilled role as “the undifferentiated voter.”21 In that field of sanitized 
study, the citizen was “an excessively inhuman creature,” Lippmann wrote. “He was pure 
14 Public Opinion, 45. 
15 Public Opinion, 47. 
16 Public Opinion, 138. 
17 Public Opinion, 141. 
18 The early democrats assumed “men took in the facts as they took in their breath.” 
Public Opinion, 141-142. 
19 Public Opinion, 150. 
20 Public Opinion, 142. 
21 Walter Lippmann, “Politics for Politicians,” review of The American Party System by 
Charles Merriam, New Republic, October 25, 1922, 18. 
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brain. He was reason incarnate.”22 This approach, which Lippmann first wrote about in A 
Preface to Politics, resulted in the study of government as “it was presumed to exist in a 
platonic heaven before it fell to earth.”23 Public opinion, perhaps not surprisingly, was 
also considered – if it was considered at all – as a phenomenon curiously devoid of mere 
mortals. In the event it became necessary to account for how it was possible that masses 
of individuals, with their competing motivations and their conflicting interests, could 
arrive at a consensus in public affairs, public opinion was invoked as an almighty 
universal force, conjured by a mystical oversoul “which imposes order upon random 
opinion.”24 During the war, the driving interest in public opinion concerned how to either 
co-opt it, as the Wilson administration attempted with the Committee on Public 
Information, or subvert it, as both Allied and German propaganda endeavored to. Prior to 
Lippmann’s Public Opinion, little thought was given to how public opinion came to be.25 
“The existence of a force called Public Opinion,” Lippmann wrote, “is in the main taken 
for granted.”26  
While Lippmann wrote in terms of the general population, often utilizing the 
editorial “we” as if to include himself, he nevertheless questioned the emotional and 
intellectual fitness of some citizens to form opinion:  
And finally since opinions do not stop at the normal members of society, 
since for purposes of an election, a propaganda, a following, numbers 
constitute power, the quality of attention is still further depressed. The 
mass of absolutely illiterate, of feeble-minded, grossly neurotic, 
undernourished and frustrated individuals, is very considerable, much 
more considerable there is reason to think than we generally suppose. 
                                                
22 Lippmann, “Politics for Politicians,” 18. 
23 Lippmann, “Politics for Politicians,” 17. 
24 Public Opinion, 110. 
25 Public Opinion, 139. 
26 Ibid. 
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Thus a wide popular appeal is circulated among persons who are mentally 
children or barbarians, people whose lives are a morass of entanglements, 
people whose vitality is exhausted, shut-in people, and people whose 
experience has comprehended no factor in the problem under discussion. 
The stream of public opinion is stopped by them in little eddies of 
misunderstanding, where it is discolored with prejudice and far fetched 
analogy.27 
Lippmann regarded the presumption that the public should form an opinion on 
every public question as further evidence that the democratic ideal of the self-governing 
man was misconceived.28 He maintained that most people had little direct knowledge of, 
or sustained interest in, the majority of public affairs on which they were expected to hold 
opinions.29 The general public, Lippmann insisted, had no burning desire for self-
government.30 Modern man’s limited attention suffered from both internal and external 
distractions. “Every man whose business it is to think knows that he must for part of the 
day create about himself a pool of silence,” Lippmann wrote. “But in the helter-skelter 
which we flatter by the name of civilization, the citizen performs the perilous business of 
government under the worst possible conditions.”31 The public, understandably, invested 
its mental resources in meeting the immediate concerns of daily life; man was self-
centered, Lippmann explained, out of necessity. Obviously, he wrote, those “self-
centered opinions are not sufficient to procure good government.”32 
27 Public Opinion, 45-46. 
28 “The pioneer democrats did not possess the material for resolving the conflicts between 
the known range of man’s attention and their illimitable faith in his dignity.” Public 
Opinion, 143. 
29 “Of public affairs, each of us sees very little, and therefore, they remain dull and 
unappetizing.” Public Opinion, 91. 
30 Public Opinion, 170. 
31 Public Opinion, 44. A friend once wrote that Lippmann “is almost the only thoughtful 
man I know in Washington who never complains that he cannot find time to think.” 
Reston, “The Mockingbird and the Taxicab,” 230-231. 
32 Public Opinion, 169. 
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Mass action was most effective in the limited context of giving consent: saying, 
or, more specifically, voting, yes or no for a candidate or an issue.33 Some members of 
society, as Lippmann had previously argued, were unfit to participate in even that most 
fundamental of democratic actions – voting. “There are two kinds of uninstructed voter,” 
he explained. “There is the man who does not know and knows that he does not know. 
He is generally an enlightened person.” Enlightened, in Lippmann’s estimation, because 
this man voluntarily forfeited his right to vote. Of the two types, he directed his disdain at 
the uninformed man who persisted in exercising his rights at the ballot box. Although this 
man, too, was “uninstructed,” the difference was that he either did not know, or else he 
did not care that he was ignorant. “He can always be gotten to the polls,” Lippmann 
wrote.34 The real power resided with the party machine, which employed propaganda and 
deployed symbols to maintain unity among the “rank and file.”35 Throughout 
government, industry, and institutions, Lippmann found no evidence of a mass of 
individuals who governed as a group. “Nowhere,” he declared, “is the idyllic theory of 
democracy realized.”36 
From the start of his career, Lippmann had advocated for fact as the antidote to 
ill-formed opinion. But facts could be exceedingly intricate and hopelessly bland, and 
remained largely unknown. Only disinterested men could be trusted to investigate issues 
based solely on, preferably quantitative, facts, employing the scientific method to draw 
conclusions. Only experts could make sense of the findings. Because men could be  
33 “The Many can elect after the Few have nominated.” Public Opinion, 130. 
34 Public Opinion, 168. 
35 Public Opinion, 130. 
36 Public Opinion, 127. 
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experts in only a few subjects, at most, even experts depended on outside sources for 
information. “Democratic theory,” Lippmann wrote, “proceeds on the opposite 
assumption and assumes for the purposes of government an unlimited supply of self-
sufficient individuals.”37 Lippmann stated that the public relied on its social set and 
newspapers for most of its information. But the leaders of a social set likely possessed an 
only slightly larger worldview than its members and were susceptible to the same 
prejudices and distorted views.38 He encouraged the public to seek out expert counsel. 
Lippmann went on to argue that increasing reliance on experts, or, at a minimum, being 
open to what they had to say, was “the utmost independence we can exercise.”39 
Because of the inherent difficulty in sorting out the details of an endlessly 
complicated world, Lippmann recommended citizens should limit the issues about which 
they form opinions. Realistic opinions, based on data and analysis, required vigorous 
effort to reach as opposed to casual opinions based on emotions and stereotypes. 
Lippmann revived his argument for insiders versus outsiders, framing the role of experts 
as an almost altruistic service that freed outsider citizens to pursue only those matters that 
directly affected them. In this conception of insiders and outsiders, Lippmann urged the 
public to take its cues from experts. “Complete independence in the universe is simply 
unthinkable,” he wrote. “If we could not take practically everything for granted, we 
should spend our lives in utter triviality.”40 He recommended the heavy lifting be left to 
the experts and the intelligence bureaus, those with the qualifications to discern the facts, 
                                                
37 Public Opinion, 125. 
38 Unless you were a member of the elite: “The private affairs of this set are public 
matters, and public matters are its private, often its family affairs.” Public Opinion, 34. 
39 Public Opinion, 125. 
40 Public Opinion, 125. 
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with their recommendations then passed on to the executives and the specialty men, those 
with the authority to make the decisions and take action. Serious analysis of facts was the 
province of insiders. The general public need not be concerned.  
The ranks of people working in publicity and public relations exploded after 
WWI.41 The challenge facing government by consent, according to Lippmann, was that 
modern government was growing more sensitive to public opinion at the same time the 
means to manipulate that consent was multiplying.42 Although he once believed the press 
might achieve the democratic ideal that was no longer the case. “The Court of Public 
Opinion, open day and night, is to lay down the law for everything all the time,” 
Lippmann wrote. “It is not workable. And when you consider the nature of the news, it is 
not even thinkable.”43  
Lippmann’s view on the press during this period 
“The trouble lies deeper than the press, and so does the remedy.”44 
Lippmann’s thesis in Public Opinion – that too much was expected of the press – 
was at odds with his earlier contention that the failures of the press resulted from a lack 
of effort on its part, a point that he and Merz emphasized with “A Test of the News.” The 
democratic ideal demanded that the modern press overcome the obstacles to sound public 
opinion and compensate for the deficiencies of government. (The press, like education, 
was held up as a solution for all manner of society’s ills.) During this period, Lippmann 
41 “The development of the publicity man is a clear sign that the facts of modern life do 
not spontaneously take a shape in which they can be known.” Public Opinion, 187. 
42 That “the opportunities for manipulation (are) open to anyone who understands the 
process are plain enough….None of us begins to understand the consequences, but it is 
no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of how to create consent will alter every 
political calculation and modify every political premise.” Public Opinion, 138. 
43 Public Opinion, 196. 
44 Public Opinion, 197. 
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argued the press could not meet its obligations due to structural limitations and 
insufficient resources; much like the myth of the self-governing man, the powers 
bestowed upon the press did not correspond with its ability to execute them.45 The press, 
Lippmann wrote, “is too frail to carry the burden of popular sovereignty, to supply 
spontaneously the truth which democrats hoped was inborn.”46 He insisted such 
expectations, like the ones placed on the public, were unrealistic; the press encountered 
the same barriers to information that the public faced.47 “If the newspapers, then, are to be 
charged with the duty of translating the whole public life of mankind, so that every adult 
can arrive at an opinion on every moot topic, they fail, they are bound to fail, in any 
future one can conceive they will continue to fail.”48  
The confounding factor, as Lippmann identified it during this period, was one of 
economics. Newspapers were commercial enterprises, yet regarded as a public service 
and held to the same ethical standards as a non-profit.49 Although the press possessed 
finite resources of time, talent, and money, the public expected it to provide limitless 




                                                
45 Public Opinion, 196. 
46 Public Opinion, 174-175. 
47 “We misunderstand the limited nature of news, the illimitable complexity of society; 
we overestimate our own endurance, public spirit, and all-around competence.” Public 
Opinion, 196. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Lippmann wrote that critics, echoing “the moral standards of the community,” judged 
the press as they would a school or a church. “This illustrates again the concave character 
of democracy.” Public Opinion, 175. 
50 “A free press, if you judge by the attitude of the readers, means newspapers that are 
virtually given away.” Ibid. 
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The insistent and ancient belief that truth is not earned, but inspired, 
revealed, supplied gratis, comes out very plainly in our economic 
prejudices as readers of newspapers. We expect the newspaper to serve us 
with truth however unprofitable the truth may be. For this difficult and 
often dangerous service, which we recognize as fundamental, we expected 
to pay until recently the smallest coin turned out by the mint.51  
The strange relationship between the press and the public was unlike that of any 
other industry’s with its customers; Lippmann referred to it as “an anomaly of our 
civilization.”52 The reader pledged no loyalty to his daily paper. Circulation, Lippmann 
wrote, was “based not on a marriage contract with their readers, but on free love.”53 
Advertising, not circulation, supported newspapers. Although circulation could be a point 
of pride for a publication, its true value lay in attracting advertisers.54 Advertisers wanted 
to reach potential customers, and newspapers depended on advertising revenue; therefore, 
both courted the same audience – customers with a measure of disposable income. It was 
this portion of the population, “the buying public,” toward which the newspaper geared 
its content.55 Of course, the buying public tended to work in the same industries that 
advertised in newspapers; and editors were frequently members of the same social set as 
the advertisers. Because most newspapers targeted a select segment of readers, 
newspaper editors tended to conform to certain conventions. Lippmann no longer raised 
51 Public Opinion, 175. 
52 “Nobody thinks for a moment that he ought to pay for his newspaper. He expects the 
fountains of truth to bubble, but he enters into no contract, legal or moral, involving any 
risk, cost or trouble to himself. He will pay a nominal price when it suits him, will stop 
paying whenever it suits him, will turn to another paper when that suits him.” Ibid. 
53 Public Opinion, 178. 
54 “The citizen will pay for his telephone, his railroad rides, his motor car, his 
entertainment. But he does not pay openly for his news. He will, however, pay 
handsomely for the privilege of having someone read about him.” Public Opinion, 176. 
55 Public Opinion, 177. 
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questions about the conformity of the news as he had previously. Advertising revenue 
provided the economic incentive for newspapers to adopt the mores of the buying public. 
Every day and against an unremitting deadline, editors had to make an array of 
decisions based on the allocation of resources: audience, advertisers, attention, space 
limitations, page placement, and the limits of their own attention. “Without 
standardization, without stereotypes, without routine judgments, without a fairly ruthless 
disregard of subtlety,” Lippmann wrote, “the editor would soon die of excitement.”56 
Editors’ preference for “the indisputable fact” alleviated some of the pressure, as a 
concrete detail was less open to interpretation, was less emotionally charged, and, 
therefore, was less likely to offend a reader or an advertiser.57 “All the subtler and deeper 
truths are,” Lippmann wrote, “very unreliable truths. They involve judgment.”58 During 
this period, he took a more charitable view of the newspaper editor’s performance than he 
had in previous books.59 He returned to the idea that the news is self-censored, to a 
degree, by the editor’s obligation to weigh news values against economic concerns. 
Accordingly, editorial decisions were not based solely on journalistic standards or even 
on the editor’s personal preference, but on what would attract – and hold – the customers’ 
attention.60 “Somebody has said quite aptly,” Lippmann wrote, “that the newspaper editor 
has to be re-elected every day.”61  
                                                
56 Public Opinion, 191. 
57 Public Opinion, 181. 
58 Public Opinion, 190. 
59 Lippmann accepted a position on the editorial staff of the World while still writing 
Public Opinion; but did not officially join the paper before completing the manuscript. 
Lippmann assumed the post of editorial page editor after Frank Cobb’s death in 1923, 
and was named editor of the World in 1929. 
60 “He must woo at least a section of his readers every day.” Public Opinion, 191. 
61 Public Opinion, 175. 
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Though the buying public constituted only a fraction of the entire population, it 
had an outsized influence on newsgathering. Many smaller and rural papers, lacking the 
resources to report on national events, republished coverage provided by the larger 
metropolitan papers and press associations. Therefore, the general news a majority of 
people read, regardless of where they lived, actually was targeted toward this small 
advertising demographic.62 Due to the homogeneity of mainstream news reporting, 
editors sought to distinguish their papers from competitors by running special features, 
which held more interest for the local reader than general news.63 
In order to differentiate themselves and collect a steady public most papers 
have to go outside the field of general news. They go to the dazzling levels 
of society, to scandal and crime, to sports, pictures, actresses, advice to the 
lovelorn, highschool notes, women’s pages, buyer’s pages, cooking 
recipes, chess, whist, gardening, comic strips, thundering partisanship, not 
because publishers and editors are interested in everything but news, but 
because they have to find some way of holding on to that alleged host of 
passionately interested readers, who are supposed by some critics of the 
press to be clamoring for the truth and nothing but the truth.64  
Contrary to the claims advanced by press critics, news was not, Lippmann 
insisted, synonymous with the truth.65 “The function of the news is to signalize an event,” 
he wrote, “the function of the truth is to bring light to the hidden facts, to set them into 
relation with each other, and make a picture of the world on which men can act.”66 
Government and industry officials routinely engaged in both censorship and propaganda 
– Lippmann wrote that one could not exist without the other – and controlled the flow of
62 “Roughly speaking, the economic support of general news gathering is in the price paid 
for advertised goods by the fairly prosperous sections of cities with more than one 
hundred thousand inhabitants.” Public Opinion, 177. 
63 “We suppose an appetite for uninteresting truths which is not discovered by any honest 
analysis of our own tastes.” Public Opinion, 196. 
64 Public Opinion, 180-181. 
65 Public Opinion, 194. 
66 Public Opinion, 194. 
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available information about social institutions. Anyone of these leaders could, at his 
discretion, dictate “what facts, in what setting, in what guise he shall permit the public to 
know.”67 It was patently false, Lippmann insisted, to believe the press could uncover facts 
that institutions failed to record. 68 The truth demanded documentation. “Everything else,” 
he wrote, “is argument and opinion.”69  
When Lippmann wrote that newspapers were the primary source of “the data of 
our opinions,” he was not suggesting the data was objective.70 “There is a very small 
body of exact knowledge, which it requires no outstanding ability or training to deal 
with,” Lippmann wrote. “The rest is in the journalist’s own discretion.”71 The public, he 
wrote, “reads not the news, but the news with an aura of suggestion about it. It hears 
reports, not objective as the facts are, but already stereotyped to a certain pattern of 
behavior.”72 And even the most conscientious of reporters was susceptible to subjectivity, 
his opinions vulnerable to the same biases, prejudices and stereotypes as the general 
public.73 “His version of the truth,” Lippmann explained, “is only his version.”74 Despite 
his own fidelity to facts, Lippmann seemed resigned to accept that the news would never 
be truly objective. The costs were too great. “The facts are not simple,” Lippmann wrote, 
“and not at all obvious.”75 Facts could also be hopelessly dull and uninteresting, and dull 
                                                
67 Public Opinion, 138. 
68 Public Opinion, 196. 
69 The press “can normally record only what has been recorded for it by institutions.” 
Public Opinion, 195. 
70 Public Opinion, 38. 
71 Public Opinion, 194. 
72 Public Opinion, 135. 
73 Public Opinion, 190. 
74 Public Opinion, 194. 
75 Public Opinion, 187. 
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and uninteresting were unlikely to capture the readers’ attention.76 “The fact that is 
sensational to the reader,” he wrote, “is the fact that almost every journalist will seek.”77 
In regards to the quality of public information available, Lippmann argued that 
the reporter filled the most valuable and least valued role at the newspaper.78 Due to the 
low pay and low prestige, the job was often considered a way station for ambitious, 
talented men.79 “Newsgathering,” Lippmann wrote, “does not attract to itself anything 
like the number of trained and able men which its public importance would seem to 
demand.”80  
Lippmann’s analyses of the press performance and opinion formation during this 
period undermined the basis of his criticisms of the New York Times’ reporting on the 
Bolshevik Revolution.81 Scant attention has been drawn to the contradictions between his 
theses in Public Opinion and his specific arguments in “A Test of the News.” In a letter from 
his co-author praising Public Opinion and Lippmann’s elucidation of the obstacles faced by 
the press, Merz noted “I wish we’d seen it as clearly when we did the Russian supplement.”82 
76 Public Opinion, 193. 
77 Public Opinion, 190. 
78 Public Opinion, 181. 
79 “The rewards in journalism go to specialty work, to signed correspondence which has 
editorial quality, to executives, and to men with a knack and flavor of their own.” Ibid. 
80 Lippmann referred to journalism schools as “trade schools.” Public Opinion, 181. This 
is not to suggest he didn’t hold the profession to high standards. His correspondence 
shows he was generous with advice to aspiring journalists, and dissuaded the untalented 
from pursuing newspaper careers: “Your own letter is so candid that perhaps you will 
pardon a little candor in return. I could not advise you to go into journalism at present 
because to tell you the truth your grammar is not adequate. You ought really to consider 
whether your command of English is great enough to justify your attempting to enter an 
already overcrowded field.” Lippmann to Michael Altschuler, April 24, 1917, WLP. 
81 In Public Opinion, he wrote that, in addition to military censorship and language 
barriers, during the revolution Russia “was officially closed to effective news reporting 
by the fact that the hardest thing to report is chaos.” Public Opinion, 192. 
82 Merz to Lippmann, Spring/Summer 1922, WLP. 
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Also in sharp contrast to his views in Liberty and the News, during this period 
Lippmann maintained that the influence of readers, editors, and publishers over news 
content “is not the control of truth by prejudice, but of one opinion by another opinion 
that is not demonstrably less true.”83 For men who had no previous knowledge or 
preformed opinions on a subject, news items concerning unfamiliar events were 
“indistinguishable from fiction.”84 Lippmann’s examination of cognitive process 
indicated that different people would interpret information in different ways. The press 
could not overcome the individual prejudices of the public; the public supplied its own 
meaning to the news.85 Thus, readers trusted or favored papers that reinforced their own 
views – further evidence that man was self-interested. As Lippmann explained, “What 
better criterion does the man at the breakfast table possess than that the newspaper 
version checks up with his own opinion?”86  
The original democratic theorists ascribed almost mystical powers to the press 
and the public. Neither could fulfill its ideal in modern society. Although the press was 
the main source of information on public affairs, the public devoted only a fraction of its 
attention to the newspaper each day. (Lippmann cited two surveys that found the majority 
of people spent just fifteen minutes a day reading the newspaper.87) Most people did not 
have time to ponder events that did not directly affect them; it was a luxury few could 
83 Public Opinion, 195. 
84 The law makes no provision for accuracy in news, thus the general reader has no 
recourse. Only the injured party may sue for libel. Lippmann felt local news tended to be 
more accurate, since the maligned party was more likely to read, and then challenge, 
misinformation about themselves. Public Opinion, 179. 
85 Lippmann first wrote in A Preface to Politics that people choose facts to confirm their 
biases. Public Opinion, 189. 
86 Public Opinion, 179. 
87 “Very few people have an accurate idea of fifteen minutes, so the figures are not to be 
taken literally.” Public Opinion, 35. 
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afford.88 “We are concerned in public affairs,” Lippmann wrote, “but immersed in our 
private ones.”89 Limited human resources also constrained the press. The democratic ideal 
held that the press should function as a conduit for the unadulterated transmission of 
factual information to the public, an obligation Lippmann maintained it was humanly 
impossible to satisfy. “All the reporters in the world working all the hours of the day 
could not witness all the happenings in the world,” he wrote.90 As it became harder to 
sustain the myth of the omnicompetent citizen, the onus for securing the knowledge 
necessary to form public opinion shifted to the press. In short, democracy expected the 
press to compensate for its own institutional shortcomings. The democratic ideal, 
however, overestimated not only the public’s capacity for knowledge but also the ability 
of the press to provide it.  
Unconsciously the theory sets up the single reader as theoretically 
omnicompetent, and puts upon the press the burden of accomplishing 
whatever representative government, industrial organization, and 
diplomacy have failed to accomplish. Acting upon everybody for thirty 
minutes in twenty-four hours, the press is asked to create a mystical force 
called Public Opinion that will take up the slack in public institutions.91 
 
Lippmann acknowledged and accepted the limitations of both the press and public 
opinion, and, rather than mandating ambitious reforms, repurposed the proper role of 
each, suggesting that responsibilities once bestowed upon the press and the public be 
allocated to experts and “specialty” men instead. “News is like the beam of a 
searchlight,” he wrote. “Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone. They 
                                                
88 Public Opinion, 39. 
89 Public Opinion, 35. 
90 Public Opinion, 183. 
91 Public Opinion, 196. 
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cannot govern society by episodes, incidents, and eruptions.”92 Unlike mainstream news, 
expert information was intended for use by specialists, although Lippmann suggested 
some might possibly be appropriate for newspapers. “The common interests very largely 
elude public opinion entirely,” he wrote, “and can be managed only by a specialized class 
whose personal interests reach beyond the locality.”93 (In April 1919, Lippmann penned 
an angry letter addressed to the editor of the Democratic Chronicle insisting he had never 
implied government should be run by experts.)94  
While many scholars consider Public Opinion Lippmann’s farewell to 
progressivism and the start of his alleged turn toward conservatism, the book closes with 
a reiteration of his belief that the democratic experiment could still succeed, albeit in a 
reimagined manner, and only with sustained effort. Despite his disenchantment with 
traditional democratic theory, Lippmann did not consider himself anti-democratic, but, 
rather, pragmatic. He may have outgrown his youthful idealism, but he had not grown 
cynical. “And if amidst all the evils of this decade, you have not seen men and women, 
known moments that you would like to multiply,” Lippmann wrote on the final page of 
Public Opinion, “the Lord himself cannot help you.”95 
92 Public Opinion, 197. 
93 Public Opinion, 169. 
94 Lippmann called it an “absurd notion,” writing “God save us from any such plan…I 
don’t expect you to make any correction, as the matter is of no importance. Being an 
editor myself, I know how easy it is to jump to conclusions on inaccurate information.” 
Lippmann, to editor, Democratic Chronicle (sic), Rochester, NY, April 26, 1919, WLP. 
95 Public Opinion, 225. 
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PART II; CHAPTER FOUR 
1925-1951 
Although public business is my main interest and I give most of my time 
to watching it, I cannot find time to do what is expected of me in the 
theory of democracy; that is, to know what is going on and to have an 
opinion worth expressing on every question which confronts a self-
governing community. And I have not happened to meet anybody, from a 
President of the United States to a professor of political science, who came 
anywhere near to embodying the accepted ideal of the sovereign and 
omnicompetent citizen. 
– Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public
The twenty-six years covered in this chapter – the longest continuously    
consistent span in the evolution of Walter Lippmann’s views on the press and public 
opinion  – coincided with a period of long-term stability in his career, his thirty-six year 
tenure at the New York Herald Tribune.1 As he settled into his role as an influential and 
well-respected syndicated newspaper columnist, his views on the press became 
noticeably more positive. In contrast, Lippmann, who from his earliest writings had 
wrestled with reforming public opinion, no longer believed it could be salvaged. Instead, 
he insisted that public opinion must be reined in. Many of Lippmann’s earlier views 
reached maturation during this time, his disparate theses on the press and public opinion 
coalesced, informed by a well-honed pragmatism that obscured much of the idealism on 
display in his younger years. He also published 17 books: Although many were reprints 
of his newspaper columns, this phenomenal output was on par with his national stature.  
Lippmann confessed in the closing pages of Public Opinion that he had “written, 
and thrown away, several endings to this book.”2 There would be no conclusion, no 
unraveling of mysteries, no final inventory of ideas. Instead, Lippmann wrapped up that 
1 Lippmann launched his “Today and Tomorrow” column on September 8, 1931. 
2 Public Opinion, 220. 
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book at the point he imagined “the polite reader has begun to look furtively at his 
watch.”3 When Lippmann wrote The Phantom Public (1925), he called it a sequel to 
Public Opinion, but it read more as the final chapter he neglected to write three years 
earlier. The Phantom Public, belatedly, carried the analysis in Public Opinion to its 
logical conclusion.4 In Public Opinion, he included a perfunctory plea to education, 
envisioning a new way of thinking to “bring our public opinion into grip with the 
environment.”5 The Phantom Public, however, was Lippmann’s “attempt to bring the 
theory of democracy into somewhat truer alignment with the nature of public opinion.”6 
Lippmann’s views on public opinion during this period: 
The public must be put in its place, so that is may exercise its 
own powers, but no less and perhaps more, so that each of us may live free 
of the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd.7 
Perhaps emboldened by the success of Public Opinion, Lippmann escalated the 
arguments advanced in that book during this period, expanding on points he had raised 
previously, and clarifying what he considered the legitimate boundaries of public opinion 
in modern society. In his postscript to that work, Lippmann assailed the sacred cow of 
democracy: majority rule, the active manifestation of public opinion.8 The ideal of the 
self-governing man was a cornerstone of democracy, but Lippmann thought majority rule 
3 Public Opinion, 220. 
4 Lippmann to Irene McNeal Swazey, April 6, 1925, WLP, reel 30. 
5 A half-hearted attempt, coming after more than 200 pages in which he detailed the 
overwhelming obstacles impeding the formation of opinion. Public Opinion, 219. 
6 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (1925; repr., New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2009), 187.  
7 Phantom Public, 145. 
8 “The principle of majority rule has acquired an unction that protects it from 
criticism…(It) has been hallowed by an altogether adventitious sanctity due to an 
association of ideas with a religious hope of salvation.” Walter Lippmann, “Why Should 
the Majority Rule?,” Harper’s Magazine, March 1926, 399.  
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proved a weak foundation to build upon.9 Democratic theorists had imbued public 
opinion with mystical powers it could not summon; democratic reformers overlooked its 
inherent weaknesses in reverence to its origins. Lippmann would now address the 
corresponding damage the imperfect ideal had inflicted on popular government. “The 
notion that public opinion can and will decide all issues is in appearance very 
democratic,” he wrote. “In practice it undermines and destroys democratic 
government.”10 Lippmann acknowledged that his observations contradicted the orthodox 
theory of democracy. “That theory rests upon the assumption that there is a public which 
directs the course of events,” he wrote. “I hold that the public is a mere phantom. It is an 
abstraction.”11 Having established he had no confidence in public opinion as a governing 
force, Lippmann set about dismantling arguments for its reform.  
Reformers had long touted education as a panacea for the challenges facing 
democracy. “They have assumed that, even if the majority is not wise,” Lippmann wrote, 
“it is on the road to wisdom, and that with sufficient education the people would learn 
how to rule.”12 But civic education could not keep pace with political and social changes; 
it was “bound always to be in arrears.”13 The public had not been properly outfitted to 
navigate the political landscape. “Nowhere,” Lippmann wrote during this period, “is the 
sovereign citizen of the future given a hint as to how, while he is earning a living, rearing 
                                                
9 “Those who believed in democracy have always assumed that the majority should rule.” 
Lippmann, “Why Should the Majority Rule?,” 399. 
10 Walter Lippmann, “Everybody’s Business and Nobody’s,” T&T, April 10, 1941.  
11 Phantom Public, 67. 
12 Lippmann, “Why Should the Majority Rule?,” 399.  
13 Phantom Public, 17. 
 80 
children and enjoying his life, he is to keep himself informed about the progress of this 
swarming confusion of problems.”14 If education were actually the supreme remedy – as 
Lippmann maintained it was in the final chapter of Public Opinion – then certainly it 
would have rectified the situation by now.15 “For education,” he noted in The Phantom 
Public, “has furnished the thesis of the last chapter of every optimistic book on 
democracy written for one hundred and fifty years.”16 
Proposals aimed at strengthening democracy proceeded from the myth of the self-
governing citizen. These proposals, Lippmann argued, inevitably overlooked the 
evidence that the public did not govern, could not act, and was only minimally interested 
in public affairs.17 The evidence suggested the democratic ideal was misconceived. 
The only the effect of inviting everybody to judge every public question is 
to confuse everybody about everything. It is not in fact possible for all 
people to know all about all things, and the pretense that they can and that 
they do is a bad illusion. It is in the exact sense of the word not democracy 
but demagogy. It rests on the idea that everyone has the time to study 
everything, and that is not true – on the idea that everyone is competent to 
judge everything, and that is not true.18  
This was not a value judgment, Lippmann insisted, but rather a dispassionate 
analysis of a flawed theory.19 “I think it is a false ideal,” he wrote. “I do not mean an 
undesirable ideal. I mean an unattainable ideal, bad only in the sense that it is bad for a 
fat man to try to be a ballet dancer.”20 The problem with conventional solutions to the 
enduring problems of democracy, according to Lippmann, was that those solutions 
14 Phantom Public, 14.  
15 Public Opinion, 219. 
16 Phantom Public, 12.  
17 “He reigns in theory but in fact he does not govern.” Phantom Public, 4. 
18 Lippmann, “Everybody’s Business.”  
19 “A century of experience compels us to deny this assumption.” Phantom Public, 69. 
20 Phantom Public, 29. 
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ultimately translated into additional burdens on an already overwhelmed public: namely 
more voting, more often, on more issues. To ask the public to perform more acts of 
democracy, Lippmann countered, was not only counterproductive it was 
counterintuitive.21 “He will not have a better public opinion because he is asked to 
express his opinion more often,” Lippmann wrote. “He will simply be more bewildered, 
more bored and more ready to follow along.”22 He maintained that the less asked of the 
public, the better. Despite the earnest efforts of various reformers, and in spite of the 
arguably misplaced confidence of democratic theorists, human nature, stubbornly, 
remained fixed – man had failed to realize the ideal of the sovereign, self-governing 
omnicompetent citizen. “The problems that vex democracy,” Lippmann explained, “seem 
to be unmanageable by democratic methods.”23 Uncompromising fidelity to original 
democratic theory sabotaged the promise of a workable democracy.24  
In Public Opinion, Lippmann debunked the myth of the omnicompetent citizen; in 
The Phantom Public, he debunked the supposed virtue of majority rule.25  He rejected the 
idea that majority rule was necessarily – or even arbitrarily – wise or moral; instead he 
considered it a perversion of public opinion.26  
                                                
21 “For what reason is there to think that subjecting so many more affairs to the method of 
the vote will reveal hitherto undiscovered wisdom and technical competence and 
reservoirs of public interest in men?” Phantom Public, 28. 
22 Phantom Public, 27. 
23 Phantom Public, 179-180. 
24 “If democracy cannot direct affairs, then a philosophy which expects it to direct them 
will encourage people to attempt the impossible; they will fail." Phantom Public, 145. 
25 “There is nothing in the teachings of Jesus or St. Francis which justifies us in thinking 
that the opinions of fifty-one percent of a group are better than the opinions of forty-nine 
percent.” Lippmann, “Why Should the Majority Rule?,” 399.  
26 Regarding the Scopes trial: “After this demonstration in Tennessee it was no longer 
possible to doubt that the dogma of majority rule contains within it some sort of deep and 
destructive confusion.” Lippmann, “Why Should the Majority Rule?,” 399.  
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I do not mean to cast even the slightest reflection on a union of men to 
promote their self-interest. It would be futile to do so, because we may 
take it as certain that men will act to benefit themselves whenever they 
think they conveniently can. A political theory based on the expectation of 
self-denial and sacrifice by the run of men in any community would not be 
worth considering.27  
 
The idealization of majority rule promoted the fiction that one could intuit a 
“homogenous will out of a heterogeneous mass of desires.”28 Majority rule did not 
embody some intrinsic value anymore the outcome of an election – where less than half 
of the eligible voters cast ballots – expressed the popular will.29 It was naïve, Lippmann 
wrote, to suggest that, somehow, “the compounding of individual ignorances in masses of 
people can produce a continuous directing force in public affairs.”30 The false idol of 
majority rule was that the sum of individual opinions was not only greater but also 
infinitely wiser than its parts.  
Citizens recognized they were neither sovereign nor omnicompetent. “Listening 
to speeches, uttering opinions and voting do not, he finds, enable him to govern,” 
Lippmann wrote.31 The public, he claimed, shared his skepticism of majority rule.32 
“They have not believed whole-heartedly that democracy was safe for the world,” he 
wrote. “This unbelief is, I believe, an intuition that there is something lacking in the 
theory of democracy, that somewhere the doctrine of popular sovereignty as conceived 
                                                
27 Phantom Public, 101-102. 
28 Phantom Public, 38. 
29 “A vote is a promise of support. It is a way of saying: I am lined up with these men, on 
this side. I enlist with them. I will follow. I will buy. I will boycott. I will strike. I 
applaud. I jeer. The force I can exert is placed here, not there.” Phantom Public, 46-47. 
30 Phantom Public, 29. 
31 “He lives in a world which he cannot see, does not understand and is unable to direct.” 
Phantom Public, 4. 
32 “Most of us are for the people when we think the people are for us, and against them 
when they are not.” Walter Lippmann, “How can the People Rule?,” in The Essential 
Lippmann, 15. 
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by its apostles is inconsistent with essential facts of human experience.”33 Lippmann cited 
prohibitive measures against alcohol, birth control, and certain books as examples of 
movements that circumvented the public will. Americans signaled their mistrust in the 
soundness of majority rule, he maintained, through attempts to subdue it, such as 
propaganda and special interest groups, and efforts to mitigate its risks, such as enacting 
voting restrictions. “The American faith in democracy has always been accompanied by 
efforts to limit the action of the democracy.”34  
Original democratic theory, Lippmann argued, was conceived at a time when 
debatable issues were confined to a man’s knowable environment. As the population 
grew and relocated from small villages to large cities, the governors of public affairs 
grew more remote from the governed. The Great Society, however, was not analogous to 
an oversized village and could not be managed by village virtues. As Lippmann wrote 
during World War II, “The methods of the town meeting will not regulate the affairs of a 
great republic which embraces a continent, which is defending a hemisphere, and is 
involved in one of the great crises of history.”35 Government ruled in absentia; the notion 
that all men should have a voice in all affairs was no longer feasible.36 “The widening 
distance between the centers where decisions are taken and the places where the main 
work of the world is done,” he explained, “has undermined the discipline of public 
opinion upon which earlier theorists relied.”37  
33 Lippmann, “How can the People Rule?,” 15. 
34 Lippmann, “How can the People Rule?,” 14. 
35 Lippmann, “Everybody’s Business.”  
36 “They cannot take an interest in, they cannot make even the coarsest judgments about, 
and they will not act even in the most grossly partisan way on, all the questions arising 
daily in a complex and changing society.” Phantom Public, 115. 
37 Phantom Public, 171. 
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In his “Today and Tomorrow” column, Lippmann frequently addressed the 
problems raised as government grew increasingly responsive to an unreliable public 
opinion. During this period, he warned that government was facilitating its own undoing 
in ceding its authority to the public under the guise of majority rule. Reluctance to hazard 
going against public opinion rendered elected officials impotent: Government could not 
execute its duties “trying to make its decisions conform to the winds of opinion.”38 As 
Lippmann explained, “Effective government cannot be conducted by legislators and 
officials who, when a question is presented, ask themselves first and last, not what is the 
truth and which is the right and necessary course but ‘what does the Gallup poll say?’ and 
‘what does the fan mail say?’ and ‘how do the editors and commentators line up?’”39 He 
suggested instead that government leaders evaluate their decisions “by consulting other 
responsible men.”40 As for the public, it must be reminded that government officials were 
not elected “to perform errands for their constituents,” Lippmann wrote, “but to use their 
judgment freely, and freely to speak and act upon that judgment.”41 These views, 
however, were at odds with statements he made in The Phantom Public suggesting public 
officials were not beholden to public opinion.  
Government, in the long intervals between elections, is carried on by 
politicians, officeholders and influential men who make settlements with 
other politicians, officeholders and influential men. Nor in any exact and 
literal sense are those who conduct the daily business of government 
accountable after the fact to the great mass of the voters.42  
 
                                                
38 Walter Lippmann, “And Now Congress,” T&T, September 30, 1939.  
39 Lippmann, “Everybody’s Business.”  
40 Lippmann, “Everybody’s Business.”  
41 Walter Lippmann, “The Ideal of Representative Government,” T&T, May 17, 1932.  
42 Phantom Public, 31. 
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Neither of his contradictory takes, however, came close to the ideal of public action as 
Lippmann imagined it, one in which “the burden of carrying on the work of the 
world…lies not upon public opinion and not upon the government but on those who are 
responsibly concerned as agents in the affair.”43  
During this period, Lippmann revisited his theory of insiders versus outsiders. It 
was now better understood as agents versus bystanders: The ability to take action was the 
key distinction between the two groups. Agents were active participants in a specific 
event; everyone else was an outsider on that occasion. The role of agents and bystanders 
were not preordained. As issues changed and moved to the forefront, the groups were in 
constant flux; Tuesday’s agent could become Wednesday’s bystander. The mass public, 
however, was always a bystander. It could not take an active role in any circumstance. 
The public “can only reward or punish a result, accept of reject alternatives presented to 
them,” Lippmann explained. “They can say yes or no to something which has to be done, 
yes or no to a proposal.”44 In aligning democratic theory with an attainable ideal of public 
opinion, he “conceived public opinion to be, not the voice of God, nor the voice of 
society, but the voice of the interested spectators of action.”45 Perhaps to illustrate his 
point, Lippmann, who long ago rejected “the old democratic notion that any man can do 
almost any job,” now affirmed that he also rejected the aristocratic theory “that a 
sufficiently square peg will also fit a round hole.”46 Both theories, he maintained, 
misunderstood the nature of competence. “Men are not good,” he wrote, ‘but good for 
43 Phantom Public, 63. 
44 Phantom Public, 42. 
45 Phantom Public, 187. 
46 Drift and Mastery,15. Phantom Public, 140. 
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something.”47 It was a misreading of his intent, Lippmann insisted, to view insiders and 
outsiders – or agents and bystanders – as “the masterful few and the ignorant many.”48 
Action was reserved for men solely by their investment in the outcome of an event. “Only 
insiders can make decisions,” he wrote, “not because he is inherently a better man but 
because he is so placed that he can understand and can act.”49 Despite his insistence that 
this distinction was not a reflection on a man’s character, Lippmann, it seemed, could not 
help but follow that assertion with a statement that reeked of elitism, an accusation that 
had dogged him for years. “The outsider,” he continued, “is necessarily ignorant, usually 
irrelevant and often meddlesome, because he is trying to navigate the ship from dry 
land.”50  
To circumvent “ignorant meddling" by people who should by rights be 
bystanders, Lippmann proposed limiting public action by the criteria of two tests. “First. 
Is the rule defective? Second. How shall the agency be recognized which is most likely to 
mend it?” he wrote. “These are, I should maintain, the only two questions which the 
public needs to answer.”51 Outside of these parameters, action would rest exclusively 
with insiders. Lippmann’s proposal was a rejoinder to the notion that everyone should 
form an opinion on every issue. His theory, he explained, “economizes the attention of 
men as members of the public, and asks them to do as little as possible in matters where 
they can do nothing very well.”52 
47 Phantom Public, 140. 
48 Phantom Public, 139. 
49 Phantom Public, 140. 
50 Ibid. 
51 “They are the only questions which a member of the public can usefully concern 
himself with if he wished to avoid ignorant meddling.” Phantom Public, 98. 
52 Phantom Public, 189. 
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Lippmann’s views on the press during this period 
“The theory of a free press is that the truth will emerge from free reporting and free 
discussion, not that it will be presented perfectly and instantly in any one account.”53 
 
As his newspaper career flourished, Lippmann frequently extolled the virtues of 
the press. In speaking on the issue to various organizations, he generally opened with 
some self-deprecating remark acknowledging his views about newspapers might lack 
objectivity; after all, he demurred, he was “merely a commentator on the news.”54 Despite 
his professional experience, Lippmann was quick to point out that he was not an expert 
on the press. Such statements, he insisted, were no false modesty. “For heaven knows 
there is nothing modest about journalism as such,” he wrote, “least of all about the 
particular branch of it which I happen to practice.”55 In the introduction to a speech he 
made in 1935, Lippmann compared attempting to cover a topic as broad as the press to 
the hazards of addressing a topic “as complex and as contentious” as “the ladies.”56 What 
was true of some, he said, was not true of all, and, even then, not true of even some all of 
the time.  
There are ladies by courtesy, by charity, by stretching the definition. The same 
might be said of some publications which call themselves newspapers. I shall not 
pursue the analogy into all its possible ramifications, except to suggest that it is 
possible to believe in the importance of the press without liking or reading every 
newspaper just as it is possible to believe in women without loving or wishing to 
marry each and every one of them.57 
 
                                                
53 Walter Lippmann, “Notes on the Freedom of the Press,” T&T April 25, 1936. 
54 The real work, he insisted, was news reporting. Walter Lippmann, “The Press,” Vital 
Speeches of the Day 1, no. 12 (February 22, 1935), 363. 
55 Walter Lippmann, “Two Revolutions in the American Press,” Yale Review 20, no. 3 
(March 1931): 434. 
56 “Surely, if men can speak on a subject which is as complex and as contentious as that, 
with only hearsay and partial knowledge and a limited experience to inform them, a 
writer for the newspapers may venture to speak about the press.” Vital Speeches, 362. 
57 Vital Speeches, 362. 
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That statement provides a good overview of Lippmann’s views on the press 
during this period.  No longer did he consider it irredeemably flawed, as he had in Public 
Opinion. The press, he conceded, may not be perfect, but it was “by and large the most 
informative in the world.”58  Of course, he was one of those journalists whose work 
reflected that. 
This period begins just as Lippmann was establishing what would prove to be a 
long, successful career in newspapers. He made little mention of the press in The 
Phantom Public, aside from dismissively referring to the public as “commuters reading 
headlines” or “busy men reading newspapers for half an hour or so a day,” the 
implication being that “a reader of newspapers” was not well informed.59 This view, 
however, was more of a reflection on the public than it was of the press, as Lippmann 
repeatedly stated he considered thirty minutes a day insufficient for staying abreast of 
public affairs. His only other mention of the press in The Phantom Public was in likening 
the public to a “deaf spectator” who could find no relief for his bewildered state, in part, 
because “no newspaper reports his environment so that he can grasp it.”60 Again, this was 
not an explicit criticism of the press. Even if the press rigorously reported every detail of 
every event, the reader, as Lippmann detailed in Public Opinion, would not necessarily 
comprehend the news accurately. (This was assuming, of course, the reader was 
interested enough to read the news in the first place.) The Phantom Public was published 
after Lippmann officially took over the editorial page at the New York World; therefore, if 
58 Lippmann, “How can the People Rule?,” 15. 
59 Phantom Public, 62-63, 109. 
60 Phantom Public, 3-4. 
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his views on the press in that book seem ambiguous, it is perhaps worth noting that he 
completed the manuscript in the summer of 1923. As this period opened, his confidence 
in the press was soaring, 
In a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1925, 
Lippmann recounted arguing with a graduate student who suggested newspapers 
deliberately misinformed voters. When the student asserted that newspapers had a 
responsibility to report on every act of government, Lippmann moved in for the kill: 
Did it ever occur to you that there are several hundred thousand 
government employees, more Departments, Bureaus and Commissions 
than you can shake a stick at, not to mention forty-eight states, 3,000 
countries, no end of cities, at least 50 diplomatic missions, and that official 
acts are performed in all of them for several hours every day? Now 
assume that every one of these acts is reported to you every day in a 
newspaper, this ideal newspaper you seem to desire, which would be as 
thick as a telephone book and about as fascinating. Imagine yourself 
confronted with that newspaper. Would you read it for thirty minutes a 
day, for an hour, including the cross-word puzzle?61 
The notion that the press could and should exhaustively report each stirring of 
government activity failed to appreciate the realities of newsgathering, as well as the 
public’s appetite for such news. “This enormous indifference is reflected in the success of 
newspapers which make no pretense of dealing with public affairs,” Lippmann said. “It is 
reflected in the apparent loss of influence by the editorial page.”62 In the absence of 
industry standards dictating news selection and emphasis, editors and reporters relied on 
personal discretion to interpret events.63 As the press was “obstructed by an almost 
impenetrable censorship in all the critical quarters of the world,” this journalistic license 
61 Walter Lippmann, “Public Opinion” (address to the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors, 1925), 145. 
62 Lippmann, address to ASNE, 146. 
63 “Editors, orators, writers do their best to discern the significance of facts which happen 
to be available to them.” Lippmann, “The President,” T&T, April 19, 1941.  
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allowed reporters to paint a picture from the available information.64 The news, 
Lippmann explained, was a work of art, not a mirror to the world.65 Still, he would argue, 
“the newspapers do their honest and courageous best to report the facts.”66  
Lippmann’s favorable view of the press coincided with his joining the staff of a 
daily newspaper.67 Even though he had long worked in journalism, prior to this period 
Lippmann had criticized the press primarily as an outsider, his disdain directed at daily 
newspapers, particularly the New York Times.68 Now, as an insider among journalists, 
Lippmann rarely criticized the mainstream press.69 He disagreed with the Hutchins 
committee recommendation that the press should engage in mutual criticism.70 “Mutual 
criticism, like marital criticism, if it is publicly made, is too hard for mortal man to take,” 
Lippmann wrote. “The good critic should be an outsider.”71 
64 The press had no recourse except to make “partial judgments on insufficient evidence.”  
Lippmann, “The President.”  
65 Lippmann, address to ASNE, 145. 
66 Lippmann, “The President.”  
67 “Two Revolutions” was written the same year Lippmann joined the Herald Tribune. 
68 In a review of Liberty and the News, the NYT pushed back against his criticisms of the 
press, dismissing Lippmann as someone with little understanding of newspaper work. 
69 “I had fallen into the vulgar prejudice of assuming that only the performer can 
understand his art, whereas it is often the case that the critic understands the play better 
than the actor. For while the performer’s own account of his art is entitled to respect and 
consideration, it has no intrinsic authority and it is open to heavy discount in the light of 
our human propensity to justify our own actions in the past and our hopes in the future.” 
Lippmann, “Two Revolutions,” 433-434. 
70 The Hutchins committee, also known as The Commission on Freedom of the Press, 
was formed in 1943 and tasked with reporting on the state of American press. The 
committee issued a report in 1947 detailing its findings and suggesting reforms to 
improve the press. Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 94. 
71 “While vigorous criticism of the press is most necessary to the welfare of the press, it 
will have to come from those who are outside the press.” Walter Lippmann, “How is the 
Press To Be Criticized?,” (July 1947), repr., Nieman Reports 53/54, no. 4/1 (Winter 1999 
– Spring 2000).
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There are few current concerns of mankind on which my colleagues and I 
do not have something to say; yet the newspaper itself, which is our 
medium, almost certainly imposes unrealized presumptions, loyalties, and 
interests, and reservations, upon any newspaper man’s discussion of his 
own craft. The last word, therefore, must lie with the detached student, 
who can by imagination and sympathy and observation know all that we 
know without our entanglements.72  
While his outlook, in general, was positive, there was one subset of the press that 
held few charms for Lippmann: the tabloids. Yellow journalism, he frequently pointed 
out, undermined the progress and besmirched the reputation of the legitimate press. But 
Lippmann predicted that the tabloids would not endure: Much like the muckrakers during 
the progressive era, yellow journalism would exhaust itself in the pursuit of 
sensationalism and novelty.73 “They will experiment,” he wrote, “until at last they bring 
down upon themselves the wrath of the established community.”74 Mature readers, 
Lippmann maintained, valued reliable news. He saw this period as the dawning of a new 
age in news reporting: Educated readers and conscientious journalists, initially spurred by 
revulsion “at the orgy of lying which the war propaganda let loose,” had launched a 
revolution in journalism.75 This new journalism, he wrote, already was overtaking the 
tabloids, demonstrating “that the objective, orderly, and comprehensive presentation of 
news is a far more successful type of journalism to-day that the dramatic, disorderly, 
episodic type.”76 
72 Lippmann, “Two Revolutions,” 434. 
73 “When everything is dramatic, nothing after a while is dramatic,” he wrote. “When 
everything is highly spiced, nothing after a while has much flavor; when everything is 
new and startling, the human mind just ceases to be startled.” Lippmann, “Two 
Revolutions,” 438. 
74 Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 102. 
75 “The most impressive event of the last decade in the history of newspapers.” 
Lippmann, “Two Revolutions,” 439. 
76 Lippmann, “Two Revolutions,” 439. 
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When Lippmann wrote that the American press was the freest of any nation, 
owing to the widespread popular support it enjoyed, he credited an unlikely source for 
helping to advance that freedom – the tabloids. “This is the great service performed by 
what I have called the popular commercial press, otherwise known as yellow journalism, 
and in its latest and perhaps last manifestation as tabloid journalism,” he wrote. “It is the 
first politically independent press which the world has known.”77 Lippmann did, 
however, go on to clarify that rather than being truly free, the popular press was more 
akin to “a kind of freedmen’s press.”78 Having traded one type of external control for 
another, the press, free of government authority, was now indebted to its audience.79 To 
escape this condition, the press must make independence its highest goal; only then could 
it secure a lasting freedom. Lippmann noted that freedom of the press and independence 
of the press were secured by distinct sources, and while the two concepts were 
complementary, they should not be conflated. Freedom of the press was granted by the 
Constitution; independence was an achievement of the press.80 But independence was a 
relatively new condition, and Lippmann felt the battle to secure its legal rights was 
ongoing. “It will be won if it is won at all,” he wrote, “by newspaper men whose highest 
ambition in their profession is to get the news and state it correctly and print it 
fearlessly.”81 
It is perfectly possible to have a press which is legally free but it is not 
independent because it is the mouthpiece of parties, interests, cults. And 
experience shows, I believe, that unless among the newspapers of a country there 
                                                
77 Lippmann, “Two Revolutions,” 437. 
78 Lippmann, “Two Revolutions,” 436 - 437. 
79 “Thus this press, escaped from the tutelage of government, fell under the tutelage of the 
masses.” Lippmann, “Two Revolutions,” 436. 
80 Lippmann, “Notes on the Freedom of the Press.”  
81 Vital Speeches, 363. 
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are established newspapers of wide circulation which are predominantly 
independent, which are predominantly objective, which are predominantly 
disinterested in the presentation of news, the legal freedom of the press has no 
solid and enduring foundations.82 
In a departure from his previous view that newspapers had assumed the role once 
occupied by wartime censors, Lippmann now maintained that insiders exercised 
censorship as a means to “protect” outsiders from “subversive ideas.” He framed 
censorship as a conflict, simultaneously, of authority versus liberty, conservative versus 
liberal, and elites versus everyone else.83 In this iteration, insiders were members of the 
“privileged” class, men who enjoyed “amazing freedom of opinion,” the same men who 
supported denying that freedom to “unadjusted” outsiders.84 It was no coincidence, 
Lippmann asserted, that the degree of media regulation corresponded with the perceived 
intelligence and social class of its target audience.85 In general, print media was less 
regulated than visual media; mainstream newspapers and magazines were subject to less 
censorship than movies or the theater.86 Again, the tabloids were the exception. Despite 
being “consciously adapted to a low and hurried intelligence,” yellow journalism 
82 Vital Speeches, 363. 
83 “They are the reserves of conservatism from which are mobilized the legions of 
defense against the irregular forces of the outsiders.” “Battle Over Censorship,” 104-106. 
84 Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 104. 
85 It was “applied in proportion to the vividness, the directness, and the intelligibility of 
the medium which circulates the subversive idea.” Lippmann noted that movies were 
more heavily regulated than the theater, which attracted an older, wealthier, and more 
sophisticated crowd. Movies, the most popular commercial medium, attracted an 
audience of “the lowest and the most immature intelligence.” Lippmann, “Battle Over 
Censorship,” 100. The first talking moving picture premiered October 6, 1927. 
86 “Men are much less moved by what they read than by what they see, and literacy is a 
recent and uncertain accomplishment of the human race. The proprietors of the tabloids 
found this out a few years ago and it has been a very profitable discovery.” Lippmann, 
“Battle Over Censorship,” 101. 
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benefitted from a type of herd immunity against censorship.87 “Nevertheless,” Lippmann 
wrote, “they are suspect because, like the moving picture, they reach the suspect 
classes.”88 Suppression, he noted, was aimed almost exclusively toward the young, the 
poor, and other impressionable persons the insiders feared were susceptible to being 
“seduced by agitators.”89 “It is not the idea as such which the censor attacks, whether it be 
heresy or radicalism or obscenity,” Lippmann wrote. “He attacks the circulation of the 
idea among the classes which in his judgment are not to be trusted with the idea.”90 For 
all the obvious occupational hazards, Lippmann observed, the censor managed to perform 
his duties and yet somehow escaped with his morals intact.  
The censor exposes himself daily to every corrupting influence. They may 
in their unconscious minds come to doubt God, insult the flag, and despise 
chastity. But whatever the private consequences may be, outwardly the 
censors remain doubly convinced of the sanctity of the institution they are 
protecting.91  
Despite his criticism of the arbitrary enforcement of censorship and the aura of 
elitism surrounding suppression, Lippmann never suggested freedom of opinion should 
be absolute. He insisted this view put him in good company: All theories of liberty, he 
wrote, were related “to the specific needs of the man who preaches it.”92 His argument 
against absolute freedom of expression echoed his analysis of opinion formation in 
Public Opinion. 
87 Tabloids provided “vicarious satisfaction.” Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 101. 
88 Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 102. 
89 “They are not unconsciously loyal, and their impressions have to be controlled by the 
insiders who are intuitively right-minded.”  Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 104. 
90 Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 98. 
91 Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 98-99. 
92 Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 95. 
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The doctrinaires of liberty base their theory on the assumption that almost 
all men have the ability to weigh evidence and choose reasonably. 
Whether almost all men have the ability or not, they certainly do not use it. 
They are governed by their interests as they conceive them by consulting 
their feelings about them. The men who ever reach a conclusion which is 
contrary to their bias and their convenience are too few to make any 
important difference in the course of events.93 
Lippmann argued in Liberty and the News that untrue opinion should not enjoy 
protection under the First Amendment, a stance he maintained during this period. He did, 
however, offer a small concession to accommodate a more generous freedom of 
expression than he had previously endorsed: In exchange for tolerance, freedom of 
opinion should demand engagement. Opinion must be subject to confrontation. Lippmann 
considered debate an essential element of free speech, as confrontation was the likeliest 
method for uncovering the truth.94 “This is the virtue of liberty,” he wrote, “and the 
ground on which we may best justify our belief in it, that it tolerates error in order to 
serve the truth.”95 Because he still had little faith that the truth would spontaneously 
prevail in the marketplace of ideas, he remained amenable to regulating the speech of 
those of “who cannot or will not permit or maintain debate when it does not suit their 
purposes.”96 In contrast to his condemnation of censorship based on privilege, Lippmann 
sanctioned the regulation of media according to its ability to facilitate debate, although he 
neglected to acknowledge that his own approach – ranking media across a spectrum of 
justifiable regulation – corresponded precisely with the elitist media censorship 
93 Lippmann, “Battle Over Censorship,” 105. 
94 In facilitating confrontation, debate would reveal, if not the truth, then “the partisan and 
the advocate.” Phantom Public, 104. 
95 Walter Lippmann, “The Indispensible Opposition,” Atlantic Monthly, August 1939, 186. 
96 “Indispensible Opposition,” 186.  
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hierarchy.97 Newspapers came out on top using his measure as well.98 “The opportunity 
for debate is so considerable that discontent cannot grow to the point where under normal 
conditions there is any disposition to regulate the press,” Lippmann wrote, before issuing 
this caveat: “But when newspapers abuse their power by injuring people who have no 
means of replying, a disposition to regulate the press appears.”99 
Lippmann was vocal in his criticism of what he considered the press’s intrusion 
into private matters. He was adamant that liberty of the press should not trump an 
individual’s right to privacy. “The First Amendment forbids Congress to make laws 
abridging the freedom of the press,” he wrote, “but it does not guarantee to the press any 
other privilege or immunities which all citizens do not enjoy.” The press had an 
obligation to exercise its rights responsibly; freedom, he warned, was precarious when it 
infringed upon the liberty of others. “Thus a journalist who respects his own liberties will 
respect the liberties of others,” he wrote, “knowing that on any other terms his freedom 
will become a tyranny to his fellow men.”100 Lippmann felt that the press “grossly 
abused” the privacy of private and public individuals, creating an atmosphere where 
personal matters were exploited, commercialized and politicized “as a spectacle for the 
mob.”101 Citizens, he wrote, deserved protection, which he called “freedom from the 
                                                
97 Lippmann noted that the relationship between regulation and ability to foster debate 
extended beyond the press. The size of the U. S. House of Representatives hindered 
robust debate, therefore its rules limited debate. The structure of the Senate, however, 
was conducive to debate and its members enjoyed “almost absolute freedom of speech.” 
Lippmann, “Indispensible Opposition,” 186.  
98 As a medium, movies were not suited to debate. The radio format offered no guarantee 
an audience would hear both sides of a debate, and thus was subject to a degree of 
regulation. Lippmann, “Indispensible Opposition,” 232. 
99 Lippmann, “Indispensible Opposition,” 232. 
100 Walter Lippmann, “The Departure of the Lindberghs,” T&T, December 28, 1935. 
101 Lippmann, “Departure of the Lindberghs.”  
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press.”102 Lippmann argued that conventional remedies such as libel laws and editorial 
corrections did little to dissuade such intrusions. “Here,” he wrote, “press can print 
almost anything about anybody subject only to an extremely cumbersome, expensive, and 
embarrassing procedure for libel.”103 The attitude of the press and the public must 
change.104 Citizens must reject tawdry, sensational reporting and the legitimate “honest” 
press must crowd the marketplace with superior, ethical journalism in order “to make it 
dangerously unprofitable to prostitute the liberties of the press.”105 Only economic 
sanctions would deter the yellow press. 
The press must protect liberties for all to ensure its own freedoms, including “the 
capacity of all men to defend their rights before independent tribunals.”106 In the court of 
public opinion, men were “almost without protection against publicity.”107 Publishers – 
here, Lippmann singled out Hearst – could subject almost anyone “to any kind of torture 
and indignity and they have no recourse. They cannot answer him effectively. They 
cannot hold him to account.”108 This was a common complaint of government officials 
against the press. “(Politicians) have raised again the everlasting question of whether 
criticism is fair criticism,” Lippmann wrote, “whether unfavorable news reports are 
102 Lippmann to Robert M. Hutchins, no date, WLP. 
103 Walter Lippmann, “The Case at Ipswich Assizes,” T&T, October 29, 1936.  
104 “What with those who wish to be in the limelight at any cost, those who are afraid to 
stand up for rights, and those who have an infantile curiosity to learn the inside story of 
the inside story of the facts of life, there has gone out of the public taste a capacity to 
realize and to resent the treatment of personal lives as a spectacle for the mob.” 
Lippmann, “Departure of the Lindberghs.”  
105 Lippmann, “Departure of the Lindberghs.”  
106 “What are the rights of individuals as against unreasonable searches and seizures by 
the press in the field of their reputations and their private lives?” Lippmann, “Notes on 
the Freedom of the Press,”  
107 Lippmann referred to press as “all who control publicity.” “Case at Ipswich.” 
108 Lippmann, “Case at Ipswich.”  
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impartial news reports.”109 He suggested politicians’ charges of press bias would be taken 
more seriously if they ever suggested it at times when they received too much praise.110 
New York Times columnist James Reston recalled that policy makers did not consider 
Lippmann unfair, but still, “while they respect his experience, and admire his style and 
clarity, they are constantly complaining, as one of them remarked, that ‘he is often clearer 
than the truth.’”111 Because the goals of the press and political leaders were often at odds, 
friendships between the two were “invariably delicate and difficult” – and, according to 
Lippmann, inevitable.112 The President, his administration and congressmen “have the 
means for informing themselves on the realities” of events, issues and policies, he wrote, 
“that no one else, not even the most conscientious newspaper reporter, can possess.”113 
For obviously they must be close: correspondents must see much of the 
men they write about. Yet if they do, they soon find themselves compelled 
to choose between friendship and the ties of loyalty that come from 
companionship on the one hand, the stern truth on the other. This is the 
unpleasant side of newspaper work and I have never heard of any way of 
avoiding it. When a personal friend becomes a public man, a predicament 
soon arrives in which friendship and professional duty are at odds.114  
109 Lippmann acknowledged that it was “only human for officials to feel that unfavorable 
news and critical comment is biased, incompetent, and misleading. There is no denying 
the sincerity of their complaints and there is no use pretending that any newspaperman 
can regularly give the whole objective truth about all complicated and controverted 
questions.” Lippmann, “Notes on the Freedom of the Press.”  
110 “In the heat of a political battle very few can ever believe that their opponents are as 
honest as their supporters.” Ibid.  
111 Reston, “Mockingbird and the Taxicab,” 235 
112 Lippmann, “Notes on the Freedom of the Press.” 
113 Lippmann, “Everybody’s Business.”   
114 President Coolidge was the rare politician who successfully navigated this problem. 
“He achieved this miracle by conveying the general impression that he had never heard of 
the newspaper with which his guest was connected, and had never had anything printed 
in it called to his attention.” Lippmann, “Notes on the Freedom of the Press.”  
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Lippmann held the public relations profession in low regard, particularly 
government publicity bureaus which he described as “disliked” and, more pointedly, 
“distrusted.”115 He found the invasion of public affairs by public relations experts galling, 
especially when it invaded the Oval Office.116 “I call this conception of publicity 
inherently insincere,” he wrote, “because it assumes that the public aspect of a person can 
be fabricated by men who have specialized in the art of manipulating public opinion.”117 
Despite his recommendations to limit the role of public opinion in public affairs, 
Lippmann still believed government had a responsibility to inform the public of its 
decisions. He considered publicity professionals writing speeches for government 
officials a duplicitous practice, particularly when it involved presidential addresses.  
Assistance, he insisted, should be provided solely by advisers rather than being 
outsourced to "ghost writers lacking first hand knowledge of, and perhaps responsibility 
for, the things they helped the President put into words.”118 The public, Lippmann 
warned, readily sensed phoniness from politicians; an air of insincerity eroded the 
public’s confidence in its leaders. “No one can write an authentic speech for another 
man,” he argued. “It is as impossible as writing his love letters for him or saying his 
prayers for him.”119  
For it is much more important that he could be genuine, and it is infinitely 
more persuasive, than that he could be bright, clever, ingenious, 
entertaining, eloquent, or even grammatical. It is, moreover, a delusion, 
fostered into an inferiority complex among executives by professional 
                                                
115 Public relations, he wrote, was typical of other “shoddy” things “that flourished in that 
interval between the two wars.” Walter Lippmann, “Something Off My Chest,” T&T, 
March 14, 1942. 
116 Lippmann, “Something Off My Chest.” 
117 Lippmann, “Something Off My Chest.” 
118 Lippmann, “Something Off My Chest.”   
119 Lippmann, “Something Off My Chest.” 
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writers, that in an age of specialists some are called to act and some are 
called to find the right words for men of action to use. The truth is that 
anyone who knows what he is doing can say what he is doing, and anyone 
who knows what he thinks can say what he thinks. Those who cannot 
speak for themselves are, with very rare exceptions, not very sure of what 
they are doing and of what they mean. The sooner they are found out the 
better.120 
Lippmann knew what he thought. Having little faith in the capacity of the public 
to form well-reasoned opinions, he used his platform as the country’s most distinguished 
political columnist to influence his vast readership. His views carried great weight with 
policy makers as well. Coincidentally, perhaps, his estimation of the press rose 
dramatically during this period. The final chapter of his career would be equally 
dramatic: Lippmann, who we first encountered as an idealistic progressive boy wonder, 
will transition into a nostalgic conservative elder statesman of the press. 
120 Lippmann, “Something Off My Chest.” 
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PART II; CHAPTER FIVE  
1952-1971 
Where mass opinion dominates the government, there is a morbid 
derangement of the true functions of power. 
– Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy
Walter Lippmann was a remarkably prolific journalist and author. He enjoyed a 
singularly impressive career as a syndicated columnist and a political philosopher. As he 
embarked on the final period of his career, Lippmann showed no signs of slowing down 
in either regard. Nor did he turn away from the issues of the press and public opinion he 
had puzzled over for so long. Amid the upheaval of the Korean conflict and the Vietnam 
War, the spectacle of the Army-McCarthy hearings, and the turbulence of the civil rights 
era, Lippmann advocated a return to the democratic ideals of the Founding Fathers. 
Just as the theories he debuted in Public Opinion distanced him from his pre-war 
ideals, Lippmann now retreated from many of the views he expressed in that classic 
work. He had always been conflicted, to some extent, about the proper role consent of the 
governed should play in a government by consent. Having grown alarmed at the 
“enfeebling” effect of public opinion on the executive and legislative branches, 
Lippmann insisted during this period that public opinion should have no voice in crucial 
government decisions. Having reached the pinnacle of his career, a summit of 
consummate establishment respectability in which he was almost an institution unto 
himself, he now thought the press had come close to achieving the democratic ideal. In 
fact, all of his hope for democracy was vested in the press, or, more exactly, newspapers.  
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In some ways, this final period was one of rejuvenation for Lippmann. In his 
seventies, the dean of American journalism joined a new news outlet, debuted on a new 
medium and won over a new audience. At the age of 74, after 32 years at the New York 
Herald Tribune, Lippmann moved his syndicated “Today and Tomorrow” column to the 
Washington Post on January 1, 1963. He wrote the first of his bi-weekly articles for 
Newsweek magazine that same month.1 Between July 7, 1960 and February 22, 1965, 
Lippmann took part in a series of seven highly rated appearances on CBS Reports. He 
published three books on foreign affairs and Essays in the Public Philosophy (1955), a 
book about natural law and democracy. An elder statesman of the press, Lippmann was 
feted, his work celebrated, throughout these last years.2 He won two special category 
Pulitzer Prizes: in 1958, for Editorial Comment; and in 1962, for Distinguished Reporting 
on International Affairs. In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson bestowed upon Lippmann 
the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor.  
In his farewell “Today and Tomorrow” column, which ran on May 25, 1967, 
Lippmann wrote that he was ready to say goodbye to “the necessity of knowing, day in 
and day out, what the blood pressure is at the White House and who said what and who 
saw whom and who is listened to and who is not listened to.”3 Lippmann died at a 
nursing home on Park Avenue in New York on December 14, 1974. He was 85 years old. 
He left behind an unfinished book he had started writing a few years earlier; it’s subject, 
the ungovernability of man.  
1 Lippmann’s final article for Newsweek was published January 11, 1971. 
2 Steel writes that Lippmann was considered "one of the shining ornaments of the 
Kennedy administration…he enjoyed a participation and an influence he had not known 
since his World War I days with Newton Baker and Colonel House." Steel, 524. 
3 Walter Lippmann, “Personal Explanation,” T&T, May 25, 1967. 
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Throughout his career, Lippmann was always contemplating the ungovernability 
of man and other inherent difficulties of the democratic system. He announced in his June 
18, 1951 “Today and Tomorrow” column he was taking a leave from his duties at the 
New York Herald Tribune to ponder the “perennial issues of the human condition.”4 
Lippmann explained he needed a fresh perspective as he resumed work on a book he first 
started in 1938. “I have now been writing these articles on current events for twenty 
years, and…anyone who has been that long in the boiler room of the ship had better come 
up on deck for a breath of fresh air and a look at the horizon,” he wrote.5 That book, 
Essays in the Public Philosophy, revealed his gloomy view of democracy: The enormous 
influence of public opinion over government had triggered the “catastrophic decline of 
Western society.”6 In order to halt that decline, he wrote, it would be necessary to restore 
“the public philosophy of civility,” based on natural law.  
Except on the premise of this philosophy, it is impossible to reach 
intelligible and workable conceptions of popular election, majority rule, 
representative assemblies, free speech, loyalty, property, corporations and 
voluntary associations. The founders of these institutions, which the 
recently enfranchised democracies have inherited, were all of them 
adherents of some one of the various schools of natural law.7  
 
In this final period of the evolution of Lippmann’s views on the press and public 
opinion, the progressive idealist morphed into a nostalgic traditionalist.  
                                                
4 Walter Lippmann, “Total War and Coexistence, I,” T&T, June 18, 1951.  
5 “So I have gone off to the country, leaving unanswered the editor’s question – which 
was whether, the times being so critical, it is right to turn away even for a few months 
from the news of the day to certain of the perennial issues of the human condition.” 
Lippmann, “Total War and Coexistence, I.”  
6 Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), 15. 
7 Lippmann, Essays, 101. 
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Charges that he had abandoned liberalism and adopted anti-democratic views 
were the two most frequent and consistent criticisms leveled at Lippmann.8 He addressed 
both accusations early on in Essays in the Public Philosophy. “Perhaps, before going any 
further, I should say that I am a liberal democrat and have no wish to disenfranchise my 
fellow citizens,” Lippmann wrote. “My hope is that both liberty and democracy can be 
preserved before the one destroys the other.”9 The book was not well received by his 
peers. Even as his career was being celebrated, he encountered opposition for his views. 
After that, although he continued to write critically about the state of public affairs, he 
softened his tone considerably, as he did in 1960, when Lippmann reaffirmed his 
confidence in American democracy in an article for Life magazine.11 “The ultimate ends 
are fixed,” he declared. “They are lasting and they are not disputed. The nation is 
dedicated to freedom. It is dedicated to the rights of man and to government with the 
consent of the governed.”12  
Lippmann’s views on public opinion during this period 
“No more than the kings before them should the people be hedged with divinity.”13 
Lippmann’s views on public opinion during this period exposed the conflicts in 
his thinking as he attempted to reconcile his idealistic hopes for democracy with his 
8 Starting in the 1930s when he joined the conservative New York Herald Tribune.  
9 Lippmann, Essays, 13. 
11 When asked if democracy was outdated, Lippmann replied, “No, I don’t think so…I am 
not a pessimist about this problem, although I’ve written quite a lot about the faults of 
democracy.” The Columbia Broadcasting System, Conversations with Walter Lippmann 
(Boston: Little, Brown) August 11, 1960 interview with Howard K. Smith, 15. 
12 Walter Lippmann, “The Country is Waiting for Another Innovator,” Life, June 20, 
1960, 114. 
13 Lippmann, Essays, 13 – 14. 
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pragmatic assessment of contemporary society. Although at heart he was a champion of 
democracy, Lippmann was never comfortable with the public’s role in public affairs. In 
Public Opinion and The Phantom Public, he challenged two foundations of democratic 
theory – the ideals of the sovereign citizen and majority rule – yet in 1952 he conceded 
the democratic experiment had thus far been successful. “There has as yet been no other 
country in the history of the world,” Lippmann wrote, “where so many people, so diverse 
in their origins and in their interests, have on so vast a territory governed themselves so 
long and preserved their freedom.”14 Still, his writing during this period was filled with 
contradictory statements as Lippmann continued wrestling with the dilemmas of 
democracy. Try as he did – at times – to project a democratically optimistic viewpoint, 
his growing concerns about public opinion reached full bloom. “There is no public 
criterion of the true and the false, of the right and the wrong,” he wrote, “beyond that 
which a preponderant mass of voters, consumers, readers and listeners happen at the 
moment to be supposed to want.”15 In his view, the effect of public opinion on public 
affairs was dangerously out of kilter.  
There has developed in this century a functional derangement of the 
relationship between the mass of people and the government. The people 
have acquired power which they are incapable of exercising, and the 
governments they elect have lost powers which they must recover if they 
are to govern.16  
Lippmann’s writing danced between various positions throughout this period, 
choreographed by the movement of events. His “Today and Tomorrow” columns, being 
topical, tended to convey a more optimistic outlook than his books, which took a more 
14 Walter Lippmann, “The Election Explained,” T&T, November 3, 1952.  
15 Lippmann, Essays, 114. 
16 Lippmann, Essays, 14. 
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contemplative view of the issues. For example, although Lippmann wrote in his 
syndicated newspaper column that the electoral process was an “enormous virtue” of the 
system, he questioned those virtues in Essays in the Public Philosophy.17 Elected 
officials, at the mercy of the voters, “have no sure tenure,” he wrote. “They are in effect 
perpetual office seekers, always on trial for their political lives.”18 The public, he 
explained, held latent veto power over politicians; politicians, therefore, were moved 
more by opinion polls than the public interest.19 Lippmann warned that democracy was 
vulnerable when politicians lacked the courage to go against ill-informed public opinion 
and exercise their best judgment.20 He clarified the distinction between public opinion 
and the public interest. “The public interest may be presumed to be what men would 
choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently.”21 
This, however, was not the case, as Lippmann revealed in Public Opinion: Voters 
were self-centered and self-interested.22 “In ordinary circumstances voters cannot be 
expected to transcend their particular, localized and self-regarding opinions,” he wrote. 
“In their circumstances, which as private persons they cannot readily surmount, the voters 
are most likely to suppose that whatever seems obviously good to them must be good for 
                                                
17 “We have developed out of our experience a process by which the conflicts and 
diversities of sections, of classes and sects are assuaged and mollified, are purged and 
cooled, so that the nation can live with them and the government be carried on.” 
Lippmann, “The Election Explained.” 
18 Lippmann, Essays, 26. 
19 Lippmann, Essays, 49. 
20 Lippmann, Essays, 18. 
21 Lippmann, Essays, 42. 
22 “The People, as an aggregate of voters, have diverse, conflicting self-centered interests 
and opinions. A plurality of them cannot be counted upon to represent the corporate 
nation.” Lippmann, Essays, 38. 
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the country, and good in the sight of God.”23 Any claim that the interests of a prevailing 
plurality of the voters approximated the public interest was misguided.24 “The crucial 
problem of modern democracy,” Lippmann wrote, “arises from the fact that this 
assumption is false.”25 He also called into question the validity of opinion polls, echoing 
his view, from the first period of the evolution of his views, that mass opinion did not 
reveal mass wisdom.26 “The Gallup polls are reports of what people are thinking,” he 
wrote. “But that a plurality of the people sampled in the poll think one way has no 
bearing upon whether it is sound public policy…the statistical sum of their opinions is 
not the final verdict on an issue. It is, rather, the beginning of the argument.”27  
The negative affect of public opinion on public policy was exacerbated when 
passions were inflamed, particularly during times of war. 
When public opinion has been inattentive or not vehemently aroused, 
responsible officials have often been able to circumvent extremist popular 
opinions and to wheedle their way towards moderation and good sense. In 
the crises, however, democratic officials – over and above their own 
propensity to err – have been compelled to make the big mistakes that 
public opinion has insisted upon. Even the greatest men have not been able 
to turn back the massive tides of opinion and sentiment.28  
23 Lippmann, Essays, 41. 
24 Lippmann, Essays, 34. 
25 Lippmann, Essays, 32. 
26 “Our experience with mass elections in the twentieth century compels us, I think, to the 
contrary conclusion: that public opinion becomes less realistic as the mass to whom 
information must be conveyed, and arguments must be addressed, grows larger and more 
heterogeneous.” Lippmann, Essays, 39. 
27 Lippmann, Essays, 41-42. 
28 Lippmann, Essays, 24. 
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The same “paroxysms of hatred” necessary to rally public support for war also 
served as an obstacle to public acceptance of the compromises necessary for peace 
negotiations.29 Lippmann insisted the public share the blame for the “grave errors” the 
country committed in the name of war and peace.30 “We must adopt the habit of thinking 
as plainly about the sovereign people as we do about the politicians they elect,” he wrote. 
“It will not do to think poorly of the politicians and to talk with bated breath about the 
voters.”31 
The public had neither the experience nor the knowledge to weigh in on strategic 
and diplomatic decisions. That necessary knowledge, Lippmann wrote, “cannot be had by 
glancing at newspapers, listening to snatches of radio comment, watching politicians 
perform on television.”32 The problem, as he had repeatedly pointed out over the years, 
was that the public did not pay enough attention to the news. But, as he discovered during 
WWI, even diligently following a story would not necessarily uncover the truth. 
Moreover, when the decision is critical and urgent, the public will not be 
told the whole truth….When distant and unfamiliar and complex things are 
communicated to great masses of people, the truth suffers a considerable 
and often a radical distortion. The complex is made over into the simple, the 
hypothetical into the dogmatic, and the relative into the absolute. Even 
when there is no deliberate distortion by censorship and propaganda, which 
is unlikely in time of war, the public opinion of the masses cannot be 
counted upon to apprehend regularly and promptly the reality of things. 
There is an inherent tendency in opinion to feed upon rumors excited by our 
own wishes and fears.33 
29 “Once again the people were drugged by the propaganda.” Lippmann, Essays, 23-24. 
30 Lippmann, Essays, 13 – 14. 
31 Lippmann, Essays, 14. 
32 Lippmann, Essays, 25. 
33 Lippmann, Essays, 25. 
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Public opinion was not only uninformed and irrational, but often, by the time it 
coalesced, Lippmann contended, irrelevant. “The movement of opinion is slower than the 
movement of events,” he wrote. “Just because they are mass opinions there is an inertia 
in them. It takes much longer to change many minds than to change a few. It takes time to 
inform and to persuade and to arouse large scattered varied multitudes of persons.”34 
Lippmann argued politicians were hamstrung by the slow pace of public opinion. The 
tempo of the political environment inhibited elected officials, despite their knowledge of 
a situation, from speaking out. “The general rule is that a democratic politician had better 
not be right too soon,” he wrote. “Very often the penalty is political death. It is much 
safer to keep in step with the parade of opinion than to try to keep up with the swifter 
movement of events.”35 
Although he wrote about the virtue of the electoral process in 1952, Lippmann 
had low expectations for the 1952 Congress; his only solace was “the very faint and, 
perhaps, fatuous hope that more and more will realize, assisted by the press and radio, 
that the biggest news anyone could make would be good news.”36 He suggested any 
member of the legislative branch who was serious about rehabilitating his poor approval 
ratings would do well to emulate the example of their more esteemed colleagues rather 
than chasing after public opinion. “The best way to be popular,” Lippmann wrote, “is not 
to be, in the strict and refined sense of the old word, a slobberer over the public 
interest.”37 To this end, he evaluated a presidents’ leadership via the optics of how they 
                                                
34 Lippmann, Essays, 20. 
35 Lippmann, Essays, 26. 
36 Walter Lippmann, “The Usurpers,” T&T, January 17, 1952. 
37 Lippmann, “The Usurpers.”  
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dealt with public opinion – whether they followed, led, or manipulated it. He noted that 
although John F. Kennedy enjoyed tremendous personal popularity, the President 
struggled to communicate his vision to the nation, which led to difficulties implementing 
his agenda. Lippmann diagnosed Kennedy’s weakness as caring too much about public 
opinion: “He does not want to be unpopular anywhere – anywhere—with anyone; and I 
think that a public leader, at times, has to get into struggles where somebody gets a 
bloody nose.”38 In contrast, Lippmann praised Lyndon Johnson’s instinct for molding 
public sentiment.39 President Johnson, he noted approvingly, had an insider’s knack for 
building consensus. “He doesn’t have to be taught it.”40  
Here, again, Lippmann’s views revealed inconsistencies. Despite his endorsement 
of Johnson’s consensus-building style of governing, Lippmann still maintained elites 
were the most important audience for leaders to woo. To be successful, he said, a 
president need not articulate his vision to the masses, but to that subset of people who 
carried out the business of public affairs. “What you must lead in a country are the best of 
the country and they will carry it down,” Lippmann said. “There’s no use of the President 
trying to talk down to a fellow who can just about read and write.”41 Catering to the 
“lowest common denominator” was a risky campaign strategy. The danger lay in 
alienating those “who really make opinion and decide elections,” he said. “They don’t 
want to be talked down to.”42 In some instances, Lippmann argued, the government was 
                                                
38 Conversations with Walter Lippmann, May 1, 1963 interview, 146. 
39 Walter Lippmann, “The Principle of the Great Society,” Newsweek, January 18, 1965, 13. 
40 Conversations with Walter Lippmann, February 22, 1965 interview, 223. 
41 “He must talk to the people who teach the man to read and write.” Conversations with 
Walter Lippmann, August 11, 1960 interview, 16-17. 
42 Conversations with Walter Lippmann, April 8, 1964 interview, 185-186. 
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justified in withholding information that might help the public better judge public affairs. 
In one of his CBS interviews, he defended President Johnson for not being more 
forthcoming about the situation in Vietnam. “Well, I think he’s in a very difficult 
position,” Lippmann told CBS news commentator Eric Sevareid. “An irresponsible 
journalist can tell the truth, but if the President of the United States tells it, morale will 
probably collapse in Saigon… So he’s in a jam and I don’t think he can explain the war 
more.”43 
Lippmann continued to endorse the role of experts in public affairs, explaining 
that the task of uncovering facts and judging their relevance required “specialized inquiry 
by trained minds.”44 “If there is no impartial tribunal to find the facts,” he wrote, “then 
there can be no such thing as an enlightened public opinion.”45 The role of the press, then, 
was to interpret this information for the newspaper reading public, as Lippmann did in his 
role as a syndicated columnist. “The raw news has, therefore, to be processed in order to 
make it intelligible,” he wrote. “For if it is not intelligible, it will not be interesting. And 
if it is not interesting, it will not be read.”47 Fact, as he now defined it, was conditional 
rather than absolute, shaped by a number of actors in the democratic process. 
All news given out by government is more or less managed. It always has 
been and always will be…it’s very naïve, its very innocent to pretend that 
news isn’t managed, and to talk as if there were such a thing as one 
absolutely perfect true version of the facts and that’s the only fact – there is 
no such thing. All the news gets managed by the White House, by the 
Defense Department, by the managing editor, by the correspondent, by the 
columnist, by everybody.48 
43 Conversations with Walter Lippmann, February 22, 1965 interview, 201. 
44 Walter Lippmann, “‘Fact Finding’ and Steel,” T&T, July 21, 1959. 
45 Lippmann, “’Fact Finding’ and Steel.”  
47 Lippmann, “Birthday Address,” 25. 
48 Conversations with Walter Lippmann, May 1, 1963, 146-147. 
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This view stands as one of his sharpest breaks from the past. Whereas he once 
accused the press of complicity in the manufacture of consent during WWI, he now 
asserted that the press provided “an essential service” in securing the consent of the 
governed.49 Where he once lamented government by newspaper, Lippmann now 
proclaimed the press the key to facilitating government by consent.  
Lippmann’s views on the press during this period 
“If the country is to be governed with the consent of the governed, then the 
governed must arrive at opinions about what their governors want them to 
consent to.”50 
In writing about the media during this period, Lippmann maintained a clear 
distinction between television and newspapers, referring to broadcasting as “the mass 
media of entertainment,” and reserving the term “the press” exclusively for the print news 
media. There was “an essential and radical difference,” he insisted, between the two 
mediums.51 While Lippmann recognized television as “the most powerful medium of 
mass communication,” he remained wary of its influence, skeptical of its exercise of that 
power, and suspicious of its motives.52 “There is a development of the mass media of 
communication,” he wrote, “which, because it marks a revolution in popular education 
and in the presentation of information, and in the very nature of debate and deliberation, 
49 Lippmann, “Birthday Address,” 26. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Walter Lippmann, “Television and Press,” T&T, March 3, 1960. 
52 Walter Lippmann, “The Administration and TV,” T&T, January 5, 1960. He frequently 
used the word “evil” to describe the television. 
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is affecting profoundly the assumptions of the older democratic system.”53 His faith in the 
press, however, had never been stronger. Newspapers, he insisted, were the antidote to 
broadcast; the press fulfilled a vital function in democracy.54 Journalists, he said, “make it 
our business to find out what is going on under the surface and beyond the horizon, to 
infer, to deduce, to imagine and to guess, what is going on inside, and what this meant 
yesterday, and what it could mean tomorrow.”55 Although his thesis in Public Opinion 
was that too much was expected of the press, in this final period of the evolution of his 
views, Lippmann concluded the press had achieved the democratic ideal. In Public 
Opinion, he questioned the assumption “that the press should do spontaneously for us 
what primitive democracy imagined each of us could do spontaneously for himself, that 
every day and twice a day it will present us with a true picture of all the outer world in 
which we are interested.”57 He now assured his cohorts that as Washington 
correspondents “we do what every sovereign citizen is supposed to do, but has not the 
time or the interest to do for himself.”58  
While Lippmann’s views on the press remained consistently reverential 
throughout these later years, the media landscape changed dramatically, particularly with 
the rising popularity of television. Lippmann, however, did not regularly watch TV.59 He 
                                                
53 “Nobody, it is fair to say, not the most sensitive and knowing among us, is as yet able 
to realize fully what all these changes mean and to point out…with sufficient clarity how 
this country should deal with them.” Lippmann, “The Country is Waiting,” 114.  
54 “People can’t live on television.” Brandon, “A Talk with Walter Lippmann.” 
55 Lippmann, “Birthday Address,” 26. 
57 Public Opinion, 174-175. 
58 Lippmann, “Birthday Address,” 26. 
59 Lippmann was caught unaware regarding Korean invasion. After that, he directed his 
assistant to begin monitoring television and radio news, since he paid little attention to 
either. Steel, 470. 
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was critical of the quality of television programming, accusing networks of pandering to 
lowbrow audiences and, in the process, debasing the public taste in pursuit of advertising 
revenue. “The great offense of the television industry is that it is misusing a superb 
scientific achievement,” he wrote, “monopolizing the air at the expense of effective news 
reporting, good art, and civilized entertainment.”60 This he blamed on economic 
incentives, which sounded as if he expected broadcast to provide a public service.61 In 
Public Opinion, however, Lippmann maintained it was unfair to hold the press to the 
same ethical standards as non-profit institutions; newspapers, he had argued, were 
commercial enterprises. Also in that book, he complained that the press was undervalued 
because the public did not feel it should have to pay for the news; he now denounced 
broadcast television for its dependency on advertisers. “While television is supposed to 
be ‘free,’” Lippmann wrote, “it has in fact become the creature, the servant, and indeed 
the prostitute of merchandising.”62 (Before Lippmann agreed to appear on CBS, he 
demanded final say over which commercials would air during his interview.63) 
Lippmann thought media should be regulated according to its ability to facilitate 
debate. Just as when he disavowed passion as a legitimate component of public opinion, 
he understood the disinterested observer was no match for the passionate partisan.65  
60 Walter Lippmann, “The TV Problem,” T&T, October 27, 1959. 
61 “We must not forget that the economic interest of the companies, which require bigger 
audiences for bigger revenues, is against any serious and lasting effect to use television 
for its highest possibilities.” Lippmann, “The Administration and TV.”  
62 Lippmann, “The TV Problem.”  
63 Steel, 516-517. 
65 “In the end what men most ardently desire is to suppress those who disagree with them 
and, therefore, stand in the way of the realization of their desires.” Lippmann, Essays, 130. 
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The more rational is overcome by the less rational, and the opinions that 
will prevail will be those which are held most ardently by those with the 
most passionate will. For that reason the freedom to speak can never be 
maintained by objecting to interference with the liberty of the press, of 
printing, of broadcasting, of the screen. It can be maintained only by 
promoting debate.66  
 
He considered it reasonable television programming should be subject to 
government regulation, because, unlike print media, broadcast networks held a “virtual 
monopoly of a whole medium of communication.”67 He took exception when the 
president of CBS suggested television stations were akin to newspapers and should 
therefore enjoy the same freedoms as the press. “This is a thoroughly false argument,” 
Lippmann wrote. “A television station is not like a newspaper. It is like a printing press. 
It is a mechanical medium of communication.”68 Newspapers, he argued, facilitated 
debate so efficiently, regulation was rarely necessary. Television, however, in his 
opinion, was not conducive to direct confrontation, cross-examination or rebuttal, 
essential elements of debate.69 Therefore, Lippmann considered government oversight of 
the broadcast industry both necessary and reasonable.70 His contention that beneficial 
debate required an actively engaged audience failed to address the same potential for 
newspaper readers to tune out; for his argument to make sense, every newspaper reader 
                                                
66 Lippmann, Essays, 129-130. 
67 Lippmann, “Television and Press.” 
68 Lippmann, “Television and Press.”  
69 “The men who broadcast the news and comment upon the news cannot...be challenged 
by one of their listeners and compelled then and there to verify their statements of facts 
and to re-argue their inferences from the facts.” Lippmann, Essays, 129. 
70 Lippmann, Essays, 130. 
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would have to read every article, every editorial and every letter to the editor in each and 
every edition.71  
In the previous period, Lippmann mocked the “guardians of morality” for their 
belief that certain susceptible classes, primarily the young, must be protected from 
subversive ideas. He now blamed television for the rise in violent youth crime. Lippmann 
saw no conflict between his support for the First Amendment and his calls for censoring 
broadcast telecasts. 
Censorship is no doubt a clumsy and usually a stupid and self-defeating 
remedy for such evils. But a continual exposure of a generation to the 
commercial exploitation of the enjoyment of violence and cruelty is one 
way to corrode the foundation of a civilized society. For my own part, 
believing as I do in freedom of speech and thought, I see no objection in 
principle to censorship of mass entertainment of the young.72 
In another surprising departure from his earlier views, Lippmann seemed to 
validate the original democratic theorists’ concept of the ideal citizen, at least in regard to 
freedom of speech. “The free political institutions of the Western world,” he wrote, “were 
conceived and established by men who believed that honest reflection on the common 
experience of mankind would always cause men to come to the same ultimate 
conclusions.”73 Although this view contradicted his analysis in Public Opinion regarding 
71 “The dialectic process for finding truth works best when the same audience hears all 
sides of the disputation.” Lippmann, Essays, 128. 
72 “Until some more refined way is worked out of controlling this evil thing, the risks to 
our liberties are, I believe, decidedly less than the risks of unmanageable violence.” 
Walter Lippmann, “The Young Criminals,” T&T, Sept. 7, 1954. 
73 Lippmann, Essays, 134. A remarkable statement, when you consider Lippmann’s views 
on public opinion for the last thirty years had been based on his insistence that the 
founding fathers misjudged not only man’s capacity but his very willingness to self-
govern. As he wrote in Public Opinion, “We misunderstand the limited nature of news, 
the illimitable complexity of society; we overestimate our own endurance, public spirit, 
and all-around competence.” Lippmann, Public Opinion, 196. 
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the inherent distortions of opinion formation, he now employed the same line of 
reasoning in his argument against “unfettered” expression. Freedom of speech, he wrote, 
“can be justified, applied, regulated in a plural society only be adhering to the postulate 
that there is a rational order of things in which it is possible, by sincere inquiry and 
rational debate, to distinguish the true and the false, the right and the wrong.”74 Although 
his justification had changed, Lippmann did not alter his proposal for elevating public 
discourse. In keeping with his nostalgia for traditional society, however, he now invoked 
an ancient philosophical theory to advocate for formal methods of debate.75 “In the public 
philosophy, freedom of speech is conceived as the means to a confrontation of opinion – 
as in a Socratic dialogue, in a schoolmen’s disputation, in the critiques of scientists and 
savants, in a court of law, in a representative assembly, in an open forum.”76 He 
maintained a soldier’s vigilance against the encroaching enemies of the truth: 
propaganda, publicity, sophistry and pandering. His first rule of engagement was that 
speech must be bound by evidence. “Nobody can justify in principle, much less in 
practice,” he wrote, “a claim that there exists an unrestricted right of anyone to utter 
anything he likes at any time he chooses.”77 There was no constitutional right to lie, 
Lippmann argued, and there should be no protection for untrue speech.78 “It may be poor  
                                                
74 Lippmann, Essays, 134. 
75 “Because the dialectical debate is a procedure for attaining moral and political truth, the 
right to speak is protected by a willingness to debate.” Lippmann, Essays, 127. 
76 Lippmann, Essays, 127. 
77 “There can, for example, be no right, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, to cry “Fire” in a 
crowded theater.” Lippmann, Essays, 124. 
78 “It is sophistry to pretend that in a free country a man has some of inalienable or 
constitutional right to deceive his fellow men.” Lippmann, Essays, 128. 
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policy to have too many laws which encourage litigation about matters of opinion,” he 
wrote. “But, in principle, there can be no immunity for lying in any of its protean 
forms.”79  
According to Lippmann, regulation was necessary to maintain order and decency. 
In the absence of debate, “the unrestricted right to speak will unloose so many 
propagandists, procurers, and panderers upon the public,” he wrote, “that sooner or later 
in self-defense the people will turn to the censors to protect them.”80 An unrestricted 
freedom of speech, he argued, undermined public order and degraded public opinion. 
Free speech exercised without boundaries led to chaos; tolerance devoid of consequences 
encouraged “silliness, baseness, and deception.”81 Freedom of expression existed to serve 
the public interest.82 In this way, Lippmann cast himself as an unorthodox champion of 
free speech: Standards and regulation would, he maintained, strengthen rather than 
weaken First Amendment rights.83 Censorship, in Lippmann’s view, was necessary to 
secure liberty.84  
Lippmann was skeptical television networks would self-regulate, as he felt they 
had little incentive to make meaningful improvements. “The companies,” he wrote, “will 
79 While he intimated that legal remedies could effectively curtail untrue speech, 
Lippmann failed to specify how that should be carried out. Lippmann, Essays, 128. 
80 Lippmann, Essays, 129. 
81 Lippmann, Essays, 126.  
82 “The right to speak freely is one of the necessary means to the attainment of the truth. 
That, and not the subjective pleasure of utterance, is why freedom is a necessity in the 
good society.” Lippmann, Essays, 125. 
83 “Once confrontation in debate is no longer necessary, the toleration of all opinions 
leads to intolerance.” Lippmann, Essays, 130. 
84 “Freedom of speech, separated from its essential principle, leads through a short 
transitional chaos to the destruction of freedom of speech.” Lippmann, Essays, 130. 
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do as much but not much more than the traffic will bear.”85 Despite his focused criticisms 
of broadcast, he offered only vague suggestions as to how the networks should be 
regulated. “My own view is that it is not possible to define in the laws and regulations 
standards of quality which can be enforced,” he wrote.86 His sole recommendation was 
not increased policing of programming, but increased competition in the form of a 
publicly funded, non-commercial network.87 Lippmann’s statement on the matter also 
reflected his rationale for devoting his career to unraveling the issues of democracy: 
“There are a lot of other things that need to be done besides producing wealth and selling 
goods,” Lippmann wrote. “One of them is to inform, instruct, and entertain the people 
through the media of mass communications. And among these media there must be some 
which aim not at popularity and profit but at excellence and the good life.”88  
85 Lippmann, “The Administration and TV.”  
86 “We could not and should not have the government run the whole television industry.”
Lippmann, Essays, 130.   
87 “No doubt, this network would not attract the largest mass audience. But if it enlisted 
the great talents which are available…it might well attract an audience which made up in 
influence what it lacked in numbers. The force of a good example is a great force, and 
should not be underrated.” Lippmann, “The TV Problem.” 
88 Lippmann, “The TV Problem.” 
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CONCLUSION 
Wisdom remains; theory passes. 
— Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics 
Lippmann’s views on the press and public opinion in the final period of this study 
are, in fundamental ways, not so different from where he began. Many of his original 
ideas are refined rather than unrecognizable at the end. The seeds of ideas planted at the 
start of his career grew as Lippmann wrestled with essential questions of American 
democracy. He was always conflicted about the power and the legitimacy of public 
opinion. Even when he wrote approvingly of the consent of the governed, Lippmann 
acknowledged public opinion was irrational; he always considered some people unfit to 
participate in democracy. He always felt the educated minority and the connected insiders 
– in other words, the “elite” – were the ones whose views mattered most. From the
beginning, Lippmann understood the power of the press to shape opinions. He always 
recognized journalism as the vital link between the public and the government, although 
at times he questioned whether the press could fulfill its duty. In each period of the 
evolution of his views, Lippmann vacillated between assigning blame for democracy’s 
inadequacies to either the press or public opinion. And at times one side of the other 
would win out.   
These shifts in Lippmann’s thinking occurred as he puzzled over how to optimize 
the dynamic three-way relationship between the press, the public and democracy. He 
wanted democracy to work. He never suggested an alternative system, even as he 
challenged democratic ideals. He never believed democracy performed as well as it  
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could. Yet Lippmann’s evolving views involved more than just dispassionate analysis. 
Just as he concluded public opinion was skewed by personal experience and self-interest, 
so was his view of its functioning in democracy over time. 
In the first period, Lippmann’s writing heralded the progressive view that access 
to facts would lead to a reasoned public opinion. In those days, journalists spoke of 
publicity as a social good, a means of educating the public. Facts were considered 
wholesome.1 Immediately following World War I, Lippmann’s advocacy for facts 
assumed a sense of urgency, although his reasons had changed. After his wartime 
experiences with the manufacture of consent, he now considered facts an absolute 
necessity. In Liberty and the News, he insisted the press should stick to fact-based 
reporting to atone for its role in spreading administration propaganda during the war. In 
Public Opinion, his thinking switched strikingly. He concluded facts were not enough to 
overcome stereotypes and individual biases and prejudices; opinions were self-centered, 
and reporters were prone to the same subjective distortions. As he launched his 
newspaper career, Lippmann’s views evolved again: He now touted the press as a 
solution to the problem, writing that, despite the obstacles journalists faced, they did their 
best to inform the public. While Lippmann never stopped advocating for fact as the basis 
for informed public discourse, he later granted that straight facts, at least in journalism, 
could be boring and unappetizing.2 Lippmann built on this idea, arguing that because the 
1 “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” Louis D. Brandeis, “What Publicity 
Can Do,” Harper’s Weekly, December 20, 1913, 10. 
2 “Mr. Lippmann is still absolutist enough to assume that there is, somewhere, a Fact with 
a capital F, a fact, in other words that can be so completely and accurately stated as to 
have for every individual, at any time and under all circumstances, one and only one 
meaning. He is willing to admit, however, that such a fact would never be news.” Robert 
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public had little interest in unadorned facts, the press had to write in a way that engaged 
the public, selecting and interpreting facts, a view that reflected groups like the Hutchins 
Commission. Lippmann acknowledged that although no one could ever know all of the 
facts, journalists tried to put events into context to help readers make sense of the world. 
Although he was an apostle of political theorist Graham Wallas’s idea of human-
centered politics, Lippmann was always wary of the public’s participation in public 
affairs. He felt the uneducated, the uninformed, and the uninterested diminished the value 
of public opinion. Immediately following WWI, he blamed the press for a woefully 
misinformed public, still believing factual news would result in rational opinions. 
Lippmann moved away from that position in Public Opinion, arguing that men were too 
self-centered and self-interested to achieve the democratic ideal of the sovereign citizen. 
Yet, at the end of that book, he held back. Apart from his recommendation to establish a 
bureau of experts to manage government information, in the final pages of Public 
Opinion Lippmann offered only platitudes. He could not bring himself to go over the 
cliff: Lippmann could not fully condemn the system. Yet, with his next book, he did not 
steer away from the conclusions he was driving toward in Public Opinion. In The 
Phantom Public, Lippmann attacked the wisdom of majority rule and questioned the 
public’s proper role in public affairs. He went even further with Essays in the Public 
Philosophy, claiming elected officials’ subservience to public opinion was destroying 
Western democracy; it was a mistake, he insisted, to conflate public opinion with the 
public interest. At each stage of his evolution, as public opinion seemed to exert a greater 
influence on elected officials, Lippmann’s arguments to rein it in grew more vigorous. 
E. Park, review of Public Opinion by Walter Lippmann, American Journal of Sociology 
28, no.2 (September 1922), 233. 
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Walter Lippmann was a creature of the times he lived in. His writing, as people 
like Steel and Soderlund have observed, reflected the nation’s changing social, economic 
and cultural currents. The evolution of his views on the press and public opinion occurred 
in response to those changes. He was a product of progressivism, coming of age just as 
interest in public opinion was on the rise. His concerns about securing democracy and 
creating a better society aligned with the leading liberal views of that time. As a 
progressive, Lippmann believed information was the key to an enlightened public 
opinion.3 Like many journalists, he was eager to volunteer his talents in support of 
President Wilson’s war aims. During the war, he wrote propaganda, but revisited his 
views once he realized the extent to which the government and the press manipulated 
public opinion. After the war, Lippmann turned his focus to protecting the sources of 
opinion. As the issues facing the country became more complex, it alarmed him that 
political leaders sailed in the direction of public opinion rather than charting a course 
based on their own judgment.  
Lippmann’s inner motivations are more difficult to plumb. He was, to a large 
extent, a very private man. We do know Lippmann was highly ambitious and enjoyed 
having close proximity to power. He campaigned tirelessly to secure an official role 
assisting the Wilson administration’s war efforts and, over the decades, advised 
candidates of both parties during their campaigns. Aside from his propaganda work, 
however, Lippmann’s role in events took place almost exclusively behind the scenes. 
3 “More intensely and systematically than ever before in the history of American thought, 
the gospel of intelligence as the key to social progress was preached by American 
liberalism during the first quarter of the twentieth century.” Kaplan, 347. 
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From his early days at the New Republic, Lippmann was an “insider” with access 
to information from well-placed sources, many of whom he counted among his friends. 
He was courted by policy makers who recognized his status not only as a journalist but as 
a “moulder of public opinion.”4  His “Today and Tomorrow” syndicated column, read by 
as many as 12 million people in U.S. and abroad, gave him a platform to influence the 
public and, in turn, affect government policy. Lippmann, however, did not disclose his 
relationships when writing about issues or public officials.5 This was where his personal 
correspondence proved most helpful, if not fully revealing of the famously guarded 
Lippmann. As he once wrote in a letter to a colleague, “There is a twilight zone where it 
is hard to say whether a man is acting executively on his opinions or merely acting to 
influence the opinion of some one else who is acting executively.”6  
Lippmann’s career trajectory influenced his views on the press. He entered the 
newspaper world somewhat tentatively, just as he completed the manuscript for Public 
Opinion. His initial contract at the New York World was for a trial period. He was 
promoted to editor of the editorial page just prior to the publication of The Phantom 
Public. In his final career move to the Washington Post, after a series of wildly popular 
television interviews on CBS, Lippmann commanded a high salary, a chauffeur, and a 
New York City apartment.7 His valuation of the mainstream print media correlated with 
his ascendancy as a newspaper columnist: Lippmann rarely criticized the press after he  
4 Frank M. Firor, president, Adolf Gobel, Inc., to Lippmann, August 26, 1929, WLP. 
5 “His immersion in politics while holding forth as a disinterested observer did not taint 
him as hypocritical or false. Everyone understood that he was Walter Lippmann.” 
Blumenthal, afterword in Liberty and the News, 63-64. 
6 Lippmann to Charles Merz, n.d. 
7 Steel, 539. 
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joined the New York Herald Tribune in 1931. While he routinely denounced 
sensationalism, whether in tabloids or on network television, his most stinging critiques 
of the press, Liberty and the News and “A Test of the News,” were written prior to his 
joining the staff of a daily newspaper. As a result of those two pieces of work, along with 
Public Opinion, many have conflated Lippmann’s emphasis on facts with the journalistic 
standard of objectivity. Readers who consider only a single text or period of his evolution 
can easily misjudge his views.8 Beginning with his tenure at the New York World, 
Lippmann portrayed newspaper journalists as earnest defenders of the public trust. Before 
long, he was suggesting easing the dividing line between editorial opinion and hard news; 
a degree of subjectivity in reporting, Lippmann insisted, was necessary to piece the raw 
facts into a recognizable picture. The role of the press, as he noted, had evolved with the 
changing times over the course of his career.  
The job has changed and grown in my own lifetime, and if I had to sum up 
in one sentence what has happened, it would be that the Washington 
correspondent has had to teach himself to be not only a recorder of facts 
and a chronicler of events, but also – if I may put it that way – to be a 
writer of notes and essays in contemporary history. Nobody invented or 
consciously proposed this development of the newspaper business. It has 
been brought about gradually by trial and error in the course of a 
generation.9  
8 This quote, for example, suggests the writer is unfamiliar with Lippmann’s behind the 
scenes involvement in various administrations: “If Walter Lippmann were alive, he 
probably would wonder how the media had come to find themselves in league with 
government, helping shape public attitudes rather than questioning, examining and 
describing the real world to the fullest extent possible.” Bill Kovach, “Too Much 
Opinion, at the Expense of Fact,” New York Times, September 13, 1989. 
9 Lippmann, “Birthday Address,” 24. 
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Ultimately, Lippmann thought the press could not only fulfill its duty to inform, 
but also that it could achieve the democratic ideal as envisioned by the Founding Fathers. 
The press could make democracy work. As journalists, Lippmann told the crowd 
gathered to fete him on his seventieth birthday, “we do what every sovereign citizen is 
supposed to do, but has not the time or the interest to do for himself. This is our job.”10 
He had less faith in the public. From the start of his career, Lippmann advocated for the 
elite to make decisions. This was the audience he courted.  
By considering Walter Lippmann’s writing on the press and public opinion over 
the entirety of his career we gain a fuller understanding of his core motivations. His 
views evolved as he considered the perennial problems of democracy from different 
angles, in different circumstances. In each period, he was acting on the best evidence at 
the time. In an important way, Lippmann’s changing views on the press and public 
opinion, his personal predilections and his professional self-interest, were an expression 
of the very problems he identified as beleaguering democracy. These problems grew 
more complex during his lifetime. The Wilson administration, which Lippmann had 
supported, ushered in a much larger, more powerful government owing to its progressive 
agenda and the need to fight a total war in Europe. Propaganda, which was not 
considered a pejorative prior to WWI, became an integral part of government, facilitated 
by proliferate opinion-moulding expertise and more potent communication tools. When 
Lippmann joined the New Republic in 1914, no one used the term “spin.” By the time of 
his death, in 1974, the government communications apparatus was inflating body counts 
in Vietnam. Journalists faced mounting doubts, about not only the consent of the 
10 Lippmann, “Birthday Address,” 26. 
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governed, but also the utility of the conventions they used to inform the public. That 
Lippmann could not satisfactorily resolve these matters, despite his sustained efforts, was 
inevitable, a testament to the intractability of the issues at the heart of the democratic 
experiment. Walter Lippmann’s greatness lies in his commitment to confronting these 
questions, the force of his expression and at times the brilliance with which he 
highlighted these issues, making them more clear and urgent.  
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